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SUMMARY 
This work covering the period 1795 to 1948 has four main features. It 
firstly examines the role of international and domestic factors in 
determining regional interaction and cooperation between South Africa 
and Chile. Secondly, it documents the whims of the international 
community, and more particularly the world powers which was a 
motivating factor in Chilean and South African politics, economy, society 
and their bilateral relations. Thirdly it covers the period when Britain rose 
to world power status. Eventually, this gave way to her displacement by 
Germany and then ultimately the United States. This study's fourth feature 
is that it marks the first documented account of direct contact between the 
inhabitants at the Cape of Good Hope and Latin America. The period ends 
with a cornerstone in the history of South African-Chilean bilateral relations 
when direct diplomatic and consular relations were established by both 
South Africa and Chile in May 1948. 
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PREFACE 
The period 1795 to 1948 has been selected for this thesis as it has four 
notable features. Firstly, the role of international and domestic factors in 
determining regional interaction and cooperation between South Africa 
and Chile. Secondly, during this period of study, the one external factor 
that was decisive in Chilean and South African politics, economy, society 
and their bilateral relations was the whims of the international community, 
and more particularly the world powers. Thirdly, the period marks Britain's 
rise to world power.status meaning her dominance of the centre stage for 
a time. This gave way to her displacement by Germany and then ultimately 
the United States. Fourthly, this study marks the first documented account 
of direct contact between the inhabitants at the Cape of Good Hope and 
Latin America. The period ends with a cornerstone in the history of South 
African-Chilean bilateral relations when direct diplomatic and consular 
relations were established by both South Africa and Chile in May 1948. 
The thesis is comprised of eight chapters plus an introduction and 
conclusion. The introduction deals with the historiography of the topic 
under investigation. Chapter One deals with the interplay of international 
and domestic factors between South Africa and Chile between 1867 and 
1948. It begins with the appointment of the first Chilean honorary consul in 
Cape Town and culminates with the establishment of direct diplomatic 
relations between Chile and South Africa in May 1948. The next three 
chapters deal with the impact of the Industrial Revolution and Napoleonic 
Wars at the end of the eighteenth century until the rise of the United 
States, the outbreak of World War II and its aftermath. Each of these 
chapters deals with the effects on Chile, South Africa and their bilateral 
relations. Chapters Five and Seven address the role played by significant 
Chilean personalities and political parties in determining Chile's general 
relations with the international community and her particular dealings 
Chile's relations with South Africa from 1830 until 1948. In tandem, 
Chapters Six and Eight deal with the role played by South African 
personalities in influencing or determining South Africa's international 
v 
relations along with her bilateral relations with Chile during the same 
period. The Introduction and Conclusion discuss the difference between 
my approach and that of D.C.M. Platt. His works, The Cinderella Service: 
British Consuls since 1825, and a chapter entitled "Trade Competition in 
the Regions of Recent Settlement" in Decline and Recovery in Britain's 
Overseas Trade, 1873-1914 are the only works that have mentioned Chile 
and South Africa in the same focus. The first work recounts the 
experiences and problems of British officials serving in diplomatic and 
consulai posts during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Plait's 
second contribution deals with Britain's trade interests and relations with 
countries such as South Africa, Australia, Canada and the republics of the 
Southern Cone of Latin America, such as Chile between 1873 and 1914. 
My thesis closes by highlighting how South Africa and Chile responded to 
the trials and tribu:ations presented by the international community, the 
whims of the super powers and the effect of these factors on their bilateral 
relations. 
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INTRODUCTION: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN 
CHILE AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1795-1948. 
This investigation into relations between Chile and South Africa is the first 
of its kind. The general field of research into South African diplomatic 
relations with other nations is on the whole meagre. This opinion has been 
expressed by Christopher Saunders in 1990. He states that: "Professional 
historians have paid South Africa's foreign policy little attention." 1 South 
African literary works on foreign relations have tended to concentrate on 
affairs with African nations, like J. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: 
Apartheid Power in Southern Africa;2 Namibian-Angolan affairs, such as 
R.S. Jaster, South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy,3 and W. 
Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, 1966-1988;4 the impact of 
apartheid on relations, such as D. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of 
Isolation: South Africa's Foreign Policy Making; 5 and involvements with 
Britain, such as C.W. de Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South 
African Republics, 1848-1872;6 and P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind 
Diplomacy. Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980.7 
Meanwhile, S. Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations between 
the Two World Wars. The League of Nations Dimension, has concentrated 
on South Africa's foreign relations with other countries through 
involvement with the League of Nations.8 
1C. Sau!lders, 'The History of South Africa's Foreign Policy,' South African Historical 
Journal (henceforth SAHJ), 23, (1990), p. 14 7. 
2 J. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa. 
3 R.S. Jaster, South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy. 
4 W. Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, 1966-1988. 
5 D. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South Africa's Foreign Policy Making. 
6 C.W. de Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-1872. 
7 P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy. Background Influences on British External 
Policy, 1865-1980. 
8S. Pienaar, South Africa and the International Relations between the Two World Wars. 
The League of Nations dimension. 
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During the 1990s, just prior to and particularly after South Africa's first 
democratic election in April 1994, a new wave of interest in South Africa's 
relations with other nations was crested. From the registers of researchers 
compiled annually by the National Archives of South Africa, there has 
been a growing trend of research into South Africa's relations with other 
nations in Europe, Africa, Australia, Asia and the Americas.9 However, 
most of these researchers are foreigners. Out of twenty-four registered 
researchers, nineteen are foreigners. Their topics involve investigations 
into South Africa's relations with nations like France, Australia, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Britain, Finland, Russia, United States, Argentina, 
Brazil, Botswana, Belgian Congo and Nigeria.10 
The subject of South Africa's relations with Latin America has more 
recently become of interest. It is however, nevertheless still on a rather 
small scale in comparison to other topics of research. During the 1980s, 
Anthony Leysens wrote a thesis entitled South Africa's Relations with Latin 
America (1966-1988). 11 However, it is safe to say that until the 1990s only 
brief investigations were done by South African scholars into Latin 
America. The general topic investigated was the migration of Boers to 
Argentina, with the works of D. Fig and C.J. Scheepers being good 
examples.12 More contemporary matters on South Africa-Latin American 
relations are being addressed by the Unisa Centre for Latin American 
Studies and the Society for Latin America Studies. The society attempts to 
bridge this gap by means of regular seminars and bi-annual publications. 
9Rearchers' Register compiled by the National Archives of South Africa, from 13 March 
1991 to the present. 
101bid. 
11 A.J. Leysens, 'South Africa's Relations with Latin America (1966-1988),' M.A. Thesis, 
University of Stellenbosch, 1991. 
120. Fig, 'Proletarianisation or Patagonia: Reassessing the rationale for the Afrikaner 
Migration to Argentina, 1902-1906,' Social Dynamics, 17, 2, (1991), pp. 103-125; 
C.J. Scheepers Strydom, Die Afrikaner en Sy Kultuur. Deel V: Afrikaners in die Vreemde, 
(ed. P.W. Grobblaar). 
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The most recent trend in interest from South Africa on Latin America can 
be attributed to the eventual realisation of the similarities in historical 
' 
social, economic and political affairs of the two regions. 13 In a SABC 
Television documentary presented by Freek Robinson on 3 December 
1996, the similarities between the Chile, Argentina and South Africa in 
terms of their oppressive governments and periods of isolation from the 
international community were highlighted and discussed.14 
On the Chilean side, similarly there is a lack of literature on Chile's 
relations with Africa. Scholars investigating Chile's foreign history have 
tended to concentrate rather on her relations with the United States of 
America, Britain, but on a much smaller scale with European countries and 
neighbouring Latin American nations. Studies into Chile-United States 
relations and U.S.-Latin American relations have been conducted by 
several scholars such as H.C. Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the 
United States;15 H. Munoz and C. Portales, Elusive Friendship;16 M.J. 
Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States relations with Argentina 
and Chile during World War //;17 J.S. Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World 
War I and US Policy toward Latin America;18 and S. de Madariaga, Latin 
America between the Eagle and the Bear.19 Meanwhile, examples of the 
literature that exists on Chile's relations with Britain during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries are Ricardo Couyoumdjian, Chile y Gran Bretana 
13South African Broadcasting Corporation Television (henceforth SABC TV) Programme 
Title: Afrikaans Fokus, Documentary Title: Latin American Countries: Chile and Buenos 
Aires, Name of Presenter: Freek Robinson, 3 December 1996. 
141bid. 
15 H.C. Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the United States. 
16 H. Munoz and C. Portales, Elusive Friendship. 
17 M.J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and 
Chile during World War JI. 
18 J.S. Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World War I and US Policy toward Latin America. 
19 S. de Madariaga, Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear. 
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durante la primera Guerra Mundial y pos guerra 1914-1921;20 and Harold 
Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896: Balmaceda 
and North.21 General works on Britain's involvement with Latin America, in 
which Chile is mentioned, during the same period can be located. A few of 
the authors worth mentioning are D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British 
Trade, 1806-1914;22 Rory Miller (ed.), Britain and Latin America in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries; 23 V. Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), Britain 
and Latin America: a changing relationship; 24 and D.C.M. Platt, Business 
Imperialism, 1840-1930: an inquiry based on British experience in Latin 
America.25 
Platt is the only author to date who has mentioned the diplomatic and 
commercial roles that Britain played in both Latin America and Africa, in 
general, and in Chile and South Africa, in particular. In Platt's work entitled 
The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825 he gives a detailed 
analysis of the duties, functions and difficulties which British consuls 
experienced in different areas of the world while serving Britain. The first 
half of his writing describes the conditions of the British Consular Service 
in the nineteenth century, while the second part deals with similar issues 
experienced by officials in the twentieth century. The topics which are 
addressed include the functions, recruitment of officials, training received, 
service conditions, salaries, promotions and incentives, and the 
relationship between the consuls and the Foreign Office. Platt describes 
the experiences of the different British officials who occupied posts on 
20 R. Couyoumdjian, Chile y Gran Bretana durante la primera Guerra Mundial y pos 
guerra 1914-1921. 
21 H. Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896: Balmaceda and North. 
22 D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914. 
23 R. Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. 
24 V. Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship. 
25 D.C.M. Platt, Business Imperialism, 1840-1930: An inquiry based on British experience 
in Latin America. 
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behalf of the British Government around the world during these periods.26 
It is in this context that South Africa and Chile are mentioned. However, 
Platt does not deal with the subject of Chilean and South African consular 
officials in sufficient depth. The main reason for this is that his work deals 
specifically with the experiences and problems of the British Consular 
Service in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In contrast, my work 
concentrates on the bilateral diplomatic and consular relations which Chile 
and South Africa had during the period 1795 to 1948. 
Furthermore, Platt in a chapter in the combined work by D.C.M. Platt, 
A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie entitled Decline and Recovery in Britain's 
Overseas Trade, 1873-1914, has once again mentioned South Africa and 
Chile together. In a chapter entitled "Trade Competition in the Regions of 
Recent Settlement," he expands on British trade experiences and 
expansion with the "regions of recent settlement" which refers to the 
European settlements on the world's temperate latitudes namely Canada, 
Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa, Australia, Chi!e and Brazil.27 This 
chapter deals with the shift in Britain's trade interests towards the 
Southern Cone of Latin America, South Africa and Australia, once her 
trade commitments to India, the United States of America and Continental 
Europe began to decline between the period 1873 and 1914.28 My work 
also differs from this other one of Plait's as it covers dealings specifically 
between Chile and South Africa in the context of the changing world power 
among Britain, Germany and the United States of America during the 
period 1795 to 1948. I have also addressed in great detail the external and 
internal factors in both Chile and South Africa which affected and 
influenced their bilateral relations. As there is no systematic treatment of 
26 O.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825. 
270.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas 
Trade, 1873-1914, p. 91. 
28 Ibid., pp. 91-129. 
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the broader historical issues involved in Chilean-South African relations. 
This is one of the gaps which my thesis tries to fill. 
Very little literature exists on relations between Latin America and the 
African continent. However, one example which should be borne inmind is 
Frederick Cooper's, The Confronting Historical Paradigm: Peasants, 
Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America.29 
Furthermore, there seems to be no literary work that concentrates solely 
on Chile's relations or involvements with the African continent. Thus, the 
primary purpose of this thesis is to attempt to breach an area of study that 
appears to have been neglected. The perspective of this thesis has been 
shaped from primary material located at various South African archival 
institutions. The author acknowledges that a similar investigation deserves 
to be conducted from the Chilean perspective as well. Another aim of the 
thesis is to illustrate the political, social and economic similarities of both 
Chile and South Africa, and encourage both countries to look beyond their 
borders to the non-European nations and forge stronger diplomatic 
relations with them. 
Since February 1990, there has been a growing tendency by South 
Africa's chief political parties, those being the National Party and the 
African National Congress, to establish and renew diplomatic and 
economic relations with other nations. These ties have not only been 
developed and strengthened in the African continent but in the Americas 
Europe and Asia too. 
Between 23 and 29 August 1993, F.W. de Klerk, former South African 
State President, and several top South African businessmen, visited four 
Latin American countries. The businessmen who accompanied the 
president were amongst others, Lesley Boyd, Deputy Chairman of Anglo 
American; Gray Mayde, Gengold; Willem de Kok, Chief Executive Director 
29 F. Cooper, The Confronting Historical Paradigm: Peasants,' Labor, and the Capitalist 
World System in Africa and Latin America. 
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of Premier Foods; and Chris Leisewitz, Managing Director of Credit 
Guarantee Insurance Corporation. The four countries visited were Chile, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.3° From newspaper articles in the 
Citizen and Pretoria News, it appears that this visit was an attempt to 
extend the attainment of regional cooperation to across the Southern 
Atlantic Ocean to South America.31 Willem Mouton, spokesperson for the 
South African embassy in Chile said that the "President's visit would help 
explore new forms of economic cooperation. "32 F.W. de Klerk was the first 
South African head of state to visit these four South American countries in 
an official capacity. This thrust into South America has economic and 
diplomatic implications for the southern hemisphere. 
According to Johan von Gernet, former South African diplomat to South 
America in the late 1980s, the continent of South America has generated 
much interest amongst South African businesses, such as the mining 
giants like Anglo American and De Beers who have realised that there 
exist plenty of untapped resources. These entrepreneurs are eager to 
create favourable economic conditions and agreements to work with the 
South American nations.33 This viewpoint was not only emphasized by this 
Foreign Affairs official, but has formed the backbone for several SABC TV 
documentaries produced by South Africans on South America.34 On 27 
February 1997, during the South African Broadcasting Centre (SABC) TV 
programme Good Morning South Africa an interview was conducted with 
the visiting Chilean Minister of Public Works, Dr. Ricardo Largos. The 
Chilean Minister's chief reason for visiting South African was to encourage 
3
°Citizen, 23-30 August 1993. 
31 /bid. 
Pretoria News, 23-27 August 1993. 
32Citizen, 24 August 1993. 
330pinion expressed by Johan van Gernet, South African Diplomat, 20 October 1997. 
34SABC TV, Programme: Afrikaans Fokus, Documentary Title: Emergence of Brazil as 
one of the Strongest Countries in the Southern Hemisphere, Presenter: Freek Robinson, 
Date: 26 November 1996. 
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the South African private sector to become involved in the Chilean 
exportation industry.35 As is evident from the above it is clear that there is 
a definite interest between several of the South American nations, like 
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and. Brazil, and South Africa for the 
development of stronger commercial and diplomatic relations. 
As can be seen on the world map on p. 9, the geographical locations of 
Chile and South Africa are far from the main world economic centres of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, those being Britain, North Western 
Europe and United States, and lately Japan. Chile is a country that is 
situated between the Andes and the Pacific Ocean. It extends from Tierra 
del Fuego in the southernmost tip of South America to Tacna in the 
Atacama Desert in the north. The area from Antafogasta to Arica became 
part of Chile after 1886 when Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia in the War 
of the Pacific (1879-1886). Similarly South Africa occupies the area from 
the Cape of Good Hope in the south to the Limpopo River in the north. 
Between the 1850s and 1910, South Africa was comprised of four 
separate territories, those being the Cape Colony, Natal Colony, the 
Orange Free State and South African Republic (Transvaal). Each of these 
areas had separate foreign policies. In 1910 when the Union of South 
Africa came into being these four territories became one country. 
Very little research has been done on the subject of regional interaction 
and cooperation between South Africa and Latin American nations. For 
the purpose of this thesis the author has chosen to concentrate on 
relations between South Africa and Chile from 1795 to 1948. During this 
period, the impact and effect of international and domestic factors played a 
significant role in determining their bilateral relations. Actually, although it 
goes far beyond our time span this trend continued to define their bilateral 
relations from 1948 until 1997. Between 1795 and 1948 the one external 
factor which was a decisive element in Chilean and South African politics, 
35SABC TV, Programme: Good Morning South Africa, Title: Chile and Argentina: Growth 
of the Chilean Economy, Studio Guest: Ricardo Largos, Date: 27 February 1997. 
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economy and society, and in their bilateral relations, was Britain. However, 
the other world powers increasingly Germany and the United States of 
America, also influenced relations between Chile and South Africa. The 
author will focus on the effect and impact which Britain, Germany and the 
United States of America had on Chile and South Africa, during this 
period. The study ends in May 1948 when Stephanus Francios du Toil 
opened the first South African Legation in Santiago and Jose Serrano 
Palma was officially recognised as the Chilean Charge d' Affaires and a 
Chilean Legation was opened in Cape Town. 
10 
Australia I\, 
World map. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE AND SOUTH 
AFRICA, 1867-1948. AN OVERVIEW. 
Chilean consuls were established in the Cape Colony and later in the 
Union of South Africa between 1867 and 1948. They complied with the 
duties and functions determined by Britain and her European counterparts 
after the Napoleonic Wars and known since 1815 as the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations. Their functions were primarily to 
protect the interests of their country, Chile, and to further the development 
of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the two 
nations. They were also responsible for the supervision and inspection of 
naval vessels registered in Chile to ensure that they complied with Chilean 
laws and regulations.1 In accordance with the 1815 Vienna Convention 
and Britain's 1825 Canning Consular Act, Britain was allowed, with 
permission from the Chilean Government, to establish consular posts for 
Chile in South Africa and did so, after a long wait, from 1867 to 1942. 
British honorary consuls were established in an effort to give diplomatic 
recognition to other countries but also to slash the expenditure of the 
Foreign Office.2 Consuls can be defined as "agents of commGrce in a 
foreign land" and Latin American consuls acted as agents for the 
expansion of British trade. 3 Such personnel were often honorary consuls 
and businessmen who were from the receiving state such as the Cape 
Colony and later the Union of South Africa. Unlike career consuls who 
devoted their full time to the consular office, the honorary consuls only 
devoted a portion of their time to it and had other employment too.4 In the 
nineteenth century these Chilean consuls who were appointed by Britain 
1 M.J. Gamboa, Elements of Diplomatic and Consular Practice. A Glossary, pp. 67-68. 
2 D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825, pp. 2-3. 
3 Ibid., p. 5. 
4J. Barratt, 'The Development of Foreign Affairs,' in D. Worrall (ed.), Government and 
Politics, pp. 430-344. 
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received their salaries from Chile.5 The Chilean consuls appointed to serve 
in South Africa and the periods in which they served coincided with the 
international, domestic, political and economic factors prevailing at the 
time. 
* * * * * 
The first honorary Chilean Consuls in the Cape Colony were established in 
August 1867 at the height of the Conservative Government under the 
leadership of Jose Perez. As readers will see in Chapter Four, the 
Conservative Government respected the wishes of the Chilean bourgeois 
class and chose to maintain good relations with Britain and her colonies. 
This was one of the reasons why Chile wanted and got the establishment 
of a Chilean honorary consul in the Cape Colony. Secondly, enthralled by 
the discovery of diamonds near the Orange River in 1867, and convinced 
that this was the rock on which the "future success of South Africa would 
be built, "6 Britain encouraged her trading partners to establish direct ties 
with the Cape Colony. From 1868 onwards, numerous countries, such as 
the United States, Germany, Italy, Austria, Venezuela, Uruguay and Peru, 
joined the ranks of forerunners France, Portugal, Brazil and Belgium who 
already had diplomatic relations with the Cape Colony. 7 Between 1867 
5 Ibid., p. 16. 
6 D.H. Houghton, 'Economic Development, 1865-1965,' in M. Wilson and L. Thompson 
(eds.), The Oxford History of South Africa, p. 11. 
7 CAD, GH 1/315, file no.: 35: Appointment of Consul of United States at Cape Town. 
CAD, GH 1 /320, file no.: 96: Appointment of Consul for North German Confederation at 
Cape Town. 
CAD, GH 23/34, file no.: 64: Recognition of acting consul for Italy, Belgium, Russia and 
Spain. 
CAD, GH 1/324, file no.: 68: Application for issue of Exequatur as Austrian Consul at 
Cape Town. 
CAD, GH 1 /323, file no.: 34: Appointment for Venezuelan Consul at the Cape. 
CAD, GH 1 /351, file no.: 6: Appointment of Uruguayan Consul at Port Elizabeth. 
CAD, GH 1 /383, file no.: 105: Application for issue of Exequatur for Consul of Peru at Port 
Elizabeth. 
CAD, GH 1/33, file no.: 477: Appointment of Vice-Consul of France at the Cape. 
GH 11295, file no.: 26: Issue of Exequatur as Consul General for Portugal at Cape of 
Good Hope. . 
GH 23/12, file no.: 4: Appointed as Consul to the Emperon of Brazil. 
GH 11165, file no.: 2924: Appointment as Consul for Belgium at the Cape. 
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and 1880, the importance of the Cape Colony was also strongly evidenced 
in Britain by the series of Colonial Secretaries advocating that the British 
Crown should adopt a more aggressive role in the Cape Colony. The first 
consul was established in August 1867. and Guillermo Jorge Anderson 
filled the position. He was a citizen of the Cape Colony, a prominent 
businessman8 and regarded by Lord Granville, as a person capable of 
serving the commercial and diplomatic relations and interests of Chile and, 
more particularly Britain.9 It was a fact that candidates for consular posts 
were more likely to be appointed if they were recommended by a person 
who had some clout in the Foreign Office, and Anderson's sponsor was 
Granville.10 After his resignation, William S. Anderson, a partner of the 
shipping company, Union and Castle Steamers renowned for transporting 
British goods around the globe, subsequently occupied the post of Chilean 
consul in Cape Town. 11 In September 1885, he resigned and the post then 
remained vacant. 12 In 1869 another honorary consular post for Chile was 
created in Port Elizabeth. David Ferguson Stewart occupied the post until 
late 1894 when he was declared insolvent and was relieved from his 
post.13 He had been a prominent businessman of the Cape Colony and, at 
the time, was adjudged by Lord Granville as a person who was able to 
pursue favourable commercial and diplomatic relations with another 
nation, like Chile on behalf of Britain. 
8 CAD, GH 1/316, fi!e no.: 73: Issue of Exequatur to the Chilian Consul at Cape Town, 
October 1867. 
9 CAD, GH 23/30, file no.: 108: Appointment of Chilian Consul at Cape Town. 
10 Platt, Cinderella Service, p. 21. 
11 CAD, Colonial Office (henceforth CO) 4239, file no.: A30: Anderson Consul of Chili, 
May 1884. 
12 CAD, GH 1/434, file no.: 51: Resignation of Chilian Consul at Cape Town. 
13 CAD, GH 1/322, file no.: 57: Issue of Exequatur to the Chilian Consul at Port Elizabeth, 
February 1869. . 
CAD, GH 23/40, file no.: 83: Cancellation of Stewart's Commission as Consul for Chili, 
July 1894. 
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Once Anderson and Stewart had vacated the Chilean consular posts, no 
new consular relations were established between Chile and the Cape 
Colony. In other words, in Cape Town from 1886 and in Port Elizabeth 
from 1895 until 1915 no Chilean Consul existed in South Africa. There 
were several probable reasons for the abandonment of direct diplomatic 
ties between South African territories and Chile. The first reason was the 
anti-British policies and the attitude of the Chilean President Jose 
Balmaceda, between 1886 and 1891. Balmaceda's presidency pursued 
rigorous campaigns discouraging British involvement in Chile's economic 
and political endeavours. Thus, it was improbable that Balmaceda would 
consent to receiving aid from Britain by maintaining and having to finance 
the consular relations at the British Cape Colony. Britain no longer had the 
support of the Chilean Government and population which it had enjoyed 
during the rule of the Conservative Party between the 1820s and 1870s. 
Even though Balmaceda was ousted by means of a coup and replaced by 
a government favourable to the Chilean bourgeois class in league with 
British investors, there was still a large contingent of the Chilean 
population who resented the British stranglehold imposed on their nation. 
As a result, despite the efforts made by President Federico Errazuriz in 
1896 when he asked Britain to assist Chile in settling a border dispute with 
Argentina, Britain remained reluctant to open consular relations between 
Chile and the British colonies in the Cape and Natal in South Africa. Also 
Britain harboured realistic fears that the anti-British lobby in Chile would 
aid the Boer republics in their struggle against British Imperialism. 
Throughout the nineteenth century and even until 1910, no diplomatic 
relations with Chile were established by Natal, the Orange Free State, or 
the South African Republic (ZAR). Despite the sporadic trade of war 
supplies to these territories prior to and during the South African War no 
formal diplomatic arrangements were entered into. In 1902 the 
appointment of consuls by the British Foreign Office. did undergo change. 
The Walrond Committee of 1902 recommended that the British 
15 
Government establish a well-organised consular service. Persons 
appointed to consular posts had to be "deserving officers." 14 In July 1907, 
Lionel L. Goldsmid applied for the post of Chilean Consul in 
Johannesburg. He had been the Justice of the Peace for the 
Witwatersrand and the managing director of De Transvaler, a prominent 
newspaper of the Afrikaans community in the Transvaal.15 He had also 
been responsible for assisting with the importation of weapons. in 
September 1896 into the Transvaal Republic. Because of his involvement 
in the South African War and his siding with essentially Boer interests, his 
application was turned down in 1910 by Winston Churchill, President of 
the Board of Trade in London and by Joseph Chamberlain, British Prime 
Minister.16 
After the South African Act of 1909, the way that the South African 
government operated and made decisions was very different to what had 
prevailed before. The head of the executive government was the 
governor-general who was the representative of the British crown. He was 
assisted by an Executive Council which was comprised of elected Union 
government officials.17 When diplomatic officials were appointed, it had to 
be done with the approval of the British Crown. As South Africa was a 
colony, all decisions of an international nature were decided by the 
governor-general, in collaboration with the Colonial Office in London and 
the final approval resting with the ruling British monarch.18 Accordingly, in 
the colonies officials appointed as honorary consuls had to meet and 
satisfy criteria laid down by Britain and act in her best interests. 
14 Platt, Cinderella Service, pp. 69-70. 
15 NAR, SAD, PM 17, file no.: 26/7/1907: Consuls. Chile, July 1907. 
NAR, SAD, GG 1012, file no.: 20/111910: Application re appointment of Lionel Golds mid 
as Consul for Chili, 1 O January 1910. 
16 Ibid. 
17T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa, p. 267. 
18 Ibid. 
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The next person to be appointed as Chilean Consul in South Africa was 
Arthur Dennison Hinde. He was a man who satisfied these requirements 
and was favoured by the Governor General of the Union of South Africa as 
being able, to pursue goals favourable to Britain and the Union of South 
Africa. Hinde served in this post for what is described as an epoch 
stretching from 1912 to 1932. Several ventures in which he had 
participated helped to place him in a more favourable light than his 
counterpart, Lionel Goldsmid. Hinde had been Secretary of the Natal 
Closer Union Society, a body responsible for encouraging the expansion 
of Natal's maize and fruit export trade.19 In 1910, he drew up plans to 
inaugurate a British steamship service between South Africa and Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. He believed that this shipping line would promote the 
coal exports from Natal to Argentina that had very little coal. Furthermore, 
he wanted this line to extend its services between South Africa and 
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Montevideo, Uruguay; 
and Valparaiso, Chile. Hinde understood that these Latin American 
republics were favourable markets for South African coal, raising coal 
mining from cinderella status to more like that of the gold and diamond 
mining. He also believed that these were favourable markets for exporting 
other South African commodities to Latin, particularly South America.20 
Incidentally, Hinde's economic interests in Latin America were echoed as 
recently as 1997 by former South African diplomat Johan von Gernet.21 
Hinde's interest in establishing a steamship line was spurred on by the fact 
that A. Schepper, a retired Government official from the Netherlands who 
had served in India, wanted the Union Government to back him in 
establishing a direct monthly steamship service which would operate 
between British South Africa and such Asiatic countries as Ceylon, Hong 
19NAR, SAD, GG 1021, file no.: 20/544: A.O. Hinde appointed as Consul for Chile, 3 
October 1914. 
20NAR, SAD, GG 1026, file no.: 20/852: Consuls. Chile. Consulate transferred from 
Johannesburg to Durban, 25 April 1919. 
21 Opinion expressed by Johan van Gernet, South African diplomat, 20 October 1997. 
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Kong, British and Dutch East Indian Islands, China and Siam and then on 
to the South American nations of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.22 British 
officials were bewitched by Hinde's prophetic vision as they realised that 
this way the profits of such a venture would flow to Britain and not to 
European competitors. 
It was towards the end of 1912 when the redoubtable Arthur Dennison 
Hinde applied for the position of Consul for Chile in Johannesburg thereby 
launching himself ·as a kingpin. In January 1913, Herbert Gladstone, 
Secretary of State, informed Hinde that he and the Governor-General in 
South Africa, Viscount Buxton, would provisionally recognise him as the 
Consul for Chile, until the King's definite exequatur came through. 
Because of interminable bureaucracy Hinde did not actually receive the 
King's Exequatur until March 1915 even though he had been serving His 
Majesty energetically ever since December 1912. It was finally rectified 
and they were lucky to have him as Chilean Consul until he resigned after 
twenty years of sterling service.23 During his term he had to deal with such 
huge issues as World War I, during which, as we know, Chile stubbornly 
remained neutral; political upheavals in Chile; and exchanges of 
knowledge and expertise between both the Chilean and South African 
agricultural and mining industries.24 During Hinde's term as consul, 
dealings between Chile and South Africa were more frequent and there 
22NAR, SAD, Customs and Excise (henceforth DEA) 314, file no.: C89: Proposed 
Steamship line to East Indies and South America. Correspondence between A. Schepper 
and the Union's Acting Secretary for Commerce and Industries, H.R Eaton, 24 
September to 3 October 1910. 
23NAR, SAD, GG 1018, file no.: 20/339: Consuls. Chile. Recognition of A.D. Hinde as 
Consul, 19 February 1913. 
NAR, SAD, GG 1021, file no.: 20/544: Consuls. Chile. Appointment of A.D. Hinde, 
Correspondence between Viscount Buxton, Governor-General, and Lewis Harcourt, 
Secretary of State of the Colonial Office in London, 3 to 28 October 1914. 
NAR, SAD, GG 1022, file no.: 20/852: Consuls. Chile. Issue of King's Exequatur for 
Hinde, 9 March 1915. 
NAR, SAD, GG 1048, file no.: 20/1913: Consuls. Chile. Resignation as honorary consul, 
16 June 1932. 
24NAR, SAD, K70, vol. 1. Minutes of Meetings of the Commission, 26 January 1916 to 8 
December 1917. 
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was a realisation on both sides that the two nations had problems in 
common and were ideally positioned to exchange ideas. 
The main reason for the involvement between Chile and South Africa 
arose from the numerous treaties and good relations forged between Chile 
and Britain during the 1920s. During that time Chile bought South African 
sheep. and coal as well as exchanging knowledge about the production of 
wine. South Africa purchased wheat, maize and nitrates from Chile.25 
Despite the contacts made, the establishment of a Chilean Consulate in 
South Africa and Chile's favourable relations with Britain, the commercial 
relations between the two nations were admittedly not on a large scale. 
Both Chile and South Africa preferred to look towards and rely on the 
markets of Britain, Western Europe and United States as their chief trading 
partners rather than each other. 
During Hinde's term the strength of Britain's colonial power weakened as 
the First World War ended. The self-governing Dominions like Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa moved along towards full 
statehood in International Law. This came about as a result of the signing 
of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of the war in 1919 when the 
representatives of the British Dominions were allowed to participate in 
signing the treaty. This act in effect, meant that the dominions had 
achieved a higher status in the international community and were no 
longer considered subordinate to Britain.26 Although the Union was in a 
position to be more independent, Jan Smuts, South African Prime Minister, 
believed that its destiny was intimately linked to Britain and he structured 
25NAR, SAD, GG 1857, file no.: 541710: Stock. Miscellaneous. Importation of stud merino 
from South Africa inio Chile, Correspondence between J.H. Thomas, Secretary o1 State 
of the Colonial Office, and Earl Athlone, Governor-General, 12 to 19 May 1924. 
NAR, SAD, URU 1037, file no.: 410: Export of Fruit to South America. Minute from the 
Prime Minister's Office, 15 December 1928. 
26G.C. Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.),"Government and Politics, 
pp. 288-289. 
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the Union's policies with Britain in mind. Although the dominions had 
entered a new stage as sovereign states, they could not really pursue 
independent foreign policies. 27 As a result of the 1926 Balfour Declaration, 
Prime Minister Hertzog established the South African Department of 
External Affairs on 1 June 1927. He believed that the portfolio of Minister 
of External Affairs was important and thus, from 1927 until 1953 it was 
filled by Prime Ministers. 28 
Nevertheless, while Hertzog held the job of Minister of External Affairs 
from 1927 until 1939, he encouraged the general thrust of the newly 
established department to have South Africa acknowledged in Europe and 
North America. In 1929 the first South African legations were established 
in The Hague, Rome and Washington.29 In 1931 as an extension from the 
Statute of Westminster of 1931 which stated Britain's acknowledgement of 
the 1926 Balfour Declaration, additional South African representatives 
were placed in Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, Brussels and Lisbon. During the 
same period, because of South Africa still being a member of the British 
Commonwealth, she was allowed to send her own selected 
representatives to serve in the post of the High Commissioner stationed in 
London.3° From 1925 until 1939 while Hertzog was Minister of External 
Affairs, this position was occupied by J.S. Smit, Eric Louw and Charles te 
Water consecutively.31 
The faint interest in Chile on the part of the new South African Department 
of External Affairs, established in 1927, was evident in the eariy 1930s 
27 Ibid. 
28Munger, Notes of the Formation of South African Foreign Policy, p. 13. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, p. 288. 
31 Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and Swaziland, No. 24 of 1948, p. 1240. 
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when Britain entered into a treaty and agreement with Chile, from which 
the Union Government decided to distance itself. Chile and Britain signed 
the Anglo-Chilean Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in April 1930 for 
the purposes of facilitating, extending and regulating trade and commercial 
relations between Great Britain, Ireland, the British Dominions, India and 
Chile.32 Then in October 1931, the Provisional Commercial Agreement 
was entered into by Chile and Britain under which Britain agreed to treat 
Chile in the same way as her most favoured foreign nation. Chile would 
receive favourable advantages with regard to customs duties, fiscal laws, 
import licenses and customs restrictions from Great Britain and her 
dominions. The reason for Britain's interest in establishing such an 
agreement was because in May 1931 Chile had signed a similar 
agreement with France. In her campaign to maintain her commercial 
power, Britain did not want her European competitor, France, obtaining a 
larger share of the Chilean market.33 However, this agreement in particular 
was rejected by the Department of External Affairs of the Union of South 
Africa, which in collaboration with the Department of Mines and Industries, 
believed that: 
As far as the promotion of our export trade is concerned, Chile 
is of no importance whatsoever as a consumer of South African 
products and the Union therefore stands to gain nothing by a 
trade agreement with Chile.34 
As a result of South Africa's attitude, Britain encouraged Chile to establish 
individual treaties with the different dominion governments.35 The Union's 
32NAR, SAD, BLO 689, file no.: PS 35/7 vol.1.: Americas. Chile. Draft Treaty sent from 
South African High Commissioner, Adv. Charles T. de Water to Minister of External 
Affairs, J. Hertzog, 11 April 1930. 
33 Ibid., Copy of Provisional Commercial Agreement, 15 October 1931. 
34NAR, SAD, HEN 4430, file no.: 791/42: Trade Relations and Treaties. United Kingdom 
and Chile. Correspondence between H.D.J. Bodenstein, Secretary of External Affairs 
and LP. van Zyl Ham, Secretary for Mines and Industries, 18 to 25 September 1931. 
35 Ibid., Correspondence between Sir Henry Getty Chilton, British Ambassador in Chile, 
and Luis Izquierdo, Chilean Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 15 to 28 October 1931. 
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attitude towards Chile was made glaringly obvious when Hinde resigned 
as Chilean Consulate in 1932 and his job remained vacant for five years.36 
The establishment of the Chilean Consulate in the Union of South Africa 
and the appointment of Hinde were after all on British prompting. 
Besides the anti-British ventures of the Union Government under Hertzog, 
other reasons contributed to the break in direct diplomatic relations · 
between the two countries, South Africa and Chile. During this period, 
between 1932 and ·1937 South African politics were undergoing changes, 
with numerous domestic issues taking precedence. The Great Depression 
hit the Union's economic prosperity and was aggravated by a severe 
drought in 1932 that left many farmers destitute. There was also a general 
mood within the white Afrikaans-speaking population that in the 1930s 
Hertzog was becoming too complacent with the Union's relationship to 
Britain. It appeared to them as if he was becoming too accustomed to 
Britain while not doing enough to meet the needs of the Afrikaans 
community. This sector of the population actually wanted South Africa to 
be completely independent from Britain in all spheres of life.37 It was for 
this reason that Hertzog rejected the Provisional Commercial Agreement 
of October 1931 between Britain and Chile. Moreover, no attempts were 
made to re-establish consular relations with Chile. As a result in 1934 
when the South African National Party, a coalition formed between 
Hertzog and Smuts, won the election, Hertzog on his part struggled to 
ensure that South Africa's policies were not seen as being pro-British. 
However, Hertzog had to contend with Smuts, who was still in favour of 
the Union remaining intimately linked to Britain. Smuts' view of South 
Africa having a common destiny with Britain was a motivating factor 
favouring the resumption of consular relations with Chile in 1937. 
36 SANDFA, DC group 2, 2243, file no.: 705/2, Chapter 1: Consular Representatives 
General List of Consuls of Foreign Countries stationed in the Uriion of South Africa. 
37 Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, p. 290. 
22 
Between 1931 and 1936 several favourable reports were compiled by Sir 
Henry Getty Chilton during his terms as British Ambassador in Chile 
(1930-1933) and Argentina (1933-1935), and distributed to the 
Departments of External Affairs of the various dominion governments.38 
During 1931 the Prince of Wales and Prince George visited Argentina and 
Chile, and were particularly well received by the Chilean President Carlos 
Ibanez, members of the British Chamber of Commerce and prominent 
Chilean businessmen. The British Ambassador also reported that the 
agreement signed between Britain and Chile on 15 October 1931 was well 
received. Furthermore, the Chilean Government agreed to give British 
goods the same treatment that they were giving to the commodities 
emanating from the modus vivendi that Chile had signed with France on 
22 May 1931.39 Relations between Chile and the United Kingdom were 
reported .by the new British Ambassador, Sir Robert Mitchell, as being 
"very friendly. "40 The report commented further on the economic 
hardships that Chile was still suffering as a result of the Depression. 
Mitchell commented on the growing interest of the United States in Chile 
but urged that because of the close relations Chile and Britain had 
preserved over the years, the Chileans still preferred to be involved with 
Britain.41 During April 1934 a mission from Chile, consisting of the Chilean 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Francisco Landerstoy and a journalist 
to cover the story, Oscar Cavagnaro, arrived in South Africa to investigate 
the possibility of strengthening trade relations between Chile and South 
Africa. This mission brought with them substantial cargo of nitrates and 
discussed the possibilities of marketing Chilean hard timber for railway 
sleepers in South Africa, as well as beans, sulphur, wines, beers, soft 
timber for furniture and grain. What Chile required was machinery, cloths, 
38 Who was Who, 1951-1960, p. 207. 
39 NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1142/3: Chile Annual Foreign Office Reports, 1931. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.: Annual Report, 1934. 
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fine wool and minerals from South Africa.42 They emphasized the 
geographical fact that Chile was "2000 miles closer to South Africa than 
Europe, Australia and the United States. "43 
To Smuts, the attraction of strengthening trading relations with Chile was 
Chile's favourable ties with Britain. In 1937 another favourable report on 
relations between Chile and Britain was delivered from the British 
Ambassador, Robert Mitchell which was distributed to the various 
dominions.44 In September 1937 Mrs. Dora P. Marais offered her services 
to the Chilean Embassy in London to serve as honorary Chilean Consul in 
the Union. Marais was born in Coquimbo, Chile, but at the time of her 
appointment she was living in Cape Town. The South African Department 
of External Affairs was in favour of this appointment and she occupied the 
post until May 1938 when there was once again a lapse in diplomatic 
relations between Chile and South Africa, which lasted until 1943.45 
The reasons for the break in relations were related both to an international 
factor as well as to the influence of political figures in both Chile and South 
Africa. The Second World War broke out in September 1939 and once 
again the world was split into two camps, those that were pro-Allies and 
those not. As with the First World War, Chile chose to remain neutral in the 
conflict and withstood pressure from Britain and the other Allied nations to 
abandon that stance. However, Chile was becoming more intimate with 
the United States from the 1920s onwards. It was only from December 
42NAR, SAD, HEN 4317, file no.: 747, vol. 1: Trade with Chile. Trade Relations and 
Treaties. Extract from the Cape Times, 24 April 1934. 
43 Ibid. 
44NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 114213: Chile. Annual Reports. Annual Report, 1936. 
45NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38136. Correspondence between Luis Renard, Charge d' 
Affaires ad-interim of the Chilean Embassy in London, E.K. Scallon, Political Secretary of 
the South African High Commissioner in London, and P.R. Botha, Secretary of the South 
African Department of External Affairs, 8 September to 16 November 1937. 
SANDFA, DC Group 3, 2243, file no.: 705/2, Chapter 1, 2 and 3: Consular 
representatives and Consuls of Foreign Countries in South Africa. 
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1941 onwards when the United States joined the conflict that Chile 
underwent tremendous pressure from the United States to join the Allies. 
Early in 1943 Chile declared war on the European Axis countries and 
stopped all relations with Japan.46 Although Chile gave her allegiance to 
the Allies, she never sent combat troops. 
Chile's initial decision to remain neutral strained relations with South Africa 
as Jan Smuts had managed to obtain the electoral support of the white 
South African popu1ation to aid Britain in the conflict and would have liked 
Chile to follow suit. In his eyes having relations with a country not actively 
siding with the Allies to the hilt could spoil South Africa's credentials in the 
British Commonwealth. However, in 1941 Chilean President Aguirre Cerda 
died and was replaced by Juan Antonio Rlos.47 Once Rios was in office, 
he broke all relations with the Axis powers and Japan. His efforts to 
restore consular relations with South Africa were successful during 1943. 
From 1943 onwards the appointment of Chilean Consulates was no longer 
done by Britain or the Union of South Africa but by the Chilean 
Government. From 1943 their Consulates were career appointments. They 
were Chilean citizens and, unlike the honorary consuls, devoted their full 
time to the consular office.48 On 6 November 1942, the Chilean 
Ambassador to London, Manuel Bianchi, informed his counterpart, the 
South African High Commissioner in London, Sidney F. Waterson, of the 
Chilean Government's decision to appoint Edmund Rogelio Pifire, a 
former Chilean army officer, as the new Chilean Consul.49 Piffre had also 
46 NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1 /42/3 vol. 1: Chile Annual Foreign Reports, Annual report on 
Chile, May 1943. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Gamboa, Diplomatic and Consular Relations, p. 127. 
49NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Correspondence between Manuel Bianchi, Chilean 
Ambassador, and Sidney F. Waterson, South African High Commissioner in London, 6 to 
11 November 1942. 
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been the mayor of a town near Santiago in Chile and was president of the 
Lunares Area Club. He was officially appointed and granted the status of 
career consul in February 1943.50 
However, as early as July 1943, Piffre started to damage relations 
between Chile and South Africa. He was arrested at Komatipoort, on the 
Mozambiquan border, which had been declared a "prohibited area." 51 He 
was not in possession of his passport or an identity document or, at any 
rate, did not show· one. On 13 July 1943, Piffre was convicted by the 
Barberton Magistrates' Court, fined £15 and jailed as he was unable to 
pay the fine. However, on 16 July the South African Department of 
External Affairs informed the Police of Piffre's identity, that he had 
diplomatic immunity and that he had been granted permission to leave the 
Union. Piffre was subsequently released and he vacated the post of 
Chilean consulate.52 This incident understandably caused tension between 
Chile and South Africa and led to yet another break in relations for forty-
four months.53 
Thus in October 1943, when Carlos Casto Ruiz applied for the post of 
Chilean Consul General in South Africa, his application was rejected by 
the South African High Commissioner, Sidney F. Waterson, in London. 
Ruiz had been a counsellor of the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, as well as the Minister of Finance in President Aguirre Cerda's 
50NAR, SAD, URU 2080, file no.: 522: Grant of Provisional Recognition to E.R. Piffre as 
Consul, Minute from the Prime Minister's Office, 22 February 1943. 
51 NAR, SAD, URU 2133, file no.: 3137: Permission of Sentence passed on E.R. Piffre, 
Report from H.G. Lawrence, Minister of Justice, to the Prime Minister's Office, 21 October 
1943. 
52 Ibid. 
53 SANDFA, DC Group 3, file no.: 705/2, Chapter 1: Consuls of Foreign Countries 
stationed in the Union of South Africa, Lists of consular representatives in South Africa, 
1942 to 1948. 
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Government between 1939 and 1941. 54 Although Ruiz was highly 
recommended, his application was rejected and the Chilean Government 
stifled efforts to have further diplomatic and consular relations with South 
Africa until 1947. 
The reasons for the renewal of diplomatic relations between Chile and 
South Africa in 1947 were three-fold. Firstly, it occurred as a result of the 
efforts made by Britain to attract the interest of British entrepreneurs, as 
well as those in the dominions, to opportunities available in Latin America. 
This was done in an effort to counteract moves by the United States to 
increase its commercial power in the areas that had once been dominated 
by Britain. As a result of this campaign, in May 1946 the British Embassy 
in Chile compiled a report on the commercial opportunities available in 
Chile. It highlighted the role that the United States was playing in 
economic and social activities there. The purpose of the report was to 
rescue Chile from the "black books of His Majesty's Government."55 The 
report described the industries that existed in Chile, namely the 
agricultural, lumbering, fishing and mining industries, as well as the 
presence of oil in Tierra del Fuego. Furthermore, the report emphasised 
that trade and commerce with Britain was generally viewed with favour by 
most sectors of the Chilean population.56 According to this article: 
Chile ... is perhaps the only one in Latin America where, for 
historical reasons, Great Britain is held in genuine affection for 
herself alone, and not merely on account of self-interest. .. [It is 
also] ... a country ... that only needs cultivating to be once 
more a focus of pro-British sentiment. .. 57 
54NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Correspondence between D.B. Sole, Secretary of 
External Affairs, and S.F. Waterson, South African High Commissioner, 1 to 22 October 
1943. 
55NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1 /42/4: Chilean Economic and Financial Matters, Printed report 
from the British Foreign Office to the Dominions on Anglo-Chilean Trade, 14 June 1946. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
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Secondly, it was in response to the change in the world order that had 
occurred after the Second World War. Prime Minister Smuts' ambition for 
South Africa was for her to play a leading role in the British 
Commonwealth and on the African continent. In order to snub the 
criticisms which the Union received from India and the Soviet Union 
concerning its racial policies, Smuts encouraged the Department of 
External Affairs to set the wheels in motion for the establishment of direct 
diplomatic ties with Brazil, Argentina and Chile during 1947. 
On 16 May 1947, the Chilean Ambassador, Manuel Bianchi, enquired from 
G. Heaton Nichols, SA High Commissioner in London, whether the Union 
was interested in establishing direct diplomatic relations with Chile. Heaton 
Nichols informed Bianchi that he would refer the matter to the Department 
of External Affairs for consideration. South Africa had already accepted 
Legations from twelve European countries since in the preceding twelve 
months.58 Heaton Nichols advised the department that he was worried that 
if they refused this request from Chile, "we may create the impression of 
discriminating against the South Americans on the grounds of colour."59 In 
July 1947 Prime Minister Smuts advised the Department of External 
Affairs that it believed that the time was right to exchange diplomatic 
representatives with the Governments of Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The 
British monarch, King George VI, had given his approval on the 
establishment of direct diplomatic ties with these three countries. 60 As a 
result, between February and March 1948, South Africa agreed to 
establish a South African Legation in Santiago, Chile. The legation would 
be headed by Stephanus Francios du Tait who would be the Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for both Argentina and Chile 
with R.H. Coaton as the temporary Charge d' Affaires stationed in 
58NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Letter from G. Heaton Nichols, High 
Commissioner, and D.B. Sole, Secretary for External Affairs, 16 May 1946. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., Letter from D.B. Sole, Secretary of External Affairs, 8 July 1947. 
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Santiago, Chile. Du Tait would live in Argentina and once South Africa had 
sufficient foreign service personnel, a separate minister would be 
appointed in Chile. Du Toil had been a journalist, had worked in the 
Senate in Cape Town since 1920 in various positions and had served as 
the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden in 1946. 
In May 1948, the South African Legation in Santiago opened. 
The third reason for the resumption of relations between Chile and South 
Africa stemmed from President Juan Antonio Rios who encouraged both 
Britain and United States to take more interest in Chile. The interest that 
Britain showed provided incentives for the Chilean Government to become 
similarly involved with Britain's dominions. In May 1947 the Chilean 
Government, via its Embassy in London, informed the High Commissioner 
for the Union of South Africa, G. Heaton Nichols, that it was keen to 
establish diplomatic relations with the Union of South Africa. 61 Between 
May 1947 and May 1948, negotiations were held between representatives 
of the Chilean and Union Governments concerning the forging of 
diplomatic bilateral relations. Chile also wanted to establish a Legation in 
Cape Town but likewise had a personnel shortage in their Foreign Service 
Department. In order to fill the diplomatic post, Chile appointed Jose 
Serrano Palma as an honorary consul to the Union of South Africa. Palma 
had served in the Chilean Foreign Service in Japan and the Far East, and 
had been an employee of the Chilean Nitrate Corporation.62 On 13 May 
1948 he was officially recognised as the Chilean Charge d' Affaires in the 
Union of South Africa.63 Thus, by the end of May 1948, for the first time in 
61 Ibid., Correspondence between Manuel Bianchi, Chilean Ambassador, G. Heaton 
Nichols, SA High Commissioner, and D.B. Sole, Secretary for External Affairs, 8 to 10 
May 1947. 
62 Ibid., Correspondence between Manuel Bianchi and G. Heaton Nichols, 24 July 1947 
to 24 March 1948. 
63NAR, SAD, BSA 1, file no.: SC 10/8: Diplomatic Relations between the Union of South 
Africa and Chile, Extract from departmental directive, 13 May 1948. 
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their histories, both Chile and South Africa had established direct 
diplomatic relations with each other. 
30 
CHAPTER TWO: CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL 
EVENTS, 1795-1880. 
Events on the international scene had great impact on Chile and South 
Africa, as well as on their economic and diplomatic relations during the 
period 1795 to 1880. Simultaneously, Britain was a catalyst in the 
domestic affairs of both nations, and their involvement with one another. 
Therefore, international situations which affected both Chile and South 
Africa during the period 1795 to 1880 need addressing. Both countries 
were affected by events that occurred in Europe and Britain. Neither Chile 
nor South Africa was in a secure enough economic or political position to 
escape these events. From the late eighteenth century until the 1820s, the 
Napoleonic Wars and the Industrial Revolution in England occupied the 
centre stage. These two developments brought British people to the Cape 
and British merchandise to the Chilean coast. As a result of the turmoil in 
Europe caused by the Napoleonic Wars, and the presence of British 
merchant and naval vessels in the Atlantic Ocean, merchandise was 
exchanged between South Africa and the South American continent in 
1801. Then from 1820 until the 1880s, Britain dominated the world and its 
influence was evident in both South America and southern Africa. The 
presence of Britain in both Chile and South Africa resulted in the increase 
of commercial activity, and both these southern hemisphere countries 
investigated the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations. 
* * * * * 
Britain's industrialisation not only allowed that country to become a world 
power but also enabled the British to extend this power across the seas. 
Industrialisation meant that from the 1760s, Britain was able to produce 
manufactured goods more abundantly than her European rivals, like 
France and Spain. Simultaneously, the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) 
centred in Europe had great impact on Britain. In 1806, Napoleon 
instituted his continental blockade policy which in effect, prevented Britain 
from trading with Europe. As a result of closed markets there, Britain 
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sought alternative markets for her merchandise which Napoleon could not 
block. Britain thus began to trade with emerging nations in Latin America 
and the Far East, thereby opening new markets for her products.1 Britain's 
industrial commodities were in great demand, particularly in the New 
World. Many of the Spanish settlements were eager to trade with Britain 
because these goods were more abundant, cheaper and more readily 
supplied than those from their mother country, Spain.2 Thus, it is small 
wonder that the Spanish American colonies encouraged supplies of British 
manufactures to their shores. 
Until 1818, Chile was a Spanish colony and thus dependent on Spain for 
its supplies. During the prolonged colonial period the items developed and 
produced for exchange were wheat, hides, tallow, cloth, minerals and 
agricultural produce. Chile, together with Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, 
became renowned for textiles since Inca textiles before 1492 were better 
than those of Lancashire in the twentieth century. Thus, of all the South 
American nations, Chile and the three others had the potential to achieve 
more developed positions within the world economy. But, as a result of 
Britain's industrialisation and trade along the Pacific Coast from the late 
eighteenth century onwards, Chile did not develop as it should have done. 
Instead it imported most of its cloth from Britain.3 Elements in Chile were 
not averse to this trade because of the feeling that Spain had a parasitic 
hold on their economy. Spain accepted the raw produce of the colonies, 
sold it in Europe but kept the wealth in Spain. Very little was reinvested in 
Latin America. This meant in effect that the Spanish American colonies 
1 M.E. Chamberlain, Pax Britannica? British Foreign Policy, i789-1914, p. 64. 
2C. Pregger-Roman, 'Nineteenth Century Chile: A Case Study. Subordination, the class 
process, and the relative autonomy of states,' Latin American Perspectives (henceforth 
LAP), 18, 1, (Winter 1991), p.117. 
3A.J. Bauer, 'Industry and the Missing Bourgeoisie: Consumption and the development in 
Chile, 1850-1950,' Hispanic American Historical Review (henceforth HAHR), 70, 2, (May 
1990), pp. 228-253. 
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were generally expected to fend for themselves economically.4 Britain, on 
the other hand, in exchange for its manufactured goods bought the raw 
materials that Chile produced. It is small wonder that the Chileans during 
the 181 Os saw themselves as the "English of South America. "5 
Scholars on Latin America who have analysed this region's commercial 
and economic relations with both Spain and Britain during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, such as Raul Prebisch, James Cockcroft, Andre 
Gunder Frank and .Johnson L. Dale, have described this period in Latin 
American history as one of "dependencia." 6 In 1806, in the memoirs of 
William Jacob, a British official who served the British Foreign Office in 
Latin America during this time, the following is recommended: 
A predominant influence in the Spanish provinces of Mexico ... 
Peru, Chili, and Buenos Ayres ... would be of the most beneficial 
consequence to Great Britain, in political, commercial and naval 
view ... by extending the consumption of our manufactures, and 
supplying us with many raw materials. . . it would be more 
advantageous to them to send their wool and their cotton to 
England, and receive it back manufactured, than to continue 
their fabrick (sic.) of those articles ... 7 
Between 1808 and 1815, the Napoleonic Wars also had an impact on 
Chile. In 1808, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Spain and placed his half-
brother, Joseph Bonaparte on the throne. As a result of the upheavals on 
the European continent, Spain granted unofficial independence to her 
colonies.8 Thus Spain, occupied with the events in Europe and unable to 
4T.E. Skidmore and P.H. Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 113. 
5M.C. Needler, An Introduction to Latin American Politics. The Structure of Conflict, p. 
270. 
6 W.L. Bernecker, 'Las relaciones entre Europa y Latinoamerica durante el siglo XIX. 
Ofensivas comerciales e intereses econ6micos,' Hispania, 53, 183, (Spring/April 1993), p. 
183. 
7/bid., pp. 187-188. 
'Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 113. 
33 
attend to her colonies' needs, allowed Britain to fill the void and the 
country thus began to assume a larger role in this part of the world. 
The above mentioned milieu simultaneously encouraged ideas of 
independence in Latin America. Between 1810 and 1820, Wars of 
Independence broke out in the various Spanish colonies. Chile was one of 
the South American regions that yearned for independence from Spain. In 
the summer of 1817, Jose de San Martin and Bernardo O' Higgins, two 
key players in Spanish American independence, invaded Chile and found 
that the Chilean people supported their cause to break free from Spanish 
rule. A Chilean-Argentine expedition was organised and the Spanish 
troops were defeated. When San Martin rejected an offer to rule Chile 
Bernardo O' Higgins became the first ruler of the independent state.9 
Just as the Industrial Revolution in Britain and the Napoleonic Wars had 
their impact on Chile, there were repercussions in South Africa as well, 
with the difference that the Industrial Revolution had a comparatively 
smaller impact on South Africa than it had on Chile. British industrialists 
did not receive the same degree of enthusiasm from the European settlers 
at the Cape that they enjoyed from the Chileans. The former were mostly 
from the Netherlands and France. These settlers thus identified with their 
own nationalities and not with the successes and achievements of Britain. 
They had settled at the Cape as early as 1652 and managed to obtain a 
remarkably high level of prosperity before the British arrived. Britain took 
control over the Cape in 1795 as a result of wars in Europe and out of 
concern that the sea route to and from the East would end up in French 
hands. In order to prevent this happening, Britain arranged with the exiled 
House of Orange in the Netherlands for an invasion of the Cape Colony in 
1795.10 
9 J. Stickler, Allende and the Saga of Chile, pp. 90-93. 
10v.T. Harlow, 'The British Occupation, 1795-1806,' in E.A. Benians, E.A. Walker and 
A.P. Newton (eds.), The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Volume Ill. South 
Africa, Rhodesia and the Protectorates, pp. 167-168. 
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The British assumed control over a colony whose European settlers 
owned most of the well established and wealthiest farms in the area. They 
also had control over the trade monopolies that had been sold off by the 
Dutch East Indian Company (V.0.C). These monopolies controlled 
commodities like bread, tobacco, meat, vegetables and wine. 11 In South 
Africa, no manufacturing industries existed at the time to provide 
alternative employment to farming. The V.O.C. had made it their policy to 
discourage local industries. Its attitude had been consistent with 
mercantilist theory, which expected colonies to provide markets for the 
mother country, and not to compete with it.12 
In 1795 when the British occupied the Cape for the first time, they 
promulgated the laissez faire policy for the Cape Colony. The reason for 
this was that Britain had learnt from experience in the American War of 
Independence ending in 1783, that it was fatal to place unbearable 
restrictions on colonies, since they provoked revolts against the mother 
country. Nevertheless, Britain did impose some degree of restrictions on 
trade and navigation. These restrictions were enforced so that colonists 
could not conduct trade with French vessels. They were also prevented 
from trading with neutral ships for fear that these vessels would smuggle 
goods to the enemy, namely France.13 These restrictions, of course, were 
imposed essentially to protect British interests. Despite the European 
settlers' apparent apathy towards British industrialisation, the arrival of the 
British in 1795 had, nevertheless, many economic advantages. New small 
11 R. Ross, 'The Cape of Good Hope and the world economy, 1652-1835,' in R. Elphick 
and H. Giliomee (eds.), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840, pp. 248-270. 
12J.B. Peires, 'The British and the Cape, 1814-1834,' in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), 
Shaping of South African Society, pp. 490-491. 
13E.A. Walker, History of Southern Africa, pp. 126-127. 
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scale industrial enterprises were encouraged and they developed notably 
in the spheres of milling, forestry and whaling. 14 
Britain's initial occupation of the Cape was brief ending in February 1803. 
The Peace of Amiens signed in February 1803 voluntarily restored the 
Cape to the Batavian Republic (Netherlands). However, it remained under 
Dutch rule until 1806, and the policy of free trade advocated by the British 
continued.15 
In 1806, war broke out yet again between France and Britain. As the new 
Batavian Government in the Netherlands proved to be a French ally, all 
Batavian colonies, like French colonies, became vulnerable to attack and 
occupation by Britain. Thus, in 1806, the Cape was re-occupied by the 
British as a direct result of events that had unfolded in Europe.16 Similarly, 
across the Southern Atlantic Ocean, Argentina was invaded by Britain to 
prevent the Southern Cone nations from becoming occupied by France 
and her allies.17 
By 1806, the Cape had achieved greater significance in Britain's eyes. As 
a result of Britain losing her North American colonies, the political and 
economic structure of the British Empire had shifted away from the New 
World and the North Atlantic towards countries in the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans. The Cape economy thus became intimately linked to that of Great 
Britain. This meant that whatever happened in Britain would have a spin-
off effect on the Cape, and on the Cape's relations with nations involved 
with Britain. 
'"w.M. Freund, 'The Cape under transitional governments, 1795-1814,' in Elphick and 
Giliomee (eds.), Shaping of South African Society, pp. 328-329. 
151.R. Christi, Wars and Revolutions. Britain 1760-1815, p. 259. 
16C.W. de Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-1872, 
pp. 40-41. 
17 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Cenutry, pp. 5-9. 
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By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain was becoming a world 
power. The British felt that they had obtained the Cape by right of 
conquest. Thus, when the British returned to the Cape in 1806, the colony 
was governed more autocratically. Supreme authority was assigned to the 
British governors appointed there. Yet despite autocratic rule, the British 
did manage to establish an atmosphere encouraging the progress of the 
colony's economy. Britain continued to develop the Cape on the 
foundations that had been established during the period of the first British 
Occupation.18 Ventures were thus undertaken in order to promote 
economic activity in the colony. The British believed it was vital to improve 
communications between Cape Town and the outlying districts. They, 
therefore, undertook the task of improving the infrastructure of the Cape 
Colony. They even established a discount bank, to provide short term 
credit to local entrepreneurs.19 
In order to stimulate economic activity and to populate diverse areas of the 
Empire with British subjects, the British Government encouraged 
numerous immigration schemes. In 1820, one of these was implemented 
in order to alleviate the economic depression and unemployment situation 
in Britain which had come about as a result of industrialisation and the 
war. Many people battled to find employment in Britain. Emigrants from 
Britain were given the opportunity to settle in British colonies. Among 
these were British settlers who arrived to settle in the Cape Colony.20 This 
civilian influx as well as the British garrison established off the Cape Coast 
at St. Helena, where Napoleon was held captive until his death in 1821, 
helped to stimulate the economy.21 
18Freund, 'Cape under the transitional governments,' in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), 
Shaping South African Society, pp. 325-333. 
19Ross, 'Cape and the world economy,' in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), Shaping of South 
African Society, pp. 258·263. 
20T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A Modern History, pp. 43-45. · 
21 Ibid. 
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The period 1795 to 1820 is hazy about contacts between the Cape Colony 
and Latin America. From the few earliest documents, dated between 1795 
and 1818, it is difficult to determine whether actual trade occurred 
specifically between the Cape and Chile. But it seems that, at least, links 
between South Africa and the South American continent were established. 
This was made possible by British merchant vessels sailing between the 
African and American continents. Several Cape Town merchants and 
small businessmen actually tried their luck by selling goods to South 
America paid for by Spanish gold bullion brought to the Cape. 
For example, in November 1801, two Cape Town merchants, Joseph 
Payne and Robert Ross, obtained licenses from Francis Dundas, 
appointed by the British as the Acting Governor and Commissioner-in-
Chief of the settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, to export British 
manufactured goods to the Spanish American settlements.22 In July 1811 
permission was granted by the Earl of Caledon to a merchant called M. 
Becker to import Latin American products such as wheat and West Indian 
rum. 23 It is also recorded that wheat, grain and flour was exported from the 
Cape to there during the months of July and August 1817 by two 
merchants, N. Christian and W. Bird.24 In 1818, Cape wine was exported 
to Latin America in order to purchase mules from there for the Cape 
Colony. 25 All of these transactions were conducted by subjects of the 
22Cape Town Archives Repository (henceforth CAD), British Occupation. Memorials 
Received (henceforth BO) 122, file no.: 63: Robert Ross requesting licence to import 
bullion from South America, 13 November 1801. 
CAD, BO 122, file no.: 69: Joseph Payne requesting licence to import bullion from South 
America, 30 November 1801. 
23CAD, Colonial Office. Memorials Received (henceforth CO) 3883, file no.: 228: M. 
Becker. Request to Customs House re American produce on Board, 6 July 1811. 
24CAD, CO (Memorials Received) 3910, file no.: 52, part 1: Application for permission to 
export wheat and flour to South America, 30 July 1817. 
CAD, CO (Memorials Received) 3910, file no. : 123: Permission to export wheat and flour 
to South America, 2August1817. 
25CAD, CO (Memorials Received) 3911, file no.: 8: Permission to export wine to South 
America, 4 February 1818. 
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British Empire and/or British companies that were established in Cape 
Town. It is clear that without Britain's naval supremacy, such trading would 
have been impossible. By then Britain had, due in large measure to being 
the first nation to industrialise, become a super power and could arrange 
interaction between peripheral states like Chile and South Africa. Such · 
links however, were on a small scale in comparison with Chile's relations 
with Britain, South Africa's relations with Britain and those of other nations 
whose ships reconnoitered the Cape of Good Hope. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the only way that Chile and South 
Africa could make contact was via British ships. As the American and 
African continents were peripheral market areas for Britain and North 
Western Europe, the contacts made between the communities in Chile 
and South Africa were infrequent or sporadic. Neither Chile nor South 
Africa had their own vessels. Thus, without Britain's shipping Chile and 
South Africa would not have had any relations. The latter two were short of 
money and what their governments generated was spent in dealing with 
domestic and border issues rather than constructing ships. 
Because of Chile's geography she had greater capacity to forge relations 
with other nations like Britain, Australia and North America and in fact 
exploited her close location by supplying wheat and other foodstuffs to the 
goldrush miners in California and Australia during the nineteenth century.26 
The Cape settlement, even though also situated in an advantageous 
geographical position was less concerned with establishing diplomatic or 
trading ties with other nations, in general, and Chile, in particular, until the 
late 1860s. From then until the late 1880s, efforts were made by the 
Chilean Government to have honorary consuls established at Cape Town 
and later Port Elizabeth. The consular posts were filled by British subjects 
living in the Cape Colony. The focus of the Cape Colony remained 
26T.M. Bader, 'Before the Gold Fleets: trade and relations between Chile and Australia, 
1810-1848,' Journal of Latin American Studies, (henceforth JLAS), 6, 1, (1974), p. 35. 
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primarily in aiding passing ships and settling land disputes with the 
indigenous groups in the interior.27 During the early nineteenth century, the 
Cape had relations with France, the Netherlands, Britain and her colonies, 
and merchant vessels that stopped at the Cape en route to or returning 
from the East. 
During the nineteenth century, South Africa was composed of the 
territories of the Cape and Natal which became British colonies, and the 
two Boer territories of the Orange Free State and Transvaal. With regard 
to Chile, although this area was never conquered as an official British 
colony, it was nevertheless as dependent upon Britain's actual colonies for 
her economic well-being. The Industrial Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Wars µmpelled South Africa and South America into commercial relations 
using British vessels, thus, South African products found their way to 
South America. This made Britain the centre and South American nations, 
like Chile, the periphery. Manufactured goods went to these South 
American countries which in turn had their primary produce sold on world 
markets. The contact between Chile and metropolitan Britain enabled her 
to have contacts with Britain's colonies around the globe. As a result of 
Britain's commercial power, other areas of the globe not conquered by her 
were nevertheless dependent on her for their economic well-being. In this 
way, Britain was in a position to make demands to ensure that facilities in 
these countries were favourable to British trade and investment. Britain's 
position in the economies of South Africa and Chile was not threatened by 
any other nation until the late nineteenth century when Germany began its 
campaign to become a powerful nation on the international stage and 
peered with interest at South Africa and Chile. 
27 L. Guelke, 'Freehold farmers and frontier settlers, 1657-1780,' in Elphick and Giliomee 
(eds.), Shaping of South African Society, pp. 65-102. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL 
EVENTS, 1880-1919. 
The late 1880s saw Britain's dominant position threatened by Germany 
who subsequently became involved in the economic, social and political 
affairs of both Chile and South Africa. Britain naturally resented the 
infiltration of Germany. The significant position that Germany had on the 
world centre stage from the late 1880s until the 1940s resulted in several 
international conflicts which had a major impact on relations between Chile 
and South Africa. Germany had become a dominant force in several Latin 
American economies including that of Chile. During the nineteenth century 
Chile was the leader of the world's nitrate industry. Like Britain, Germany 
had great interest therein as nitrates were used not only in agriculture but 
also in the manufacture of ammunition. The Germans who were pro-Boer 
during the South African War (1899-1902) helped the Republics to obtain 
supplies of nitrates and other military materials from Chile. Similarly, 
during the First World War, Chile's nitrates were also in great demand by 
both the Allies and the Central powers. Therefore, Chile chose to remain 
neutral in the conflict. The Allies, in particular Britain, undertook a virulent 
anti-German propaganda campaign and imposed an economic blockade 
against Germany and her allies. But in 1913 Germany retaliated and 
began to develop synthetic nitrates and once it became difficult to sustain 
their war effort with natural nitrates, they went into full production. The 
production of synthetic nitrates at the Haber-Bosch plant, situated at 
Oppau (Ludwigshafen), was more expensive than obtaining them naturally 
from Chile but the Germans persisted. The result was that the Chilean 
economy was devastated because Chile lost one of her chief trading 
partners, that being Germany, and many of the pro-Allied nations were 
prevented or discouraged from having trade relations with Chile. Britain's 
anti-German campaign resulted in a period of strained relations between 
neutral Chile and pro-British South Africa. 
* * * * * 
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Between 1880 and 1919, the first international factor to affect Chile and 
South Africa was the rise of Germany. On 24 September 1862, Bismarck 
became the ruler of Prussia and undertook the campaign of uniting 
Germany. By the time Germany had been unified in 1871, German 
capitalism had obtained powerful momentum.1 The German economy 
particularly in the fields of mining, iron and steel demonstrated impressive 
rates of growth and Bismarck's ambitious foreign policy was regarded as 
an expression of . the state's power. The rise of Germany and its 
aggressive foreign policies threatened Britain's domination in the world 
economy. Britain regarded itself as the financial powerhouse of the world; 
a source of capital for the peripheral areas, like Chile and southern Africa; 
a major importer of primary products and thus, felt threatened by 
Germany's advancement.2 Towards the end of the nineteenth century 
Germany was making advances into the economic pursuits of foreign 
countries which Britain had previously regarded as its own domain.3 It is 
therefore no wonder that Germany's interest in both Chile and South 
Africa in the late 1880s was a cause of great concern to Britain. 
Germany's influence in Chile became apparent from the 1880s, 
particularly in Chile's mining and agricultural activities. In 1883-1884, Chile 
annexed the Atacama Desert and the Peruvian province of Tarapaca after 
defeating Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). The 
result was that Chile obtained a monopoly in the mining of nitrates in these 
areas where they were abundant.4 Nitrates with their ambiguous uses 
became Chile's leading export from the late 1880s. The promise of 
improved economic conditions in the nitrate fields attracted both British 
1A. Wood, Nineteenth Century Britain, 1815-1914, pp. 244-249. 
2 V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, p. 156. 
3D. Blackbourne and G. Eley, The Peculiarities of German History. Bourgeois Society and 
Politics in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 127-155. · 
4W.F. Sater, The Southern Cone Nations of Latin America, pp. 32-33. 
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and German investors. This was the first time since Chilean independence 
that Britain's position in Chile's economy and society was really 
threatened by another competitor. 
During the later nineteenth century, the Germans formed communities in 
Chile mainly in the southern Frontera region. These Germans and their 
enterprises received unconditional financial support from Bismarck's 
government.5 The Frontera region included the settlements of Malleco, 
Cautln, Valdivia, Llanquhue and Pitrufquen. The abundant streams and 
mild climate attracted the Germans who settled in this region. All of these 
features were similar to natural conditions in north western Europe and the 
German immigrants thus adjusted easily to the region. Although 
immigrants from other European nations, like Switzerland, France, Spain, 
Holland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia also settled in the region, 94% of 
all the farms in that area were German-owned. The economic pursuits of 
these Germans in the Frontera region were farming, trade, town planning 
and mining. German schools were introduced and Lutheran churches 
established.6 The German influence was so strong that according to the 
author, G. Mccutchen McBride, the town and province of Valdivia 
practiced a "distinct Teutonic culture."7 According to Chilean Eduardo 
Zomosa, this area was renowned for that with German being the main 
language spoken.8 Throughout Chile, from the northern mining districts to 
the southern areas, the German influence was evident in economic, social 
and political activities. In 1885, a British diplomat, William Roberts, made 
the following observation: "Foreign commerce is represented in 
5H.C. Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the United States, p. 135. 
6G. McCuthchen McBride, Chile: Land and Society, pp. 297-299. 
71bid., p. 291. 
8information obtained during conversations with Eduardo Zomcisa, a Chilean resident in 
South Africa, during November 1992 
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Valparaiso by England first, and then by ... Germans. "9 In the 1890s, the 
growing German influence in Chile became an even greater matter of 
concern to the British. In November 1899, Audley Gosling, British Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Santiago from 1897 to 1902, 
informed the Foreign Office in London that Germans commanded Chile's 
military and naval forces with distinction. Gosling claimed further that 
because of the "German influence ... the Chilean population had become 
hostile to Great Britain."10 
Similarly, Germany's attention was attracted to South Africa during the late 
nineteenth century. Prior to 1870, when the diamond industry was 
established, the economy was predominantly based on agriculture. In the 
1870s, the diamond industry came into being and was followed with the 
development of the gold mining industry from the 1880s. The mining 
industry overturned the pattern of economic activity in South Africa. 11 This 
industry attracted the attention of Britain, as well as that of other European 
nations, in particular Germany, so that in South Africa as elsewhere British 
investors no longer dominated. With the subsequent development of the 
diamond mining industry in the Orange Free State and gold mining in the 
Transvaal, there too, the British Government became concerned that 
these two territories would be engulfed by another European Power, most 
likely Germany.12 Furthermore, Germany was not only gaining strength 
with its mining capital and machinery, but also had emotional connections 
with the Boer population and was represented by an extensive consular 
9Evans, Relations with United States, p. 155. 
'°Who was Who, 1897-1916, p. 287. 
National Archives Repository (henceforth NAR), Transvaal Archives Collection 
(henceforth TAD), Microfilm Collection M594, Foreign Office (henceforth FO) 2/269, pp. 
108-111; Chilian sympathy for Boers. Correspondence from Audley Gosling, British 
Minister in Santiago, 1 November 1899. 
11C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic, p. 117. 
12 J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa. Its Causes and Effects, pp. 96-97. 
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service which made Britain very nervous.13 Therefore, Britain was 
determined to ensure that these two independent territories were 
governed in a manner which did not threaten Britain's presence on the 
continent, and was prepared to go to great lengths to protect this interest. 
In 1884, Germany established its military presence in German South West 
Africa (Namibia). Britain felt it was being placed under pressure from 
Germany fearing that this new German colony would link up with the 
Transvaal. In order to prevent this happening, Britain annexed 
Bechuanaland (Botswana) in 1885. Germany's ambitions concerning the 
Transvaal, in particular, were aided by the fact that the Transvaal 
Government was weary of British cultural domination and political control. 
Growing tensions between the trekker republics and Britain developed in 
the 1880s and were further fuelled by Germany's presence in the rest of 
the African continent. 14 In 1880, Chief Justice Reitz and a German editor 
of the Free State Express, Carl Borckenhagen, encouraged the white 
inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange Free States to oppose Britain and 
obtain assistance from Germany when the need arose.15 
In the 1890s, Britain's position in southern Africa was hampered by the 
pressure Germany placed on the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay. Germany 
encouraged the formation of economic and diplomatic ties between the 
Transvaal and Mozambique. Access to Delagoa Bay enabled the Boers' 
allies, France, Germany and Norway amongst others, to supply them with 
arms and ammunition.16 The British, on the other hand, were subjected to 
discriminatory railway rates by the Transvaal Government, an increase in 
130.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, Britain's Overseas Trade, 1873-1914, p. 
116. 
14Davenport, South Africa, pp. 200-205. 
15E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p. 389. 
16Davenport, South Africa, pp. 204-205. 
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the volume of non-British trade, a growth in foreign shipping and foreign 
immigrants into the Transvaal, as well as the loss of commercial wealth to 
rival European powers, chiefly France and Germany. In December 1895, 
in an attempt to bring the Transvaal Government under British rule, the 
Jameson Raid was organised.17 However, this attempted coup failed and 
the Transvaal Government arrested the culprits. Immediately after the raid, 
Germany congratulated Kruger and offered assistance to the Boers in their 
cause against Britain. Fearful of losing South Africa and her empire to 
Germany, the area was subsequently declared by the British as their 
sphere of influence. From 1897 onwards, British naval vessels patrolled 
the Mozambique coast implying that Britain was prepared to go to war if 
the Boer republics would not submit themselves to British dominance.18 As 
a result of pressure from British officials both in London and South Africa, 
as well as the Uitlander community in the Transvaal, the South African 
War broke out in October 1899. Germany was still involved and assisted 
the Boers to obtain arms and ammunition. Firms in Germany, Norway and 
France manufactured many of the weapons used by the Boers.19 
Germany also staked her claim in the regional cooperation and interaction 
between South Africa and South America, and Chile in particular, during 
the period 1880 to 1918. However, Britain was always close on Germany's 
heels to do battle if the need arose. This was particularly evident up to and 
during the South African War. The Jameson Raid enabled the Transvaal 
Government to realise that they were inadequately armed to defend 
themselves from a British onslaught. As already mentioned, the Boer 
republics received most of their firearms from firms in Europe. Germany 
and France were responsible for the majority of the arms and ammunition 
17R.V. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice. The Case of South African 
Gold Mining Finance, 1886-1914, pp. 6-8. 
18A.N. Porter, 'Lord Salisbury, Mr Chamberlain and South Africa, 1895-9,' Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1, (1972-3), pp. 18-20. · 
19F. Pretorious, Kommadolewe Tydens dieAnglo-Boereoor/og, 1899-1902, pp. 26-27. 
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that the Boers obtained from 1896 until the end of the South African War 
in 1902.20 In fact, a group of Chileans in the areas of lquique and Valdivia, 
with assistance from France and Germany, also manufactured machine-
guns and supplied ammunition to the Boers during their struggle against 
Britain.21 
Audley Gosling, British Ambassador to Chile, kept the Foreign Office in 
London informed of the anti-English sentiment present in Chile during the 
South African War.22 Not all of Chile's population were anti-British during 
this conflict and it is clear from by Audley Gosling's reports that much of 
the anti-British sentiment was fuelled by Germany. Like Chile, several 
South American nations aided the Boers during their conflict against the 
English.23 Consignments of arms, ammunition, food and donkeys en route 
to the Transvaal from South America were confiscated by British officials 
at the South African ports. Britain retaliated by imposing restrictions on 
communications between Chile and South Africa.24 This scenario would be 
repeated on a grander scale during the First World War (1914-1918). 
The First World War broke out on 4 August 1914 when Britain declared 
war on Germany. The international balance of power was shattered arid 
the world that had evolved since the end of the Napoleonic Wars was 
thrown into disarray.25 Britain was determined to maintain her naval 
supremacy over Germany being of the opinion that as long as she was 
20 /bid. 
21 NAR, TAD, Staatssekretaris, Buitelandse Sake (henceforth SSA) 876, file no.: RA 
5207199: Nieuwe Mitrailleuse te Verkoopen, 17 July 1899. 
22NAR, TAD, M594, FO 21269, pp. 108-111: South African War. Chilean Sympathy for 
Boers, 1 November 1899. 
23/bid. 
24NAR, TAD, M596, FO 2/271, pp. 70-78: Shipment of nitrate ~f soda to Boers, 9 to 11 
November 1899. 
25 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p. 155. 
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able to preserve her naval predominance, her world position and empire 
would be safe.26 The British Foreign Office was intent on imposing a 
weapons embargo in order to bring Germany to its knees. During the war, 
Britain undertook the responsibility of keeping sea lanes open for food 
supplies and other war materials required by the Allied Forces fighting on 
the European continent. Simultaneously, however, Britain sought 
measures to deprive the Germans of these items in the hope of forcing 
Germany to abandon her military efforts. Britain was insistent that her 
colonies adhered to the same principles. They were thus required not to 
provide food and other war supplies to the Central Powers. That which 
British colonies could produce would be utilised only by Britain and the 
other Allied nations.27 
In order to convince the colonies and the United States of America to 
support the Allies in their struggle against Germany, Britain undertook an 
extensive anti-German campaign, which continued throughout the First 
World War. M. Sanders and P.M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the 
First World War, 1914-1918 describes it well. The campaign had negative 
effects on South Africa's relations with Chile, which decided to remain 
neutral in the conflict thereby being automatically branded by Britain as 
"pro-German." As a British colony, South Africa was discouraged from 
having commercial and diplomatic relations with Chile. The anti-German 
propaganda campaign was directed not only at Germany but also at those 
nations like Chile, who chose to remain neutral in the war. 28 
26Z. Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy: the Foreign Office before the Great War,' in 
B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss (eds.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign policy, 
1895-1939. Memorial Essays, pp. 26-29. 
27C. Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, pp. 21-23. 
28M. Sanders and P.M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-
1918. 
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Right from the beginning of the conflict in Europe, Chile did indeed choose 
to remain neutral and proclaimed a policy of non-alignment with neither the 
Allied forces nor the Central Powers. Chile at that stage still had a leading 
position in war applicable nitrates. Despite her neutrality, Chile was 
strongly pressured for exclusive supply of nitrates by both Allied and 
Central forces. Even after June 1915 when presidential elections had been 
held in Chile and Juan Luis Sanfuentes was elected into power, their 
Government was adamant about maintaining neutrality throughout the 
war. 29 However, as with other neutral countries, Britain exaggerated 
Germany's influence in Chile to the Allied nations and British dominions to 
the point of being ridiculous. Everyone was assured that Chile's military 
system had become Germanised and that even the Boy Scouts were 
learning to goose-step.30 In 1917, the United States of America joined the 
war as an active military force. Once this happened, Chile was also 
pressurized from the United States to abandon its neutrality stance. 
Nevertheless, Sanfuentes maintained Chile's neutral position in the war. 
He maintained his belief that it was more important for Chileans to concern 
themselves with domestic affairs than become involved in the international 
conflict, even though the anti-German campaign that had been initiated by 
the British was intensified by the North Americans. 31 
Despite Chile's neutrality during the early war years of 1914 and 1915, the 
Chilean coast became a field for naval operations between German and 
British navies. On 9 March 1915, the German cruiser Dresden cast anchor 
in Cumberland bay off the island Mas-a-Tierra which belongs to the Juan 
Fernandez group of islands and is approximately 500 miles from the coast 
of Chile. (Refer to map, p. 56.) The commander of the Dresden requested 
permission to remain in the bay for eight days while the vessel was being 
29H. Muiioz and C. Portales (eds.), Elusive Friendship, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1984), 
p. 13. 
30Evans, Relations with United States, p. 173. 
"Munoz and Portales (eds.), Elusive Friendship, p. 13. 
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repaired. On 14 March 1915, however, a British squadron composed of 
the cruisers Kent, Glasgow and Orama arrived in Cumberland Bay and 
immediately opened fire on the German cruiser. The Dresden hoisted a 
flag of truce and despatched an officer to inform Glasgow that it was in 
neutral waters. This was disregarded by the British squadron, who then 
subsequently fired and sunk the German cruiser. 32 Although the incident 
caused much embarrassment to the British authorities, Britain justified 
their actions by stating that the Dresden had posed a threat to British 
commerce in the region. 33 Britain suspected that any German vessels in 
Chilean waters were obtaining nitrates to sustain their war supplies. 
Germany's reasons for engaging in naval operations along the coast of 
Chile during this period was a result of two factors. In the south of Chile, 
as explained previously, many Germans had settled and provided supplies 
and aid to German vessels, rather than to those of Britain. Most of the 
naval manoeuvering of German vessels in Chilean waters occurred in the 
Southern Pacific near to German settlements to obtain food supplies and 
maybe a bonus of clandestine nitrates. The second factor was that, 
despite the development of synthetic nitrates in 1913 by the German 
processing plant Haber-Bosch at Oppau (Ludwigshafen), this process was 
more expensive than obtaining them naturally from Chi!e.34 According to 
Couyoumdjian, despite the efforts of Britain and later the United States of 
America to impose blockades and blacklisting, they were not able to 
squash trade with Germany entirely. In fact, he recorded that German and 
32 NAR, Central Archives Collection (SAD), Office of the Governor-General (henceforth 
GG) 663, file no.: 9/87/13: War 1914-1915: Parliamentary Papers. Correspondence re 
sinking of German cruiser. Report from the Colonial Office in London, 16 April 1915. 
33/bid. Letter from Sir Edward Grey of the Foreign Office in London to Augustin Edwards, 
Chilean Minister, 30 March 1915. 
34 S. Colliers and W.F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808- 1994, pp. 165-166. 
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British nitrate trades continued throughout the war to do business 
alongside each other in Valparaiso.35 
The demand for nitrates was an exception and more generally the First 
World War had a serious effect on Chile whose export economy was 
disrupted by the war. Pre-1914 Britain and Germany had become Chile's 
two leading trading partners. But as a result of blockades imposed by 
Britain, Chile's access to its major markets in Germany and Belgium was 
blocked. During the- latter half of 1914, even nitrate exports decreased by 
more than half which resulted in the closure of several oficinas.36 
However, during 1915, the nitrate industry recovered slightly because of 
Allied demand for explosives and munitions. The vaccuum created was 
filled by the United States of America. Britain had a more urgent agenda in 
orchestrating its war effort than being obsessed with production and 
efficient management of the nitrate industry. Instead, the United States of 
America purchased supplies of Chilean nitrates for the Allies. As a result of 
the war, Britain was not able to export manufactured articles and other 
commodities to Chile as it had been doing ever since the late 1780s. The 
United States of America's wartime interest in Chile sparked a resurgence 
of general economic activity and industrial expansion. The United States of 
America successfully managed to enhance its commercial links with Chile 
and became Chile's chief trading partner.37 
The specific boom in Chile's nitrate industry during the war was short lived 
however because the Haber-Bosch processing plant went into full 
production to produce synthetic niirates. It was soon copied by the Allied 
nations and Chile's natural nitrates were no longer in demand. Chile's 
35R. Couyoumdjian, Chile y Gran Bretana durante la primera guerra mundial y la 
posguerra, 1914-1921, PP- 285-287. 
36H. Blakemore, 'From the War of the Pacific to 1930,' in L Bethell, (ed.), Chile since 
Independence, pp. 68-69. · 
37Couyoumdjian, Chile y Gran Bretana, pp. 288-297. 
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leadership on nitrates, and the attendant prosperity it brought to the 
country, was thus diminished.38 
In the meantime, South Africa had become a member of the British Empire 
when it became a Union in 1910. The South African Act of 1909 had 
altered the status of the self-governing territories. The areas of Natal, 
Cape, Transvaal and Orange Free State could therefore no longer have 
independent foreign policies. The Union of South Africa, like other British 
dominions at that time, was a self-governing entity only as far as its 
internal affairs were concerned. Furthermore, the Union was in a position 
of allegiance to Britain and trade arrangements could only be concluded 
once they had been signed by British officials.39 In 1911 at a Conference 
in London concerning the British dominions, Britain decided that in the 
interests of her colonies she would handle their international negotiations. 
With the declaration of war by Britain in August 1914, South Africa was 
thus automatically a participant. Prime Minister Louis Botha and General 
Jan Smuts opted to send troops and assist Britain in her fight against 
Germany and the other Central Powers. This was in spite of General 
James Barry Munnik Hertzog and other Afrikaners who wanted South 
Africa to remain neutral in the war. The Union undertook an active role in 
the conflict by supplying troops and protecting the strategic position of the 
Cape.40 This demonstrated the lengths to which Britain could get loyalty 
from its colonies. 
In Chile, the government maintained its position of neutrality throughout 
the war despite pressure from the United States. The campaign which the 
United States of America undertook against neutral countries, resulted in 
38Blakemore, 'War of Pacific to 1930,' in Bethell (ed), Chile since Independence, p. 69. 
39E.S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign. Policy, pp. 13-16. 
40M.E. Muller, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse verteenwoordiging 1910-1972, p. 47. 
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countries like Chile being branded in Allied quarters as pro-German.41 As 
already mentioned, Britain tried its utmost to discourage British colonies 
from trading with the enemy. The intentions of Britain to brand Chile as 
pro-German appeared in a memorandum, received by the Secretary of 
Defense in South Africa on 5 January 1917. The document describes how 
German propaganda was transmitted in neutral countries. According to it, 
the government department responsible for the general pursuit of 
propaganda was the German Foreign Office. The branch of the Foreign 
Office which dealt. with such matters was called the Zentralste//e fur 
Auslandsdienst. In South America the propaganda was issued more for 
the purposes of securing an unassailable position for Germany, than of 
influencing the inhabitants on war related issues. It was stated 
furthermore, that newspapers like the Gazeta de Chile, Revista de/ 
Pacffico and Deutsche-Chilianische Bund were reputed to be aciive 
propaganda media utilised by the Germans in South America, in general 
and in Chile, in particular.42 
Britain continued her own campaign by declaring in a circular dated 16 
March 1917, that it refused to issue licenses for exports to firms of neutral 
or pro-German countries. The British colonies, including South Africa, 
were encouraged to adopt a similar policy. Encouragement from Britain 
and persuasion from the memorandum sent to the Secretary of Defense in 
January 1917, resulted in the South African Prime Minister's Office issuing 
a refusal to allow coal exports to be sent to the Chilean-German coke 
comp<::ny Companfa Carbonffera y de Fundici6n Schwager in Coronel.43 In 
January 1918, Britain informed South Africa of an agreement that had 
41 TA Bailey, The Policy of the United States towards Neutrals, pp. 18-22. 
42South African National Defense Force Archives (SANDFA), Secretary of Defense. 
Group 2 (henceforth DC) 782, file no.: DC 2351/9199: German system of press control 
and propaganda, 5 January 1917. 
43NAR, SAD, GG 589, file no.: 9/51/123: War 1914-1917: Refusal of all exports to Chile, 
16 March 1917. 
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been concluded between it and the United States. This involved the 
shipment of goods from Britain and the British Empire to consignees in 
both Central and South America. Numerous consignees there were 
considered to be pro-German. They were included on both the British 
Statutory List and United States Enemy Trading List and their citizens 
could be subjected to detention.44 The country of Chile was so regarded 
since it maintained its non-alignment policy throughout the war and this 
constrained South Africa's relations with Chile. 
An incident occurred in August 1918 which illustrated the strained relations 
between Chile and South Africa and which was the outcome of the 
publication of the British Statutory List and the United States of America's 
Enemy Trading List. This incident was also due to the agreement which 
both Britain and United States of America had signed in January 1918. 
The incident unfolded when the London Chilean Legation informed A.J. 
Balfour, an official of the Foreign Office in London, that a Chilean citizen, 
Don Felipe Santiago Fonck, had bought shares in the South African East 
Rand Proprietary Mines Limited (E.R.P.M.). The British authorities 
suspected, however, that Fonck was actually a German subject. Fonck 
had given a Hamburg address when purchasing the shares, although he 
was at the time living in Vina de/ Mar (refer to map on p. 56) in Chile. The 
British authorities disregarded the fact that he was living in Chile at the 
time. They wanted to work under the agreement which Britain had entered 
into with the United States of America. The South African Government was 
ordered to pay a portion of the dividends of Fonck's shares to the Public 
Trustee in London and the rest to the Custodian of Enemy Property in 
Pretoria. 45 
44NAR, SAD, GG 565, file no.: 9/271242: War 1914-1918: Trading with the Enemy. 
Reciprocal arrangement with United States. Letter from the Foreign Office in London to 
Viscount Buxton, Governor General, 24 January 1918. 
45NAR, SAD, GG 566, file no.: 9/271273: War 1914-1918: Trading with the Enemy. Shares 
belonging to Chilean citizen, 14 August to 18 September 1918. 
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All of the above incidents illustrated the control Britain wielded over the 
colonies and their external relations with nations not in Britain's favour. 
South Africa and Chile maintained somewhat strained relations throughout 
World War I. This negative effect on the relations between Chile and South 
Africa was, firstly, due to restraints imposed by Britain and the United 
States of America. Secondly, it was due to the manner in which Chile and 
South Africa's ruling authorities responded to these restraints. Their 
restrained relations during the First World War demonstrated that both 
countries submitted to the great powers. 
The rise of Germany in the 1880s and the threat she posed to Britain's 
position in the world order, had serious effects in both South Africa and 
Chile. The Germans became involved in the economic activities of both of 
these countries, and challenged the position which Britain had occupied 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a result of Germany's 
interference in the South African War (1899-1902) and the number of 
German colonists who had settled in Chile in the late nineteenth century, a 
sector of the Chilean population, resentful of the hold which Britain had 
managed to exert on the Chilean economy, supplied the Boers with arms 
and ammunition in their battle against the British. To summarise, shortly 
after the South African War ended in 1902, another international disaster, 
the First World War (1914-1918), had an impact on South African-Chilean 
relations. The Chilean economy was affected by the demands from both 
the Allies and the Central Powers for nitrates for their war efforts. Chile 
decided to remain neutral in the conflict being scared into a serious 
economic depression after the British, and then the United States of 
America, blacklisted and imposed blockades on Chile as they decided to 
brand the republic as being pro-German. As South Africa was a British 
colony she was obliged to side with Britain in the First World War. South 
Africa was only allowed to maintain consular relations with Chile during 
this period and was prevented from having any commercial or other 
diplomatic relations with Chile. 
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CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA AND INTER-
NATIONAL EVENTS, 1919-1948. 
The rise of communism and the 1929 Great Depression had a bearing on 
both Chile and South Africa's domestic affairs, which in turn affected their 
bilateral relations. These nations' domestic affairs dominated their 
attention more than their commercial relations with each other did. Another 
international factor to influence relations was the emergence of the United 
States of America as a new force in the world centre stage after the First 
World War. The United States of America began to replace Britain as a 
dominant force in Latin America, and more particularly in Chile's economy, 
society and politics. Towards the end of World War II, Britain realised that 
she was losing her grip on South America. In 1946 Britain therefore 
undertook a campaign to propagate amongst British investors the 
commercial advantages of South America. Relations with Chile were 
encouraged and the dominions were given favourable reports. As a result 
South Africa established direct diplomatic relations with Chile in 1948 by 
opening the South African Legation in Santiago. 
* * * * * 
After World War I, as a result of the loss of the European nitrate markets 
due to competition from the German synthetic nitrates and in response to 
the world economic recession in 1919 and 1921, Chile experienced 
economic hardship. Their economy was thrown into the grips of a severe 
economic depression long before the 1929 Wall Street Crash. The Chilean 
post-war economic recession was brought about by the Allies' Nitrate of 
Soda Executive. This body was responsible for obtaining a constant 
supply of nitrates to fuel the Allies' wartime effort against the Central 
Powers. However once the war was over it dumped its supplies of nitrates 
onto the world markets, which brought prices down and reduced Chile's 
exports by 66 percent. Many mines were forced to close and 
unemployment levels rose. 1 As a result of the economic distress, Chile 
18. Collier and W.F. Sater, History of Chile, p. 202. 
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experienced much political instability and social unrest.2 During the 1920s, 
the Chilean Communist Party, under the leadership of Luis Emilio 
Recabarren, worked closely with organised labour and protested against 
the exploitation of the Chilean proletariat. The working class participated in 
strikes and riots that were widespread from lquique in the north to Puerto 
Natales in the south.3 Between 1920 and 1927 several Chilean presidents 
tried to improve the economic and social conditions of the country, but 
they all failed and were overthrown and replaced by someone new. 
In 1927 when Carlos Ibanez became Chilean president he imposed a 
dictatorship and remained in power until 1931. Ibanez implemented 
authoritarian politics by imprisoning political opponents and labour leaders. 
He tried to squash the communist ideas by censoring and restricting free 
political activities.4 Ibanez also imposed his statist activist ideas that led to 
a slight improvement in the economy. The Chilean Government for the first 
time in the twentieth century expanded the role it played in the economy. 
The mining export industry was encouraged to improve productivity, 
industrialisation was stimulated, a mild programme of agrarian reform was 
instituted and the country's infrastructure was improved. Loans and foreign 
investment that came largely from the United States of America financed 
all of these ideas.5 During the 1920s, the United States of America began 
increasingly to replace Chile's other foreign investors and trading partners, 
like Britain, Germany and France. 
Chile's economic recovery was however short lived. In 1929 as a result of 
the Wall Street Crash, mineral exports fell and financing from foreigners 
2G. Grant, 'The State and the Formation of a Middle Class: A Chilean Example,' LAP 10, 
2 and 3, (1983), pp. 151-152. 
3A. Barnard, 'Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents and Chilean relations with the 
United States, 1940-1947,' JLAS, 13, 2, (1981), p. 347. 
4T.E. Skidmore and P.H. Smith, Modern Latin America, pp. 124~125. 
5 /bid. 
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ceased. The depression emphasised the republic's vulnerability to 
upheavals on the international scene.6 The depression struck and affected 
the mining sector first and hardest. The value of copper and nitrates 
dropped. The world prices for agricultural goods fell, the consumption of · 
food from the mining areas dwindled, and the depression reverberated 
from the mining sector into the agrarian.7 As foreign exchange, savings 
and investment dried up, landowners and industrialists alike blamed the 
government and Ibanez was overthrown in 1931.8 
During the 1930s, Chilean reformers criticised the excessive national 
dependence on the foreign sector. In response, Chile under President 
Arturo Alessandri between 1932 and 1938 embarked on a nationalist-
development path that centred on import-substitution industrialisation. 
Alessandri followed a trend that was similar to other Latin American 
countries which turned away from "export-led growth towards inward 
looking development based on import-substituting industrialization." 9 The 
nationalist-development model was based on a combination of state 
capital, private local capital and foreign capital as the main propellers of 
indigenous economic growth.10 Pursuing Chile's intention of increasing her 
export revenues a Chilean mission under the leadership of the Under-
secretary for Foreign Affairs, Francisco Landerstoy, visited South Africa in 
1934 to extend her commercial relations. 11 During the 1930s, Chile signed 
6Grant, 'State and Middle Class,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p.154. 
7P. Drake, 'Chile, 1930-1958,' in L. Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, pp. 93-95. 
8 /bid. 
9V. Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p. 17. 
10Grant, 'State and Middle Class,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 155. 
11 NAR, SAD, Dept. of Trade and Industry (henceforth HEN) 4317, file no.: 747, vol. 1: 
Trade with Chile. Trade relations and Treaties. Extract from the Cape Times, 24 April 
1934. 
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commercial agreements with France, United States and Britain as part of 
her ambition to boost exports.12 
Chile utilised these export revenues to stimulate manufacturing 
development and invested them in the construction of infrastructure 
necessary for the national industry. State enterprises were established in 
areas necessary for the growth of the consumer industry like public 
utilities, petroleum, pharmaceuticals and sugar refining. This economic 
reconstruction programme was successful, partly because of the gradual 
revival on the international market.13 But despite the aim to reduce its 
dependency on the foreign sector and to achieve greater self-sufficiency, 
United States of America's investments there grew by 80%. United States 
of America's companies dominated Chile's mining sector. During this 
period copper and nitrates made up nearly 80% of Chile's exports. The 
United States of America thus became Chile's premier trading partner so 
that Britain and Germany were no longer her chief source of export 
revenue.14 During the 1930s, World War II and afterwards, Chile relied on 
the U.S.A. for manufactured consumer goods, food and capital goods. The 
U.S.A. was ever-taking over larger portions of the Chilean economy that 
had once been dominated by Britain.15 In response to the intensified threat 
that the U.S.A. presented to British trade and commerce with Chile the 
British Government from 1936 onwards encouraged British investors to 
pursue commercial interests with Chile. Accordingly, the British 
Ambassador in Chile, Robert Mitchell, compiled favourable reports on 
conditions there. 16 
12NAR, SAD, Dept. of Foreign Affairs (unarranged group), (henceforth BTS) file no.: 
1 /42/3: Chile Annual Foreign Office Reports, 1931, 1934, 1936. 
13Grant, 'State and Middle Class,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 155. 
14Drake, 'Chile, 1930-1958,' in Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, p. 87. 
15/bid. 
16NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1/42/3: Chile. Annual Reports, 1936, 1938. 
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In 1939 World War II broke out and once again the world was divided into 
two camps, supporters of either the Allies or the Axis Powers. The Chilean 
Government under Aguirre Cerda remained neutral in the conflict, as it had 
during World War I. There were two reasons for this decision. Firstly, in 
1939 Chile had experienced a devastating earthquake, with the result that 
her attention was thus focused on the domestic problems and not 
participating in the war. Secondly, the Chilean Government feared that 
pro-Allied moves would provoke a political reaction from the German 
settlement in the south of Chile.17 They contributed greatly to the national 
economy and the Government had no wish to antagonise them. 
Nevertheless, between 1939 and 1941 while the U.S.A. remained a 
neutral force in the war, the North Americans were purchasing large 
supplies of nitrates from Chile which they in turn supplied to the Allies for 
their war effort. However, in December 1941 after the bombing of Pearl 
Harbour, the United States abandoned its neutral stance, and 
subsequently placed tremendous pressure on Chile to join the Allies. 
Finally, in January 1943, the new Chilean President Antonio Rios declared 
war on the Axis Powers. The reasons for joining the Allies were that 
President Rios knew how dependent Chile was on U.S. foreign investment 
and trade. Furthermore, he also remembered the hardship that the country 
had suffered during World War I as a result of blockades and 
blacklisting.18 
Unlike in World War I, Chile was not placed under pressure from Britain 
during the first years of the war. Britain realised that Latin America was 
increasingly becoming infiltrated by the United States. Thus, despite 
disapproving of these countries remaining neutral, Britain did not alienate 
the area completely.19 Britain's colonies were not encouraged to break off 
17NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1/42/3, vol. 1: Chile. Annual Reports. May 1943. 
18M.J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relation with Argentina and Chile 
during World War II, pp. 23-34. · 
19NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1 /42/3, vol. 1: Chile. Annual Reports, 1941 and 1942. 
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relations with Chile. Nevertheless, only in 1943 did Edmund Rogelio Piffre 
fill the post of Chilean Consul in South Africa, which had been vacated by 
Mrs Dora P. Marais in 1938. 20 
In the years after the Second World War, the United States intensified its 
campaign to monopolise as much of the Latin America economies as it 
could. The United States was now a world power and managed to displace 
Britain and exert her own influence throughout the globe. Like other Latin 
American countries, Chile's dependence on the United States also 
deepened. In 1946, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla became Chilean president 
and he made it his aim to keep United States investors happy. By ensuring 
that the United States was satisfied with local conditions, the Chilean 
Government hoped to retain the support of the upper and middle classes 
wl1ich benefited directly from United States involvement.21 
After the war, Britain tried desperately to improve her status in the world 
order. She realised that she was losing her grip on the economies of Latin 
America. In a desperate effort to maintain her dignity she launched a 
campaign to encourage British investment, and stronger diplomatic and 
commercial relations between herself, her colonies and the Latin American 
countries, particularly Chile, Argentina and Brazil. Britain also encouraged 
diplomatic ties not only between Chile and herself but also with British 
colonies.22 Following up in May 1947, the Chilean Ambassador in London, 
Manuel Bianchi, inquired about establishing direct bilateral relations with 
20SANDFA, DC 2243 Group 2, file no.: 705/2, Chapter 1: Consular Representatives. 
General List of Consuls of Foreign Countries stationed in the Union of South Africa. 
21 Barnard, 'Chilean Relations with United States,' JLAS, 13, 2, (1981 ), pp. 361-363. 
22NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1/42/4: Chilean Economic and Financial Matters, Printed report 
from the British Foreign Office to the Dominions on Anglo-Chilean Trade, 14 June 1946. 
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South Africa. A year later, Chile re-established the Chilean Consulate, 
headed by Jose Palma Serrano, which had been vacant since 1943. 23 
Like Chile, during the period 1919 to 1948, South Africa was affected by 
upheavals on the international scene. Chile had suffered from an 
economic depression during the later war years and up until the early 
1920s while South Africa experienced similar dilemmas. As a result of the 
increase in the cost of equipment and the general production of gold 
mining, together with the declining gold price during the war years, more 
than half of the gold mines in the Witwatersrand were threatened with 
closure by 1920. The economic situation caused unrest and strikes from 
miners who feared that their jobs were at stake.24 However, unlike in Chile 
where the workers united to protest against their exploitation, the South 
African workers were divided along racial lines. The black miners 
accounted for approximately 89,3% of the total work force in 1920 and 
they were paid lower salaries than their white colleagues. 25 A colour bar 
was also implemented which restricted certain jobs in the mines to whites 
only and vice versa. Despite these fissures, both white and black 
employees protested against the lower salaries. The South African 
Government had proposed that in order to reduce costs, the mines employ 
less whites and more blacks as they could be paid much less. This caused 
much tension and led to bitter clashes between white and black miners. 
During this period in the 1920s, South Africa was also influenced by 
communist ideas. However, they were mainly propagated for the whites 
23NAR, SAD, Ambassador London (henceforth BLO) 701, file no.: 38/36: Foreign 
Legations and Consuls. Correspondence between the Chilean Ambassador Manuel 
Bianchi, and the South African High Commissioners, G. Heaton-Nichols and Leif 
Egeland, 16 May 1947-13May1948. 
240. Yudelman, The Emergence of Modern South Africa: States, Capital and the 
Incorporation of Organised Labor on the South African Gold Fields, 1902-1939, pp. 134-
142. 
25Davenport, South Africa, p. 280. 
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under the slogan, "Workers of the World unite, and Fight for a white South 
Africa." 26 
South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, who took office in August 1919 
after the death of Louis Botha, had to deal with the economic and political 
crises that beset South Africa in the 1920s. He wanted to have the gold 
mining industry functioning productively as the country's economy and 
prosperity depended on it. In 1922 General Smuts instructed the South 
African Police to use whatever force was necessary to quell the unrest and 
restore order. Partly, as a result of this episode, Smuts lost the 1924 
general election and General JBM Hertzog became Prime Minister.27 
During the 1920s while the United States was expanding into the markets 
of Latin America, Britain's colonies were trying desperately to break off 
their imperial shackles. South Africa, under the leadership of their new 
Prime Minister, Hertzog, led the way. This was made possible by the fact 
that Britain had allowed her Dominions to sign· the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles alongside her, thus promoting the Dominions to a higher status 
in International Law.28 In 1926, Hertzog requested that the position and 
role of the Dominions be defined and described clearly and this was to be 
set down in writing. In 1926 the Balfour Declaration came into being which 
defined the Dominions as: 
autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in 
status, in no way subordinate to another in any respect of their 
domestic or external affairs, though united by a common 
allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations.29 
261bid., pp. 281-283. 
27 /bid. 
28S. Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations between the Two World Wars. The 
League of Nations Dimension, pp. 7-10. 
291bid., pp. 21 ·22. 
65 
Following up the Balfour Declaration, South Africa established her 
Department of External Affairs in 1927 and the South African Government 
could now determine with which nations it wished to have diplomatic 
relations.30 In 1930 Britain and Chile signed the Anglo-Chilean Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation, which was a gesture from both nations to 
facilitate, extend and regulate trade and commerce between the two of 
them as well as with Britain's colonies. However, when Chile actually 
asked for this agreement to be extended to the Empire, Britain advised her 
to pursue separate agreements with each of the Dominions. The main 
reason for this was that the South African Government for one refused to 
comply with the agreement, as it saw no benefit to itself.31 
The next bombshell on the international scene to affect South Africa's 
relations with Chile was the Great Depression, which deeply affected both 
national economies. As a result of the depression, South Africa's diamond 
trade collapsed while other major exports such as gold and wool, also 
suffered as prices plunged on the world market. On the political scene, the 
National Party's popularity began to wane and in order to salvage a joint 
victory in the 1934 election, the National Party under Hertzog and the 
South African Party under Smuts formed a coalition dubbed the South 
African National Party. Hertzog stayed on as Prime Minister and as 
Minister of External Affairs.32 
Between 1932 and 1937 there was a lapse in diplomatic relations between 
Chile and South Africa, with the resignation of Arthur Dennison Hinde as 
Chilean Consul who had been appointed as Chilean Consul in 1915.33 
30/bid., p. 22. 
31 NAR, SAD, BLO 689, file no.: PS 35/7, vol. 1: Americas. Chile. Draft treaty sent from 
South African High Commissioner, Adv. Charles T. de Water, to Minister of External 
Affairs, J. Hertzog, April 1930. 
32Davenport, South Africa, pp. 302-305. 
33SANDFA, DC Group 2, 2243, file no.: 705/2 Chapter 1, 2 and 3: Consular 
representatives and Consuls of Foreign Countries in South Africa. 
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Despite the break in consular relations, small scale commercial relations 
persisted between the two countries. But the general attitude of the South 
Africans was an ambivalent one. Without much push or shove, the South 
African Government were more drawn to western Europe and the United 
States, than to the Latin American sub-continent. 
In September 1939 World War II broke out and this international 
catastrophe affected South African politics as well as bilateral relations 
with other nations .. The outbreak of the war caused a split in the South 
African Cabinet between Prime Minister Hertzog, who wanted to remain 
neutral, and Smuts, who was in favour of breaking off relations with 
Germany. After a parliamentary vote of 80 to 67 votes, South Africa 
declared war on Germany.34 General Jan Smuts thus became the S0uth 
African Prime Minister until 1948. Although Britain did not as hard as in 
World War I Smuts' South Africa was guided only to pursue relations with 
nations who were in good standing with Britain.35 
At the end of the war in September 1945, the mood on the international 
stage had changed. Britain's world power status, waning since World War 
I was now virtually extinguished. The United States now occupied that 
position. Having absorbed the markets which had once been dominated 
by Britain. Secondly, many of Britain's colonies were striving for their 
independence and many, like India, had revolted against the racial 
undertones of British Imperialism. South Africa's internal policies of racial 
segregation were intensifying. As a result of new independent Asian and 
African states, South Africa began receiving external criticisms of her 
policies. Prime Minister Smuts, a founder member of the United Nations, 
wanted South Africa to play a more prominent role both in the British 
Commonwealth and on the African continent. He was however, not 
34Davenport, South Africa, pp. 327-328. 
35G. Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), South Africa: Government and 
Politics, p. 289. · 
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expecting the international scene to change so drastically. In order to 
alleviate criticisms, particularly from India and Russia, regarding South 
Africa's domestic policies, he made an exerted effort to establish 
diplomatic relations with countries not on the European continent.36 
Between April 1947 and April 1948, Smuts attempted to establish bilateral 
relations with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile. However, he was only 
successful in doing so with Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Uruguay allowed 
South Africa to send a representative to Montevideo but, did not 
reciprocate. Thus in May 1948 when the National Party came to power, 
direct biiateral relations between Chile and South Africa were already in 
place.37 
36/bid., pp. 290-291. 
37NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Correspondence between G. Heaton-Nichols and 
Lief Egeland, South African High Commissioners, and D.B. Sole, a senoir official of the 
Dept. of External Affairs, May 1947 to March 1948. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE INFLUENCE OF CHILEAN POLITICAL 
PARTIES AND FIGURES ON BILATERAL 
RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFFRICA, 1830-1902 
International events during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were 
not the only factors that determined relations between Chile and South 
Africa. During the period 1830 to 1902, several personalities and political 
parties in Chile, South Africa and Britain also had a major influence. 
Special emphasis has to be placed on the role which Chilean personalities 
and parties played in influencing relations with Britain and subsequently 
South Africa during the period 1830 to 1902. Between 1831 and 1871, the 
Chilean political scene was dominated by the Conservative Party which 
obtained its support from the elite sectors of the population who benefited 
especially from trade and involvement with British vessels along the 
lengthy coastline. The national presidents from the Conservative Party, 
General Joaquin Prieto (1831-1840), General Bulnes (1841-1850), Manuel 
Monti (1851-1860) and Jose Perez (1861-1870) did everything in their 
power to maintain good relations with Britain in order to satisfy their 
electorate. During the Conservative era, several missions were undertaken 
by individuals like Ramon Friere, a former national president, and Diego 
Portales, a merchant, to forge relations with Britain and her colonies. 
During the 1830s Chile established relations with Australia which was a 
British colony. Chile's relations with Britain were also favourable. However, 
she only established direct diplomatic relations with the British colony at 
the Cape in the late 1860s. British ships regularly sailed between the 
continents of South America and southern Africa en route to the east, 
providing opportuntities for trade and contacts between South Africa and 
Chile. 
In 1871 Federico Errazuriz became president and the Conservative Party 
no longer had the upper hand over the electorate. In the 1860s they 
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formed an alliance with the Liberal Party in preparations to contest the 
1871 election. Through the Conservative Party, whose supporters were 
Chile's bourgeoisie who benefitted the most from external relations with 
Britain, relations with Britain and her colonies were maintained. However, 
during the 1870s the world recession affected the Chilean economy very 
badly as the demand for copper and silver declined on the world market. 
The result was that certain elements of the Chilean Liberal Party became 
nervous of having the Chilean economy so dependent on Britain. 
In 1879 when Anibal Pinto was president, the War of the Pacific broke out 
between Chile, Peru and Bolivia. It ended in 1884 when Chile defeated the 
other two nations and seized the provinces of Antafogasta and Tarapaca. 
(Refer to maps on pages 56 and ix.) These areas were rich in nitrates and 
as a result of the victory, Chile obtained a monopoly of the industry. 
Shortly after the war, both British and German investors were interested in 
obtaining shares in the lucrative industry. In 1886, Jose Manuel 
Balmaceda, a Liberal, was elected as president. The Conservative Party 
was no longer prime in Chilean politics. Balmaceda objected to the 
stranglehold that Britain had on the Chilean economy and launched a 
campaign to curb it. He tried to nationalise industries, particularly mining, 
or alternatively tended rather to favour and encourage investment from 
Germany. However, the oligarchy, with assistance and encouragement 
from Britain, managed to overthrow Balmaceda in a Civil War in 1891. 
During his term of office, Chile maintained restrained diplomatic relations 
with Britain and her colonies. The Balmaceda Crisis in effect split the 
Chilean population into pro- and anti-British groups which determined 
relations with the four South African territories in the 1890s and early 
1900s. After Balmaceda had been ousted, Federico Errazuriz returned to 
the presidency as he favoured involvement with Britain. In 1896, he asked 
the British monarch, Queen Victoria, to assist in settling a border dispute 
with Argentina which demonstrated the lengths ~hat elements in the 
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Chilean Government were prepared to go to maintain favourable relations 
with Britain for the benefit of this collaborating oligarchy. 
* * * * * 
As already mentioned in the period between 1831 and 1871, the Chilean 
political scene was dominated by the Conservative Party. It received its 
mandate predominantly from the landholding and commercial elite, who 
were avid supporters and immediate beneficiaries of economic relations 
with Britain. As a result, national presidents during this period did their 
utmost to support and encourage commercial and diplomatic ties with 
Britain and her empire. 
The first Chilean personality to establish diplomatic ties with one of 
Britain's colonies, namely Australia, was General Ramon Friere. During 
the 1830s, this former Chilean president while in exile in Sydney, set the 
wheels in motion and forged diplomatic relations with Australia.1 Friere had 
been responsible for leading a rebellion in 1823 through which he replaced 
Bernardo O' Higgins as president. He hung on to the presidency until 1826 
when a civil war broke out, his forces were defeated by General Joaquin 
Prieto driving him into exile.2 
During the 1830s, Diego Portales who served under General Joaquin 
Prieto's presidency, managed to stabilise Chile and did his utmost to 
protect and nurture the interests of the supporters of the Conservative 
Party. Its supporters were essentially the landholding and commercial 
elites who wanted a strong unitary state. From the 1830s until the 1870s, 
Chile was governed by a strong central and conservative government 
whose diplomatic orientation was towards Europe and Great Britain in the 
commercial, financial and cultural fields. Chile's commercial relations with 
1 Bader, 'Before the Gold Fleets,' JLAS, 6, 1, (1974), p. 45. 
2 Stickler, The Saga of Chile, pp. 99-100. 
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countries like Australia and Britain flourished. 3 Portales, together with the 
Minister of the Treasury, Manuel Rengifo, did their utmost to eradicate 
problems and attract greater interest from Britain and Europe in the way of 
commerce. In 1832 a national merchant marine was created to ensure a 
ready supply of ships to transport Chilean products to the world markets.4 
Chilean farmers were encouraged to cultivate new land. Irrigation projects 
were initiated, canals were constructed and farmers began modernising 
their methods of production.5 The agricultural produce was exported in 
exchange for luxury items. From the 1830s, Chile began its spiral of 
dependency on Britain. Loans from Britain formed the backbone of funds 
used by the Conservative Government to develop Chile's economy.6 The 
involvement of Britain in the Chilean economy provided the Chilean 
Government with an incentive to establish relations also with Britain's 
colonies. 
Chile's relations with Britain and her colonies began in the 1830s with 
Australia as we have seen. Under the Conservative Government, Chile 
forged links with the present day states of New South Wales, Queensland 
and Victoria. In the 1830s and 1840s, under Conservative Chilean 
President General Bulnes (1841-1851 ), many ships travelled regularly 
between the port of Valparaiso and the Australian port of Sydney.7 From 
the 1830s onwards, virtually a!I the Chilean agents managing trade were 
affiliated to foreign trading concerns whose head offices were in London. 
During this period many British companies made their base in Chile and 
were all intimately linked to international trade.8 Britain emerged as Chile's 
3 Bauer, 'Industry and the Missing Bourgeoisie,' HAHR, 70, 2, (May 1990), pp. 233, 247. 
4 C. Veliz, Historia de la marina mercante de Chile, pp. 52-60. 
5 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 22. 
6 Grant, 'State and Middle Class,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, (1983), p. 153. 
7 Bader, 'Before the Gold Fleets,' JLAS, 6, 1, (1974), pp. 35-57. 
8 Jbid., pp. 42-44. 
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most important trading partner and from 1831 until 1871, the Conservative 
Party did everything in its power to maintain and strengthen such 
relations.9 
Throughout the Conservative Era, 1831-1871, the Chilean Presidents from 
Prieto to Jose Perez respected the wishes of the Chilean bourgeois class 
and remained in good favour with Britain as this assured them of victory 
during elections. Chile's merchants and mine-owners supported the idea 
of free trade, with the reasoning that an increase in Chilean exports would 
result in a lower price for their favoured imported luxury items.1° From the 
1830s, Chile's silver, copper and nitrate mining enterprises had already 
attracted the attention of British investors. Coal mining also became a well-
established economic activity in Chile, and similarly, attracted the attention 
of Britain. In the early 1840s, the development of steam navigation created 
a demand for coal from Chile, with the British company Pacific Steam 
Navigation purchasing the largest quantity. 11 From the 1850s, the nitrate 
industry with the backing of British investors stimulated commerce and 
industry in Chile that resulted in the establishment of modern 
infrastructure.12 The revenue and foreign investment generated from the 
silver, copper and coal mines financed the importation of technology and 
technicians. This led to many internal developments in Chile. Its first 
railway was constructed from Chanarcillo to the port of Caldera, while 
smelters were established in Tongoy, Guayacan and Lota. 13 (These 
places are indicated on the maps on pages 56 and ix.) 
9C. Pregger-Roman, 'Class and Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile,' LAP. 
18, 1, (1991), p.136. 
10M.C. Needler, An Introduction to Latin American Politics. The Structure of Conflict, p. 
13. 
11 L Ortega, 'The First Four Decades of the Chilean Coal Mining Industry, 1840-1879,' 
JLAS, 14, 1, (1982), pp. 2-3. 
12C.G. Pregger-Roman, 'Origin and development of the bourgeoisie,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, 
(1983), p. 39. . 
13Sater, Southern Cone Nations, pp. 25-26. 
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Analogous to the landholders and merchants, the mine-owners were also 
stalwarts of the Conservative Party, likewise beneficiaries of Britain's 
involvement in the Chilean economy. Despite the prosperity that Britain 
and the export-based economy brought to these people, discontent was 
rife amongst other sectors of the population. Towards the late 1850s, the 
Chilean economy actually began to lose momentum. This was the result of 
a decline in the demand for foodstuffs from countries like Australia and the 
United States, once their gold mining enterprises had become less 
productive. 14 The resultant economic problems laid the basis for civil war 
in Chile in 1859. Silver miners from the north, coal miners from Lota and 
Coronel, and farmers nationwide joined forces in a rebellion against the 
government. Though the government managed to squash it, the 
domination of politics by the elite was weakened as from that date.15 The 
opposition party, the Liberal Party, who since the 1820s had advocated 
less centralised government, limited presidential power, legal equality and 
freedom for individuals, splintered, and the dissidents founded the Radical 
Party.16 It addressed the interests and concerns of the lower middle class 
and proletarian miners. Furthermore, they favoured a decentralised 
government, honest elections, secular government and the abolition of 
binding government to the Catholic Church.17 
Despite the changing political attitude towards the Conservative Party from 
the 1850s, the Chilean Government continued to satisfy the demands and 
needs of the elite groups in Chile and resolutely maintained amicable 
economic and diplomatic relations with Britain. In the mid-1860s, under 
President Jose Perez, Chile gave Britain permission to establish an 
14 Ibid., p. 22. 
15 Stickler, The Saga of Chile, pp. 102-103. 
16 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 114. 
17 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 28. 
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honorary Chilean Consul at the Cape Colony. The Consulate was to be 
manned by officials appointed by the British Government. Those officials 
were prominent businessmen from the Cape Colony. In August 1867 
Guillermo Jorge Anderson was appointed as honorary Chilean Consul in 
Cape Town.18 In 1868 Britain approached the Chilean Government for 
their consent to appoint another honorary Chilean Consul in the Cape 
Colony stationed in Port Elizabeth. This was done in 1869 when an 
honorary Chilean consular post, occupied by David Ferguson Stewart, was 
established in Port Elizabeth.19 Thus, by 1870 Chile had two honorary 
consular posts in the Cape Colony and this was consented to and 
undertaken to satisfy the Chilean interests who benefited from favourable 
relations with Britain. 
The mood of optimism and confidence that characterised Chile in the 
1850s and 1860s was severely shaken in the mid-1870s when Errazuriz 
ruled. From approximately 1873, the world including Chile was beset by 
economic depression. This was due to the collapse of the silver boom; the 
appearance of new and more efficient producers of wheat on the world 
economy; the decline in copper prices also as a result of new producers 
and the end of the Franco-Prussian War; the shift to the gold standard by 
Germany and other countries which caused a drop in the value of silver; 
as well as severe floods and droughts.20 The recession experienced on 
the international markets caused financial panic in Britain, Europe and 
United States, plunging them into severe economic crises. In Chile, the 
economic situation resulted in social unrest. 21 Luckly for him Errazuriz 
ended his term before the economic crisis vented its full force on Chilean 
18 CAD, Government House (henceforth GH) 1 /316, file no.: 73: Issue of Exequatur to the 
Chilian Consul at Cape Town, October 1867. 
19 CAD, GH 1/322, file no. 57: Issue of Exequatur to the Chilian Consul at Port Elizabeth, 
February 1869. 
20 S. Collier, 'From Independence to the War of the Pacific,' in L. Bethell (ed.), Chile since 
Independence, p. 29. · 
21 Stickler, The Saga of Chile, p. 30. 
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society. Anibal Pinto, who came in as president in 1876 and remained in 
office until 1881 was forced to address the economic situation and tackle 
the social problems that the depression left in its wake. Not only was the 
economy in the grips of depression during the late 1870s; there was also 
much squabbling in political life amongst the various parties. Pinto tried 
addressing this animosity by accommodating the political differences, but, 
this was regarded as weakness by the Chilean public.22 For, during Pinto's 
term of office, he was forced to take the Chilean currency off the gold 
standard in 1878. -This feebleness hurt the pride of Chile's middle and 
upper classes. These sectors were further offended by the decision of the 
government in the same year to impose a tariff system to protect native 
industries and producers.23 However, before the political situation could 
become a full-scale crisis, the Chilean Government managed to distract 
the electorate by plunging into a border dispute with its northern 
neighbours, Peru and Bolivia, which detonated the War of the Pacific 
(1879-1884). 
Of course, there was nothing all that new in this ploy. Ever since 
independence Chile and its northern neighbours, Bolivia and Peru had 
been involved in boundary disputes. In the late 1870s, the boundary 
became an issue when the resources in the area, namely nitrates became 
commercially viable. Successions of treaties between the separate states 
were made. 24 One such treaty was signed in 1874, in which Chile agreed 
to abandon its claim on the Atacama Deseri, on condition that the Bolivian 
authorities did not increase taxes on Chilean corporations in the area. 
However, in 1878 these corporations complained that Bolivia had indeed 
raised taxes. When the Chilean Government reacted, Bolivia confiscated 
the companies, and an international border dispute followed. Hilari6n 
22 H. Blakemore, 'From the War of Independence to the War of the Pacific.' in Bethell 
(ed.), Chile since Independence, pp. 34-35. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 35. 
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Daza, Bolivian President, and General Mariano Prado, Peruvian President, 
formed a military alliance. When Bolivia refused to yield to demands from 
Chile, it declared war on both Bolivia and Peru in April 1879. 25 Despite 
Chile's unpreparedness to enter the war, the economic crisis and looming 
political uncertainty, it managed to capture the Bolivian coast in the first 
month of the war. In spite of this the war lasted another five years. In 
October 1883, the Treaty of Anc6n was signed between Chile and Peru in 
which Peru had to cede the province of Tarapaca. Meanwhile, the 
provinces of Tacna and Arica were handed over to Chile for ten years, 
after which a plebiscite was to determine their final ownership. A separate 
truce was secured with Bolivia in 1884. Bolivia was required to give away 
the province of Antofagasta and thus cede its coastline to Chile, becoming 
a landlocked country. 26 
As a result of the annexation of the Atacama Desert, the Peruvian 
province of Tarapaca and the Bolivian province of Antofagasta, Chile 
obtained a monopoly on nitrate production. The nitrate industry helped to 
compensate for Chilean losses that had resulted from the decline in the 
value of copper and silver. Nitrates emerged as Chile's new primary export 
product. Despite this, very few Chilean entrepreneurs were able to 
participate in the industry.27 The British investors were attracted to the 
promise of improved business conditions on the nitrate fields and were 
there first. They were further encouraged by the Chilean ruling elite to 
expand their control. Yet besides Britain, a new, more aggressive 
competitor now also emerged on the scene in the shape of Germans who 
formed settlements in Chile that received support from their Government.28 
25 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, pp. 31-32. 
26 Blakemore, 'War of Pacific to 1930,' in Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, pp. 35-
36. 
27 H. Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896. Balmaceda and North, 
p. 7. 
28 C. Pregger-Roman, 'Nineteenth Century Chile,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991), P. 125. 
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The nitrate industry attracted so much attention that Chile's earlier 
developing agrarian and industrial sectors were seriously neglected by the 
foreign investors and Chilean government.29 
During the War of 1879-1884, the Chilean Government held elections. The 
Chilean electorate was especially unhappy with the manner in which 
Pinto's Government had dealt with the economic crisis, which Chile had 
experienced as a result of changes on the world markets. The decline in 
the demand for silver during the 1870s had a major impact on Chile. The 
result was that Domingo Santa Maria, a Liberal, was elected as president. 
But, his term had to be focussed on the War of the Pacific. In 1886, Jose 
Manuel Balmaceda, was elected president. Balmaceda was an ardent 
nationalist who believed in using state machinery to develop the Chilean 
economy. He especially wanted to "Chileanize" the nitrate industry and 
used it to expand the economy in other spheres.30 The programme he 
implemented aimed at the expansion of the manufacturing sector reducing 
the importance of foreign markets and importing goods into Chile. In order 
to achieve these ideals, Balmaceda was forced to confront foreign groups, 
particularly the British, who, by now, dominated Chile's commercial and 
financial activities. His first tactic was to give protection to Chilean produce 
against foreign competitors by imposing importation tariffs. Secondly, he 
tried to reduce Britain's influence in Chile. He did this by trying to minimise 
Chile's reliance on Britain and to hand contracts to other countries as 
well. 31 An unidentified British Minister made the following observation 
while in Chile: 
I have not failed to observe that government contracts for public 
works ... had been conducted chiefly with ... Fr.ench and ... 
29 J.F. Rippy, 'British Investments in the Chilean Nitrate Industry,' Inter-American 
Economic Affairs, 8, 2, (1954), pp. 3-4. 
30 Pregger-Romiln, 'Class and politics,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991), p. 137. 
31 Pregger-Roman, 'Origin and Development of the Bourgeoisie,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, 
(1983), p. 52. 
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German firms instead of English firms as was formerly the 
case.32 
Balmaceda's third tactic was to recapture control of the nitrate industry 
that had passed into the hands of British investors. This caused 
dissatisfaction among British diplomats and investors whose general 
reaction was that Balmaceda was being "anti-foreign." 33 His fourth tactic 
was to try and stimulate the development of the industrial, agricultural, 
coal, copper and silver mining sectors with the support of Chile's ruling 
class. Fifthly, Balmaceda used government revenue to improve the 
infrastructure of the country. 34 
Balmaceda's campaign affected Chile's relations with South Africa, more 
particularly the Cape Colony, during the 1880s. In 1886 Britain was not 
granted permission from Balmaceda's Government to fill the vacant 
Chilean honorary consular post in Cape Town. The post had become 
vacant as a result of William S. Anderson's resignation. He had occupied 
that position since the early 1870s after the resignation of Guillermo Jorge 
Anderson.35 However, the honorary consular post in Port Elizabeth 
occupied by David Stewart remained intact. 
Despite Balmaceda's good intentions to make Chile more self re:iant, less 
dependent on Britain, and to diversify the economy from its exclusive 
export-base, he made many enemies in Chile's ruling class and among 
people in Britain. 36 By 1890, British investors and capitalists regarded 
Balmaceda as a threat to British prosperity in the Chilean nitrate fields. 
These investors feared that Balmaceda would again secure a majority in 
32 Ibid. 
33 Pregger-Roman, 'Nineteenth Century Chile,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991), p. 127. 
34 Pregger-Roman, 'Origin and Development of the bourgeoisie,' LAP, 10, 2 and 3, 
(1983), pp. 52-53. 
35 CAD, GH 11322, file no.: 13: Resignation of Chilian Consul at"Cape Town. 
36 Pregger-Roman, 'Relative Autonomy of States,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991 ), pp. 127-130. 
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the elections on 1891. British investors encouraged Chile's wealthy nitrate 
mine-owners to organise a rebellion to overthrow Balmaceda. The 
involvement of British mine-owners was visible in a report compiled by 
Patrick Egan, United States ambassador. 
[It was]. . . officially reported to the government that the 
managers ... of the English [nitrate] oficinas in Tarapaca urged 
their workmen to join the revolutionists, promising them £2 per 
day during their term of service and holding out the threat that 
unless they did join they would never again get employment in 
T . 37 arapaca ... 
The groups supporting Balmaceda were the copper, silver and coal mining 
entrepreneurs, many industrialists and some entrepreneurs. On the other 
hand, the nitrate entrepreneurs, bankers, some agriculturists and their 
foreign supporters opposed Balmaceda.38 
In 1891 a civil war broke out. Balmaceda's forces were defeated and he 
fled to the Argentine embassy in Santiago. His defeat left British interests 
in the nitrate industry unscathed.39 The Balmaceda Crisis left a period of 
uncertainty and effectively divided the Chilean population into two camps, 
those that supported Britain and those who disliked Britain. These two 
factions determined the relations that Chile had with the four South African 
territories, particularly during the South African War (1899-1902).40 The 
pro-British group offered assistance in the form of horses, mules, donkeys 
and soldiers to the British forces fighting in South Africa. 41 Meanwhile the 
anti-British group, with the assistance of France and Germany, supplied 
the Boer republics with arms, ammunition in the form of nitrates and food 
37 Ibid., p. 129. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 44. 
40 NAR, TAD, Microfilm Collection M594, Foreign Office (henceforth FO) 2/269, pp. 108-
111: Chilian Sympathy for Boers, Correspondence from Audley Gosling, British Consul in 
Santiago, 1 November 1899. 
41 NAR, TAD, M560, FO 2/337, p. 28: Volunteers for South Africa from Chile, 
Correspondence between Chilean volunteers and Audley Gosling, 25 April 1900. 
80 
supplies during their campaign against the British at the turn of the 
century.42 
In 1891 Admiral Jorge Montt, a member of the Conservative Party, was 
appointed as president. He was described as mild-mannered. Montt's 
presidential powers were seriously curtailed by the new 1891 Chilean 
Constitution, which embraced the parliamentary regime, with the 
Legislature having supremacy over the Executive. The status of foreign 
investors was protected and improved. The option of the nationalisation of 
enterprises was abandoned by the Chilean Government in order to meet 
the demand of foreign investors.43 The Chilean elite recovered well from 
the crisis, and were now eager to participate in the North Atlantic export 
economy. They furthermore ensured that their interests would be 
protected and they would continue to govern the country, with the Chilean 
presidents being their puppets, until the 1920s.44 
Despite the situation in Chile during the 1890s, the presidents had 
achieved a few points in their favour. The economy was growing, there 
were improved amenities in the major cities and the country was kept out 
of war.45 Furthermore, several Chilean presidents played an active role in 
encouraging trade and diplomatic relations with foreign nations, including 
Britain. During Federico Errazuriz's later presidency between 1896 and 
1901, a dispute arose between Chile and Argentina concerning their 
national boundary in the far south. War threatened and Errazuriz 
requested the assistance of King Edward VII to resolve the conflict.46 
42 NAR, TAD, M595, FO 2/?71, pp. 70-78.: Nitrate of soda as contraband of war, 
Correspondence between Colonial office and Foreign Office, 9 to 11 November 1899. 
43 Blakemore, 'War of the Pacific to 1930,' in Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, p. 
56. 
44 G.Vial, Historia de Chile, 1891-1973, Vol. 2, p. 7. 
45 Blakemore, 'War of the Pacific to 1930,' in Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, p. 
67. . 
46 Ibid. 
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Despite efforts from the Chilean presidents during the 1890s to repair 
relations with Britain, the latter viewed Chile with suspicion particularly as 
they were aware of the anti-British sentiments present in sectors of the 
population.47 Furthermore, the presence of the German colonies in Chile, 
together with the support and financial assistance from the German 
Government and the threat that Germany posed against Britain's position 
in the Chilean economy made Britain reluctant to pursue ambitious 
programmes with Chile.48 This attitude had repercussions for Chile's 
relations with the Cape Colony. In 1894, the Chilean honorary consular 
post in Port Elizabeth, occupied by David Ferguson Stewart since 1869, 
became vacant as he was declared insolvent.49 The British Government 
never made any attempts to contact the Chilean Government to obtain 
their consent to fill the position and the Chilean honorary consular post 
remained vacant until 1915. 
To summarise a complex history, during the period 1830 to 1902, each of 
the Chilean presidents, from Prieto to Errazuriz, played their part in 
influencing Chilean relations with the British colonies, particularly the 
Cape. The Conservative presidents did everything in their power to 
maintain and strengthen relations with Britain in order to satisfy the 
Chilean elite, from whom they obtained their electoral support. Between 
1879 and 1884, as a result of Chile's victory in the War of the Pacific 
against Bolivia and Peru, Chile obtained a monopoly on the nitrate 
industry. It attracted the attention of foreign investors the British and the 
Germans. The nitrate industry gave the Chilean Government a certain 
amount of bargaining power. 
47 NAR, TAD, M594, FO 2/269, p. 108.: South African War: Chilian Sympathy for Boers, 
Letter from Gosling, 1 November 1899. 
48 McCuthchen McBride, Chile: Land and Society, pp. 283-284 .. 
49 CAD, GH 23/40, file no.: 83: Cancellation of Stewart's Commission as Consul for Chin, 
July 1894. 
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The Transvaal and Orange Free State Governments would obtain their 
supplies of nitrates to use as ammunition during the South African War 
(1899-1902), thus opening a new common interest for relations between 
Chile and South Africa. During the late 1880s when President Balmaceda 
was in power, relations between Chile and the Cape Colony were 
somewhat strained because of Balmaceda's attitude toward Britain. This 
was not helped by the fact that in 1886 the vacant Chilean honorary 
consular post at Cape Town remained unoccupied as Balmaceda refused 
to give Britain the necessary consent. Furthermore, because of the anti-
British climate in Chile in the 1890s, and despite the determined intentions 
of Chilean presidents Montt and Errazuriz to bring Chile back into Britain's 
favour, when the honorary consular post occupied by David Ferguson 
Stewart in Port Elizabeth was vacated in 1894, Britain was reluctant to fill 
the post and it remained vacant in South Africa until 1915. Balmaceda's 
term as president managed to divide the Chilean population into two 
camps, the pro-British and anti-British. These two camps played roles in 
the South African War with the pro-British groups assisting and supporting 
Britain while, the anti-British groups sent supplies to the Transvaal and 
Orange Free States Governments. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF SOUTH 
PERSONALITIES ON BILATERAL 
WITH CHILE, 1830·1902 
AFRICAN 
RELATIONS 
Between 1830 and the late 1860s, little contact occurred between South 
Africa and Chile. There were no South African personalities who wanted to 
establish commercial and diplomatic relations with foreign countries other 
than the Netherlands, France and Britain. However, this indifference 
·changed from the. late 1860s onwards. In the Cape and Natal, three 
knights Henry Barkly, Bartle Frere and Theophilus Shepstone together 
with their home-based counterparts, Colonial Secretaries Lords Granville, 
Kimberley and Carnarvon, created the incentives for the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Chile. Later in the South African Republic 
(Transvaal), Commandant-General Piet Joubert and State Secretary and 
Transvaal Minister Plenipotentiary in France and Europe, Dr. W.J. Leyds 
were also important in intensifying ties with Chile prior to and during the 
South African War (1899- 1902). 
* * * * * 
Unlike most Chileans who between 1830 and 1902 regarded the presence 
of the British as an opportunity to advance their economy and place 
Chilean commodities on the world market, the South African community's 
incentives were small scale because of the monopolistic practices of the 
Dutch East India Company (D.E.l.C.). The D.E.1.C. discouraged its 
colonies from competing against the mother country for markets and 
goods. Furthermore, the early European settlers at the Cape were 
generally anti-British and felt that the D.E.l.C. looked after their needs in 
the Cape of Good Hope. The composition of the European population at 
the Cape of Good Hope at the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
predominantly of Dutch origin with a small percentage of French origin. 
The occupation of the Cape by Britain in 1806 had little impact as an 
incentive for economic growth by the colonists. Although Britain tried to 
implement policies to benefit both the Cape and Britain, these policies and 
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they together with the attitude of the British provoked national and 
religious antagonisms, particularly amongst the Dutch settlers.1 Between 
1836 and 1848, in an effort to elude British encroachment, approximately 
15 000 Boers decided to emigrate. Some of these trekkers moved into 
Natal; others across the Orange River; while others went further north 
across the Vaal River. This exodus meant that for the rest of the 
nineteenth century South Africa would be composed of four separate 
territories which had their own separate involvements with foreign nations 
such as Chile. The trekkers who moved further into the interior of South 
Africa engaged in an exchange economy. They traded their various 
manufactured articles and ammunition with the indigenous people in 
exchange for livestock and other frontier products.2 As an unintended 
result of the trekkers, opportunities were opened for the development of 
trade and naval relations with Britain and other European countries such 
as Portugal at Delagoa Bay and Port Natal.3 In 1842, Britain annexed 
Natal and a year later declared it a British colony. Although Britain did not 
claim the territories occupied by the Boers north of the Orange and Vaal 
Rivers these Boers were nevertheless classed as British subjects. 
However, because of the expensive wars being waged against African 
inhabitants of the eastern Cape, the Colonial Office in London decided to 
grant independence to the South African Republic (Transvaal) in 1852 and 
to the Orange River Colony in 1854.4 
Thus by 1855 South Africa was composed of four separate territories each 
determining its own foreign relations and policies. Of the four, the Cape 
was the most advanced and most capable of pursuing relations with 
distant countries like Chile but did not actually do so until the 1860s. Natal 
1 Davenport, South Africa, pp. 49-53. 
2 Ibid., pp. 76-83. 
3 W.M. Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton. The Making of the South African Native 
Problem, p. 222. 
4 Davenport, South Africa, pp. 81-82, 188-189. 
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shared the advantage of access to the sea. It was also part of the British 
Empire but, in spite of that saw no incentive to established diplomatic 
relations with Chile.5 Probably the reason for this was that the main focus 
of their activities was directed towards their mother country, Britain. 
The Cape and Natal colonies were merely two of forty British colonies 
established around the globe. Britain's imperial policies, however, pivoted 
around India. As a. result the development of export economies for Natal 
and the Cape were very low on the agenda.6 The domestic and external 
affairs of the Cape and Natal colonies were determined in London. Neither 
could make decisions, above all, as regards foreign relations, without 
consulting Britain. The executive power of the Cape was placed in the 
hands of a governor and a lieutenant-governor in Natal. Both of these 
officials were appointed by Britain and followed instructions from London.7 
The cabinet in London relied on the knowledge and experience of officials 
of the Colonial Office when making decisions about the colonies. The 
Colonial Office depended on the serious commitment and liaisons 
between the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner in each 
particular colony. At the London end, the Secretary for Colonies deployed 
sufficient rein to afford the High Commissioner wide discretion concerning 
colonial affairs.8 Thus, the territories of the Cape and to a lesser degree 
Natal were in the most favourable positions to establish relations with the 
outside world, for example, Chile. In addition, they had the geographical 
advantage of coastlines. It is thus not surprising that throughout the 
nineteenth century, the only territories to have official contact with the Latin 
American sub-continent were the colonies of the Cape and Natal. 
5 G.C. Olivier, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid, p. 15. 
6 L. Thompson, 'Great Britain and the Afrikaner Republics, 1870-1899.' in M. Wilson and 
L. Thompson (eds.), The Oxford History of South Africa. Vol. II: South Africa 1870-1966, 
pp. 1-2. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., pp. 289-290. 
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On the other hand, the Orange Free State and Transvaal, both landlocked, 
were forced into deals with their neighbours to gain access to port facilities 
and naval vessels to conduct trade with overseas nations like Chile. From 
the late 1860s diamonds were discovered in the area of Griqualand West, 
and later gold was unearthed in the Transvaal. Moreover, there arose the 
German Government's flirtations with the Boer republics. To counter this 
the British Government wanted the two British colonies and the two 
Afrikaner republics to become a white-controlled federal Dominion under 
the British Crown. By this ploy London could ensure that British 
entrepreneurs dominated the foreign trade of the region. Further, it meant 
that London determined and controlled any and all foreign relations 
developed with other nations.9 British officials in dealings with the Boer 
republics could impose conditions as the price of permission to utilise the 
coastal facilities and infrastructure of the Cape and Natal colonies.10 
Despite the ambitions of the British Government and its officials, both the 
South African Republic (ZAR) and Republic of Orange Free State were, 
nevertheless, regarded as sovereign states by the international 
community. As independent nations they had the right to establish 
diplomatic relations without the consent of Britain.11 The South African 
Republic was the first southern African territory to establish a fully fledged 
department of foreign affairs with a State Secretary in charge. The person 
who filled this portfolio was Dr W.J. Leyds. The ZAR had plenipotentiary 
ministerial representatives in The Hague, France, Germany and Portugal, 
also consular representatives in London, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg, 
Frankfort, Lisbon, Brussels, Madeira, Lourengo Marques, Rome and 
Durban. Similarly, from 1855 onwards the Orange Free State had consular 
9 Ibid., p. 47. 
10 Ibid. 
11 01ivier, Buitelandse Beleid, p. 15. 
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representatives abroad in the Netherlands, Britain, United States, Italy, 
France, Portugal, Germany and Belgium.12 
Unlike Chile, which since the 1820s had a series of national presidents 
who each contributed to Chile's domestic and foreign relations, the leaders 
of the Natat and Cape colonies during the nineteenth century 
predominantly carried out instructions from Britain. During the period 1830-
1866, no personality in either of the two British colonies or the two Boer 
republics distinguished themselves with any bold steps in the field of 
foreign policies and diplomatic involvement with other nations.13 
The later British officials who forcefully pursued the grand design to have 
the whole South African sub-continent under the British Crown, were 
Colonial Secretaries Lords Granville (1868-1870), Kimberley (1870-1874), 
and Carnarvon (1874-1880); High Commissioners and Governors of the 
Cape Colony Sir Henry Barkly (1870-1875), and Sir Bartle Frere (1877-
1881 ), and Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent to the "Native 
Tribes" of Natal.14 That grand design, in a way, brought in Chile. 
From the mid-1860s, the British Government developed a heightened 
interest in South Africa due to the discovery of diamonds. Under the 
direction of Prime Minister Gladstone the British Government pursued a 
federalist policy for southern Africa, similar to the one they pursued with 
Canada in 1867. One of the incentives for pursuing this policy 'Nas to 
boost the Cape Colony's economy as well as that of Britain by assigning 
certain powers and duties to the Cape Government in an effort to make 
12 Ibid. 
13Thompson. 'Great Britain and Afrikaner Republics,' in Wilson and Thompson (ed.), 
Oxford History of South Africa, pp. 289-290. · 
14 Ibid. 
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the colony self-reliant and less dependent on taxes from Britain.15 From 
the 1860s, many of the British officials occupying offices involved with the 
Cape and Natal colonies favoured the idea of the whole South African 
sub-continent becoming a self-governing white-controlled, federal 
dominion under the British Crown. The ambitions of these officials for the 
Cape and Natal colonies also stretched into the realm of diplomatic 
involvement with nations, like Chile, who were in good favour with Britain. 
The purpose of pursuing relations with nations like Chile as well as 
Argentina and Brazil was also driven by Britain's desire to have the 
southern hemisphere under her control. 16 Britain already had extensive 
commercial relations with many South American nations.17 The British 
Crown also had a paramount presence in Australia. Thus the desire to 
greatly expand the British Empire on the African continent, in particular, 
and on the globe, in general, dominated Britain's political and strategic 
agenda until the outbreak of World War I. 
The above-named officials, who sought measures to encourage the 
governments of the Transvaal and Orange Free State to form a union with 
the Cape and Natal colonies under the British Crown, wanted the new 
Dominion to stretch as far north as the Limpopo River at least, if not to the 
Zambezi River and beyond. 18 Simultaneously, these visionaries brought in 
relations between South America and South Africa as, for example, trade 
agreements were entered into between Natal and Chile. 
These same British officials were also responsible for fuelling the fire 
which culminated in the South African War (1899-1902), which forced the 
15 Ibid., p. 291. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, pp. 43-45. 
18 Thompson, 'Great Britain and Afrikaner Republics,' in Wilson and Thompson (eds.), 
Oxford History of South Africa, pp. 291-293. 
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Boer republics to look for sources to supply them with arms and 
ammunition. The pressure which the British exerted on the Boers worked 
to attract the sympathy and fellow-feeling of elements in Chile who were 
similarly opposed to the hold that Britain had on their society and 
economy. The attention of these Chileans was alerted by events set in 
motion when Lord Carnarvon instructed High Commissioner Bartle Frere 
and Theophilus Shepstone to take more drastic measures by assigning 
them the no mean task of annexing the Transvaal in January 1877. 
Shepstone and Frere promised to defend the Transvaal against the Zulu 
threat developing on the country's south-eastern border. However, in 
January 1879, the British regiment was severely defeated in a separate 
conflict at the Battle of lsandlwana. During the same month, the executive 
council of the South African Republic instructed Paul Kruger and Pie! 
Joubert to present a petition to the British cabinet in London signed by 
6591 Transvalers against their annexation.19 On the other hand, 
Gladstone's cabinet was adamant and the republic was prepared to go to 
war to stop annexation. In February 1881, the British were severely 
defeated by the Boers at the Battle of Majuba. In August 1881, both 
parties signed a peace treaty called the Convention of Pretoria. Amongst 
the provisions agreed to Britain was entitled to move troops through the 
Transvaal during times of war and monitor its external relations against 
threats from European aggressors. Nevertheless, as a result of the 
setbacks of defeats at lsandlwana at the hands of the Zulus and Majuba at 
the hands of the Boers, Britain's plans for the expansion of their empire in 
Southern Africa were shelved for fourteen years. 20 
In 1890, Cecil John Rhodes was appointed Prime Minister of the Cape 
Colony. Just as before with the discovery of gold deposits in the 
Transvaal, the reluctance of the Dutch community to introduce up-to-date 
production methods together with the growing interest of European 
19 Ibid., pp. 296-299. 
20 Ibid., pp. 305, 307. 
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competitors in the gold mining industry, inspired new moves to bring the 
Transvaal and Orange Free State Republics under the British Crown. 21 
Rhodes had the vision to see that whoever controlled the Transvaal could 
determine the destiny of the whole sub-continent and was famous for 
wanting the British Empire to extend all the way from Cape Town to 
Cairo.22 He tried to persuade the Transvaal Government to modernise the 
methods of production to make the gold mining industry a profitable 
enterprise.23 He even obtained assistance from the Uit!ander community in 
the Transvaal, the majority of whom were British, to convince Kruger of the 
benefits of being part of the British Empire. It was only after all such 
attempts had failed that, under the direction of Colonial Secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain, Rhodes organised an attempted coup in December 1895 
known as the Jameson Raid.24 But it failed, Kruger was re-elected for a 
fourth term of office in 1898, and the South African Republic embarked 
upon an arms build up in case of another attempted forced annexation by 
the British. 25 
In 1896 immediately after the Jameson Raid, the Transvaal Government 
conducted a survey to establish stocks of arms and ammunition in the 
republic. That Raid had made the Transvaal realise how vulnerable they 
were to invasion. The survey indicated that 41 % of all Transvaal military 
conscripts did not possess firearms at all; while 59% possessed weapons 
that were hopelessly obsolete. Appalled by this survey, the South African 
Republic launched a secret drive campaign to accumulate arms and 
ammunition by the Executive Council during the week 17 to 26 January 
21 Ibid., pp. 306-308. 
22 De Kiewiet, History of South Africa, p. 117. 
23 J.A. Hobson, 'A Small Confederacy of International Mineowners,' in T.C. Caldwell (ed.), 
The Anglo-Boer War. Why it was fought? Who was responsible?, p. 21. 
24 A.H. Duminy, The Capitalists and the Outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, pp. 4-5. 
25 Pretorius, Kommandolewe Tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, p. 26. 
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1896.26 The chief duties of the Executive Council were to arrange for the 
purchase of weapons, cannons and ammunition. The Orange Free State 
Government similarly became conscious of their vulnerability to a British 
onslaught. To assuage their fears, they formed a political alliance in March 
1897 with the South African Republic Government. The two sister 
republics agreed to aid each other militarily and in other ways in the case 
of an attack or invasion. From this date, the Orange Free State also began 
an arms and ammunition build-up. As in the Transvaal so in the Orange 
Free State artillery was fortified and adequate defence systems were 
organised. By the time the South African War broke out in October 1899, 
the two republics had already accumulated 49 800 Mauser rifles, 43 800 
Martini-Henrys, 5 150 Guedes, 2 730 Lee-Metfords, 100 Krag-Jorgensons, 
83 cannons and 87 machine-guns.27 F. Pretorius in Kommandolewe 
Tydens die Ang/o-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902, describes this armament. He 
mentions the various European countries from which the republics 
obtained supplies of arms and ammunition. However, he like other authors 
on the South African War, fails to mention the arms and ammunition 
obtained from Chile. Their nitrate industry was tapped to provide the 
essential ingredients to manufacture gunpowder while the anti-British 
lobby in Chile manufactured weapons for the Boer republics, which were 
channelled to South Africa via France and Germany. Chile did not have 
her own vessels capable of sailing directly to South Africa. France and 
Germany were two oi Chile's trading partners, apart from Britain. Boer 
sympathisers in France and Germany made sure the nitrates and 
weapons reached the South African Republic. However, it must be said 
that a relatively small number of weapons were supplied by Chile 
compared with whar the Boer republics obtained from Germany, France 
and Norway.28 The build-up of arms, ammunition and other war supplies 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
28 Ibid. 
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by the Boer republics was made possible by Dr. Leyds who was stationed 
in Europe as the South African Republic's Minister Plentipotentiary in 
France and Germany. He made every effort to ensure that the South 
African Republic and Orange Free State received adequate supplies and 
funds from abroad to support the cause against the British.29 He not only 
made appeals for supplies of arms and ammunition but also set up a fund 
in Europe to aid the Boer widows, orphans and refugees which was 
particularly well supported by the Germans, French and Norwegians.30 
Nations as far afield as Russia, United States, Australia, Mexico, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy all became involved in the conflict. Meanwhile, on the 
South American continent not only Chile but Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil 
and Venezuela participated.31 Actually also most of the South American 
nations provided war supplies to both the British and Boers. As regards 
commodities, the Argentines, for example, supplied beef, while others 
supplied wheat, donkeys and weapons. Some sent soldiers.32 In fact, 
Argentina supplied beef to the pro-Boer South African Supply and Cold 
Storage Company and to the British forces through the Imperial Cold 
Storage Co. Ltd. This latter venture was financed by De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd. with the encouragement of one of its key players 
and former Prime Minister oi the Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes.33 Like 
29 L.E. van Niekerk, 'Dr. Leyds and some plans to help the Boers, 1899-1902,' Kleio, 11, 1 
and 2, (1975), pp. 1, 15-16. 
30 lb"d 1 . I ., p. . 
31 NAR, TAD, M564, FO 2/349: Argentine Government. Ammunition for Boers, 10 May 
1900. 
NAR, TAD, Microfilm Collection A304, FO 2/267: Mules for South Africa from Rio de 
Janeiro, 20 October 1899. 
NAR, TAD, Staatssekretaris (Afdeling Buitelandse Sake) (henceforth SSA) 511, file no.: 
RA 2073/97: Consul of Venezuela Kaapstad. Toezending van de wapens en vlaggen, 9 
April 1897. 
32 NAR, TAD, A304, FO 2/267: President, Buenos Aires, offers to sell military stores. 19 
October 1899. 
NAR, TAD, A305, FO 2/269: Offer of mules, transport and hay from Chili, 4 November 
1899. 
33R. Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939, p. 61. 
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Argentina and Chile, many of the South American nations had two internal 
factions, one that supported the British and another supporting the Boer 
republics. The pro-British supporters were those South Americans who 
benefited from British commerce and involvement in their nations' 
economies. On the other hand, the anti-British groups were those who 
resented the. stranglehold which Britain had on their domestic economies 
and sympathised with Boer resistance in their equivalent plight. After 
Britain's victory in the South African War many Boer families emigrated to 
the Latin American countries of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela 
and Mexico.34 
In Chile, the group opposed to the British were the mine-owners, 
industrialists and agriculturists that had supported Balmaceda in the late 
1890s. This sector of the Chilean population received much support from 
the German and French communities living in Chile, as well as the home 
governments of Germany and France. As a result of the allegiances with 
the French and German communities in the areas of lquique and 
Pitrifquen, the South African Republic (ZAR) was able to obtain weapons 
and ni!rates from Chile. The strong anti-British enclave in Chilean society 
had high visibility in October 1895, when the Chilean Government decided 
to officially denounce the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 
which had been signed between Chile and Britain as long ago as 4 
October 1854.35 
340. Fig, 'Proletarianisation or Patagonia: Reassessing the rationale for the Afrikaner 
Migration to Argentina, 1902-1906,' Social Dynamics, 17, 2, (1991 ), pp. 103-125. 
CAD, Government House (henceforth GH) 11482, file no.: 155: Foreign Colonization in 
Chile, 17 October 1903. 
NAR, TAD, M590, FO 21649: Emigration of Boers to Paraguay, 16 May 1902. 
NAR, TAD, Governor of the Transvaal Colony (henceforth GOV) 1034, file no.: PS 
8911106: Boer Settlement in Venezuela, January 1906. 
NAR, TAD, Lieutenant Governor (henceforth LTG) 76, file no.: 84114: Boers and Burgers. 
Boer Colony in Mexico, 1903-1906. 
35 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (henceforth NAO), Colonial Secretary's Office 
(henceforth CSO) 1445, file no.: 548811895; Report on Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation between Great Britain and Chile, 1 October 1895. 
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Assistance to the Boers from the South American nations began in 1897. 
Several consignments of firearms, ammunition, mules, donkeys, horses 
and soldiers made their way to the ZAR from South America. In June 
1897, a consignment of 550 mules, 80 horses and 4 000 donkeys all 
"intended for military purposes" were disembarked at Durban harbour.36 
According to Major R.F. Frost, veterinary surgeon of the Natal Army's 
Veterinary Department in Pietermaritzburg, the animals, most in a bad 
condition, were en route to the ZAR.37 During April 1897, a consignment of 
weapons from Venezuela passed through Cape Town, likewise bound for 
the ZAR. These weapons were sent to the South African Republic with the 
intention of using them in the struggle against the British.38 In July 1899, 
Gustav Marc Barbarie, a Chilean gunsmith living in Valparaiso, informed 
Dr. Leyds in France that he had newly designed machine guns which he 
wanted to sell to the South African Republic. According to Barbarie, these 
automatic weapons were a new series that would prove themselves 
indispensable in modern warfare. He was particularly eager to see them 
used against the English and he agreed to manufacture the weapons in 
Chile under top secret conditions.39 The prospect of an arms trade with 
Chile went down well with the ZAR authorities principally because the 
British were more suspicious of cargoes coming from Europe to the Boer 
republics than from Chile. Nevertheless, Barbarie agreed to make these 
brand new weapons clandestine by appearing to be "machines to 
manufacture cigarettes." 40 Dr. Leyds received similar offers from various 
36 NAD, CSO 1523, file no.: 4950/1897: Horses, mules and donkeys transported from 
South America to Durban, 17 June 1897. 
37 Ibid.: Report of R.F. Frost re shipments of mules and horses in Durban en route to 
Pretoria, 29 April 1897. 
38 NAR, TAD, SSA 511, file no.: RA 2073/97: Consul of Venezuela Kaapstad. Toezending 
van wapens, 9 April 1897. 
39 NAR, TAD, SSA 876, file no.: RA 5207/99: G.M. Barbarie· wenscht deze regeering 
eener nieuwe mitrailleuse te verkopen, 17 July 1899. (This document is in French.) 
40 Ibid. 
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parts of the globe from as early as October 1899 and throughout the 
duration of the War.41 
The Boer republics backed up by the German and French Government 
during 1899, managed to obtain the Portuguese Government's 
acquiescence in the use of Delagoa Bay to channel arms and 
ammunition.42 As well as having this loophole, the South African Republic 
and Orange Free State managed to sneak supplies through the ports of 
Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. On 5 November 1899, a letter 
was sent from the Foreign Office to H. Bertram, Secretary of State of the 
Colonial Office in London, informing him that nitrates from Chile and 
sulphur from Sicily were being consigned on ships going to Delagoa Bay 
with cargoes for the ZAR. On board the vessels in question were also 
German-made 37 millimetre rifles destined for the Orange Free State. 
Bertram himself was instructed to be on the lookout for these 
consignments and he was further instructed to forewarn the Portuguese 
officials at Delagoa Bay of these dubious vessels. Then again on 9 
November 1899, a discussion occurred amongst officials in Britain's 
Colonial and Foreign Offices concerning nitrates sent from Jquique in 
Chile, to the ZAR via Port Elizabeth.43 W.E. Davidson owner of William, 
Walker and Co., responsible for the shipment, informed Bertram that the 
consignment was earmarked for the "more peaceful arts of alkali 
manufacture ... and as ... agricultural manure."44 Davidson assured the 
Colonial Office that the shipment could not be regarded as "contraband of 
war. "45 Thanks to him, this particular shipment was allowed through Port 
41 Van Niekerk, 'Dr. Leyds and some plans to help the Boers, 1899-1902,' Kleio, 11, 1 
and 2, (1975), p. 15. 
42 D.D. Diespecker, 'British intelligence operation in Mozambique in August 1900,' Military 
HistoryJourna/9, 6, (December 1994), pp. 219-225. 
43 NAR, TAD M595, FO 21271: Question of Nitrate Soda being contraband of war, 11 
November 1899. 
44 Ibid.: Letter from W.E. Davidson to H. Bertram, 13 November 1899. 
45 Ibid. 
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Elizabeth to the Transvaal while throughout the war, uncounted shipments 
of nitrates were delivered to the Boer republics under the pretence that 
they were bought for agricultural purposes, especially as the Boers were 
famous as a farming people. 
On the other hand, at the beginning of November 1899, less than a month 
after the war had begun, Audley Gosling, the British Ambassador in 
Santiago, informed _the Foreign Office in London, that in Chile a "spirit of 
sympathy" for the Boers prevailed.46 Gosling informed the Foreign Office 
in London, that he had briefed the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Rafael Errazuriz, of the patience and forbearance which the British 
Government had exercised during negotiations with the Transvaal 
Government concerning the voting rights of the Uit!ander community. In an 
attempt to persuade the Chilean population to be more pro-British, Gosling 
offered to the Chilean newspapers her views of the "true causes of the 
war." On 24 November 1899, Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafael 
Errazuriz, received a letter from the Marquis of Salisbury informing him 
that a "state of war" had existed between the United Kingdom and the two 
republics since 11 October 1899.47 In the Chilean newspaper, El Chileno, 
dated 15 March 1900, an article appeared congratulating Queen Victoria 
on the defeat of the Boer forces in Ladysmith, Natal, and the capture of 
Bloemfontein by British forces during February and March 1900.48 The 
article furthermore, expressed admiration for the British soldiers fighting in 
South Africa, describing their deeds as "an example of patriotism . . . 
dying for their Queen and country. "49 A few days after this article's 
appearance, Audley Gosling received several applications from Chilean 
46 NAR, TAD, M594, FO 2/269: South African War: Chilean Sympathy for Boers, 1 
November 1899. 
47 NAR, TAD, M594, FO 2/274: Notification of Stole of War. Correspondence between 
Audley Gosling and Rafael Errazuriz, 24 November - 1 December 1899. 
48 NAR, TAD, M560, FO 2/337: War in South Africa. Article in El Chileno, 15 March 1900. 
49 Ibid. 
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citizens wanting to volunteer for active military service for Britain in South 
Africa. However, these volunteers were turned away as the British officials 
were not totally convinced that all of their loyalties were solely with the 
British.50 Nevertheless, the Chileans were responsible for sending 
shipments of horses, mules, wheat and other foodstuffs for the British 
regiments fighting in South Africa. 
After the South Afri_can War, Chile's relations with South Africa remained 
small scale. Trade in agricultural produce and nitrates occurred between 
Chile and the four South African territories. Between 1903 and 1906, a 
group of Boers disgruntled with Britain's victory in the war, emigrated to 
Chile. These Boers settled around Pitrufquen which was part of Chile's 
German enclave.51 Furthermore, from 1907 onwards, Chile made efforts to 
resume honorary consular relations with South Africa. 
50 NAR, TAD, M560, FO 2/337: Volunteers in Chile. Correspondence between volunteers 
and Audley Gosling, 17 March to 25 April 1900. · 
51 NAR, TAD, GOV 55, file no.: GEN 1230103: Emigration of Boers. 
NAR, TAD, GOV 83, file no.: GEN 5/06: Boers in Chile. 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
99 
THE INFLUENCE OF CHILEAN POLITICAL 
FIGURES AND PARTIES ON BILATERAL 
RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, 1902-
1948 
During the period 1902 to 1948 several political parties developed in Chile 
and each of the Chilean presidents elected during this period naturally 
played a role in determining Chile's relations with other nations. The 
parties which featured on the Chilean political scene were the 
Conservatives, Liberals, Nationalists, Radicals, Liberal Democrats, 
Democrats and Communists. 
Under the government of Pedro Monti, between 1906 and 1910 efforts 
were made to strengthen diplomatic relations, while commerce and trade 
were opened not only on the South American continent but also, for 
example, with South Africa. 1 The proof is that in 1907, the Monti 
Government encouraged the re-establishment of consular relations with 
South Africa while, in April 1908 the Chilean training ship General 
Baquedaro paid a visit to Cape Town.2 Between 191 O and 1915, Ramon 
Barros Luco was elected president and he was also aware of the 
importance of forging diplomatic relations with Latin American neighbours. 
He established a Treaty of Friendship that was signed by Chile, Argentina 
and Brazil, and a railway line was constructed between Chile and Bolivia. 
During Luca's administration in 1915 a Chilean consulate was opened in 
South Africa in Johannesburg as a result of steps initiated by his 
predecessor. After World War I broke out in Europe, Jan Luis Sanfuentes 
became president of Chile and he had to adopt a position on it. He was 
adamant on keeping Chile neutral in the conflict. His reasons were, firstly, 
that he felt it was more important for Chile to give priority to its domestic 
1 NAR, SAD, Prime Minister's Office (henceforth PM) 17, file no.: 26/7/1907: Consuls. 
Chile, July 1907. 
2 CAO, GH 1 /496, file no.: 42: Chilean Training Ship General Baquedaro from Valparaiso 
to Cape Town, April 1908. 
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concerns rather than become involved in the international conflict. 
Secondly, Sanfuentes realised that Chile's nitrates would be in great 
demand by both the Allies and the Central Powers. Thus by remaining 
neutral and supplying both sides with nitrates, Chile's economy would 
boom. Between 1915 and 1917 the nitrate industry did indeed boom but 
only because the United States of America became a major trading 
partner, who managed to replace Britain ironically because of the 
blockades which Britain imposed on Chile. 
* * * * 
In 1915 Britain and her Allies imposed blockades on Chile to prevent her 
from supplying Germany with nitrates. Of course, the Allies needed 
nitrates too, and the U.S.A., though not yet officially involved in the war, 
obtained supplies from Chile and thereby assisted the Allies in sustaining 
their war effort. However, in 1917 the U.S.A. officially joined the war and 
added its mighty pressure on Chile to abandon its neutral stance.3 Chile 
refused and her economy suffered the consequences of remaining neutral. 
During World War I, Britain launched a propaganda campaign to have 
Chile branded as pro-German. Britain's colonies were discouraged from 
being involved with Chile. As a result of Britain's attitude, the South African 
authorities refused to assist Chilean citizens from obtaining money due to 
them from shares which they held in the South African mining industry, 
together with shares blocked by boycotts imposed on Chilean companies. 
Therefore, in 1916 when the South African Government approached Chile 
to obtain information concerning the operations of their mining industries, 
Sanfuentes' Government ignored the request. 
During the 1920s, as the result of the economic depression caused partly 
by World War I, Chile experienced large-scale political turmoil with 
numerous strikes, coups and counter-coups because the Chileans were 
3 T.A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Towards Neutrals, pp. 153-157. 
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unhappy with the prevailing economic circumstances. Between 1895 and 
1925, it was impossible for a presidency in Chile to remain in power for 
long. Political instability was reinforced by the fragmentation of major 
political parties, which had increased to the six identified above. This 
proliferation of parties resulted in the formation of coalition governments, 
since it was difficult for any of them to win control of the legislature.4 
Political control remained in the hands of the oligarchy, which represented 
primarily the interests of the agricultural faction. Some opposition came 
from merchants with urban interests, while workers also began to exert 
pressure.5 During this period, Chilean society became polarised between 
the wealthy few and the deterioration of the standard of living of the 
masses. The wealthy few were those sectors of the population that 
benefitted from Chile's commercial and diplomatic relations with Britain 
and her colonies, and evermore increasingly with Germany. The Chilean 
Governments were unresponsive to the pleas of the masses and 
exploitation of the workers by their employers. Thus provoked many of the 
labourers to participate in nation-wide strikes and riots.6 Towards the end 
of this period, under the dictatorship of General Carlos Ibanez, Chile's 
economy began to improve and much financial aid was received from the 
U.S., who became ever more enticing in luring the Chilean economy away 
from Britain. 7 
However, the 1929 Wall Street Crash ended this period of economic 
prosperity in Chile and saw Ibanez replaced by Arturo Alessandri who 
served as president from 1932 until 1938 with a programme of political 
stability.8 During 1934, a Chilean delegation visited South Africa with the 
4 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 45. 
5 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 121. 
6 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 47. 
7 S. Colliers and W.F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994, p. 220. 
8 Ibid. 
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intention of strengthening commercial relations between the two countries. 
This was frustrated by the political uncertainties in Chile to which South 
Africa responded by suspending its diplomatic relations with Chile from 
1932 until 1937. The five year break in diplomatic relations began in 1932 
when Arthur Hinde resigned as the Chilean honorary consul. However, by 
1938 when the Popular Front won the elections in Chile and Aguirre Cerda 
became . president, Chile once again began to boom and prosper. In 
September 1937 consular relations were once again established in South 
Africa but only lasted until 1938 when they once again collapsed until 
1942. This time diplomatic relations were hampered by an international 
event which placed Chile and South Africa on opposite sides. In 1939 
World War II broke out and Chile once again remained neutral until 1942 
when the United States joined the war. South Africa's Prime Minister Jan 
Smuts had pledged his loyalty to the Allies and thus broke all ties with 
nations not supporting the Allies. The consular relations were only 
resumed once Chile had declared war on the Axis powers and Prime 
Minister Smuts was convinced that Chile was on the side of the Allies. 
The Popular Front was an alliance of the Communist and Radical Parties. 
Despite his political connections, prior to the outbreak of the Second World 
War, Cerda managed to obtain support from the upper and middle classes 
by implementing policies that they favoured by establishing even stronger 
diplomatic and commercial relations with countries like the United States 
of America, Britain and her colonies, and Germany. During Cerda's term, 
consular relations with South Africa were resumed. In 1942 Juan Antonio 
Rios became president and his office was faced with choosing Chile's side 
in World War II. 
Since the beginning of the Second World War, Chile fell evermore under 
the sphere of influence of the U.S. as she depended greatly on the 
Colossus of the North for her economic well-being. From December 1941 
onwards, after the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the U.S. declaration of 
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war on the Axis Powers, Chile was placed under such pressure to 
abandon her neutral stance that she broke relations with the Axis Powers 
and declared war on Japan but never supplied troops as,. for example, 
Brazil did. As a result of Rfos's decision to allow Chile to side with the 
Allies, Chile was able to re-establish commercial and diplomatic relations 
with the Union of South Africa. In 1946 Gabriel Gonzalez Videla took over 
as president and during his term Chile's economic ties with the United 
States increased. The traditional elite in Chile, who had once favoured 
Britain, now defected to the U.S.A. While Gonzalez Videla was president, 
Britain made gallant efforts to improve and strengthen relations with Chile. 
Britain realised she was losing her influence and trading power status over 
Chile to the United States of America. Britain thus encouraged her 
colonies to pursue further commercial ties and forge diplomatic relations 
with Chile. As a result, in April 1947 the Chilean Ambassador in London, 
Manuel Bianchi, approached the South African Department of External 
Affairs on the possibilities of establishing direct bilateral relations between 
the two countries. It was followed through when in May 1948 the South 
African Department of External Affairs, with encouragement from Britain, 
established a South African Legation in Santiago, the inland capital of 
Chile. The establishment of this legation was put into place by the Smuts 
Government prior to the 1948 elections when the Nationai Party came to 
power.9 
Labour unrest during this period became a matter of prime concern to 
governments, particularly with the emergence of the Communist Party 
under Luis Recabarren in 1906. The stronger governments in power like 
that of Pedro Monti (1906-1910), managed to bring improvements, such 
as the construction of a railway link from Santiago over the Andes to 
Argentina. During Monti's term, as already mentioned, the first Chilean 
training ship General Baquedrano visited Cape Town setting the trend for 
'Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and Swaziland, No. 24 of 1948, pp. 1241-1243. 
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future journeys for their other training ships. 10 Under him Chile made 
arrangements with Britain for the re-establishment of the Chilean 
Consulate in South Africa. While, between 191 O and 1915, under 
President Ramon Barros Luco a railway was built between Chile and 
. Bolivia; a Treaty of Friendship was concluded between Chile, Argentina 
and Brazil; and the Chilean School of Aviation was founded. 11 Luco was 
not only interested in forging relations with the neighbouring South 
American natjons. During this period, Chile's relations with Britain 
strengthened as Britain's exports doubled and in fact, coincided with 
Britain's commercial expansion into Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. The 
expansion of British interest in Latin America, and particularly Chile, 
appealed to the bourgeois and middle classes that displayed their support 
for Pedro Monti. In the early 1900s, several shipments of nitrates were 
dispatched tc southern Africa for agricultural purposes. Chilean farmers 
also sold their prize-bred livestock to farmers in the Transvaal.12 From 
1910 Luco continued to ensure that Chile basked in Britain's favour. 13 
Following on steps initiated by Pedro Monti, during Luca's reign he 
continued with efforts to arrange for the re-establishment of a Chilean 
Consulate in South Africa and in March 1915, Arthur Dennison Hinde was 
appointed their Consul in Johannesburg.14 
10 The Chilean training ship, the Esmeralda, has made regular stops at Simonstown since 
the 1970s. 
11 Stickler, The Saga of Chile, pp. 115-116. 
12NAR, TAD, Colonial Secretary (henceforth CS) 420, file no.: 571104: Fertilising agents 
for South Africa, Correspondence between F.B. Smith, Director of Agricultural, and 
Commissioner of lands, Pretoria, 11 December 1903 to 8 February 1904. 
NAR, TAD, Lieutenant Governor (henceforth LTG) 53, file no.: 67/63: Prize Well-bred 
Stock exported to Chile, Correspondence between Foster Rogerson, Barnato Chamber, 
and Sir Arthur Lawley, Private Secretary of Lieutenant's Office, 4 to 8 November 1904. 
13 D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas 
Trade, 1873-1914, pp. 95, 123. 
14 NAR, SAD, GG 1012, file no.: 20/1/191 O: Application for appointment of Consul of Chili, 
January 1910. 
NAR, SAD, GG 1022, file no.: 20/582: Consuls Chile. Issue of exequatur for Hinde, march 
1915. 
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In 1915 Juan Luis Sanfuentes was elected president a while after World 
War I broke out in Europe and Chile remained steadfastly neutral in the 
conflict. Sanfuentes felt that Chile's own economic development, popular 
unrest and strikes were more pressing issues for his government than 
participating in the war. Furthermore, the demand for nitrates by both the 
Allied Forces and the Central Powers to sustain their war effort appealed 
to the Chilean Government. He did not want to forfeit the enticing 
economic prosperity for Chile resulting from remaining neutral and being in 
a position to supply nitrates to both sides. 15 Despite pressure from Britain 
and later the United States, Chile hung on to neutrality then. In 1917, 
Britain and the other Allied nations imposed blockades and blacklisted 
firms in Chile effectively, denying the Germans any access to the nitrate 
supplies. 16 In order to sustain its war effort, the Germans converted to 
synthetic nitrates. The Allied Forces soon adopted this process with 
serious consequences for Chile. The blockades, blacklisting and 
development of synthetic nitrates severely affected Chile as well as her 
relations with Britain and her colonies. 
On 16 October 1916, the Governor-General Viscount Buxton in South 
Africa dispatched a letter to obtain permission from A. Bonar Law, 
Secretary of State of the Colonial Office in London, to appoint a State 
Mining Commission. This commission was assigned the responsibility of 
investigating and reporting on the advisability of state mining; financial 
organisation and control matters affecting them, together with their 
creation; and the legislative framework which would be required for such 
ventures.17 In order to perform its task efficiently, permission had to be 
sought and was obtained from the Secretary of State of the Colonial Office 
15 Evans, Relations with United States, p. 173. 
16 Ibid., p. 174. 
17 NAR, SAD, GG 1820, file no.: 52/177: Mines. General. State· Mining Commission. List 
of Questions re information required, 16 October 1916. 
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to obtain information concerning these issues from other governments 
which had mining operations of their own. The countries that the 
Commission identified were Great Britain, her colonies such as India, 
Canada, New Zealand, Egypt, Tasmania, South Australia, Victoria, New 
South Wales; Britain's allies France, Belgium, Holland, and United 
States.18 The State Mining Commission was also interested in obtaining 
information concerning the operations of state-owned mining companies 
that were essentially German. As this State Mining Commission was 
performing its investigations while the World War was raging, it decided to 
approach a neutral country, namely Chile to obtain this information.19 
Between the end of October 1916 and January 1917, detailed 
questionnaires were sent to these various countries. The fact that Chile's 
neutral position did not really pose a threat to Britain is evident from this 
Commission. Moreover, the British Colonial Office had no problem in 
granting permission to obtain information from Chile and more particularly, 
from German-owned mines there. 20 However, it appears as if Sanfuentes' 
Government chose to ignore the request as no response was received 
from them. Sanfuentes's probable reasons for ignoring this were firstly, 
because of Britain's wartime trade embargo. The second reason was in 
response to the refusal of the South African Government to assist Chilean 
Don Felipe Fonck to obtain his dividends from his shares in the East Rand 
Proprietary Mines Limited. Instead his dividends were paid into the Public 
Trustee in London and the Custodian of Enemy Property in Pretoria as 
was done with the money owed to all pro-German subjecis.21 
18 Ibid.: Correspondence between Viscount Buxton, Governor General, and Bonar Law, 
Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 25 October 1916. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.: Correspondence between the South African Governor General and various 
governmental heads of these countries re information for Commission, 25 October 1916 
to 28January1917. 
21 NAR, SAD, GG 566, file no.: 9/27/273: War 1914-1918. Tradin'g with the Enemy. Shares 
belonging to Fonck, Chilean citizen, August to September 1918. 
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In 1920 Arturo Alessandri was elected president and entered Chilean 
politics while the country was facing a period of acute post-war economic 
depression. As a result of the weak economic climate, there were many 
strikes and riots during Alessandri's presidency. In 1921, unlike any of the 
previous governments, the state intervened in the labour disputes. 
Although it initially supported the labourers, after endless criticisms it sided 
with the employers. However, by 1924 many Chileans had become 
dissatisfied with the manner in which Alessandri dealt with the problems in 
the country. Consequently, in early September 1924, the armed forces 
intervened and replaced Alessandri and his government with a military 
junta.22 However, by January 1925, when the military junta was unable to 
resto;e order the junta was overthrown by a second military coup and this 
time the military was in full command. In March 1925, Alessandri was 
recalled to the presidential seat while the revolutionary forces were still 
active in Chile. From June 1925 to January 1927 there were bitter clashes 
between the government and organised labour. The government's inability 
to address the economic crisis as well as problems of unemployment 
failed to restore stability.23 During the inter-war period as a result of 
economic circumstances and political uncertainties, Chile's relations with 
the Union of South Africa were small scale, but consular representation 
was nevertheless maintained in South Africa. 
In May 1927, General Carlos Ibanez was elected president with the 
reputation of being "strong man" of Chilean politics. 24 He was the officer 
who had restored order in 1924 when Alessandri stepped down. Once 
elected, Ibanez consolidated a regime that lasted until 1931. It was the 
toughest government of the twentieth century up to then thai Chileans 
found themselves living under. Ibanez placed the press under strict 
censorship; free political parties were not allowed to exist; and opponents, 
22 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, pp. 123-124. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Stickler, The Saga of Chile, pp. 119-120. 
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particularly labour leaders were arrested.25 He also instituted ambitious 
projects to boost the economy. His government played an even larger role 
in the economy than when Balmaceda was in control. By means of foreign 
loans and investments mainly from the U.S., projects envisaging the 
construction of roads, railways and power facilities were undertaken.26 
While lbaiiez was in a power, fruit was exported from South Africa to Chile 
demonstrating that he still acknowledged the importance of Britain and her · 
colonies as trading partners.27 However, after the Wall Street Crash, 
Chile's very brief prosperous period during the mid-1920s ended and the 
country was thrown into the grips of the Great Depression. Various sectors 
of the population, from workers to employers, voiced their dissent from the 
government by participating in such protests that in July 1931 lbaiiez 
conceded defeat and resigned. 28 
In 1932 Arturo Alessandri was again elected president. During eight 
turbulent years of coups, counter-coups, popular revolts, military 
dictatorship and the rise of left and right extremism, he managed to bring 
about a period of stability in Chile. He introduced a battery of measures to 
stimulate the development of the economy. His government imposed 
higher tariffs on imports and tax exemptions to encourage the construction 
of public works programmes. He, furthermore, instituted social reforms, 
such as a minimum wage for private enterprise employees, a health care 
programme for individuals in the social security programme and 
investment of funds in the provision of public housing.29 The national 
economy recovered as a result of Chile's ability to restrain its international 
25 Ibid. 
26 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 125. 
27 NAR SAD Executive Council Minutes (henceforth URU) 1037, file no.: 410: 
Regulau'ons re 'Export of fruit to continent of South America, Minute from Prime Minister's 
Office, 15 December 1928. 
28 Collier and Sater, History of Chile, p. 202. 
29 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, pp. 57-58. 
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creditors' demands. More land was cultivated for agricultural purposes and 
cereal production increased as a result of spreading technology. These 
fruits and cereals were sold domestically rather than made to compete on 
world markets with producers like United States of America, Australia and 
Canada.30 
Between 1932 and 1937, Chile's consular relations in South Africa lapsed 
because of the political and economic uncertainties evident in Chile and 
South Africa's own vicissitudes such as the impact of the Great 
Depression and droughts on the economy. Nevertheless during 1937 
officials from the South African Department of Agriculture participated in 
an expedition to South America to acquire knowledge on forestry and 
agricultural. This expedition was organised by the Imperial Agricultural 
Bureau.31 During this period South Africa imported fruit trees from Chile 
and Argentina. 32 
During Alessandri's term he received support from the rightist 
Conservatives, Liberals and Democrats, while those with more leftist views 
broke away and formed their own parties. In 1936, the Communist and 
Radical Parties joined forces in a Popular Front. Chilean politics was no 
longer the exclusive domain of the traditional upper classes. On the 
contrary the 1938 election was contested by a broad spectrum of political 
parties. They were the Radicals, Communists, Democrats, and a new 
party, the Confederation of Chilean Workers. 33 Alessandri's Government 
had managed to acquire the confidence of the Chilean populace so that 
3° Collier and Sater, History of Chile, pp. 230-231. 
31 NAR, SAD, Dept. of Treasury (henceforth TES) 540, file no.: 2/449: Agriculture and 
Forestry: Expedition to South America, 27January1937. 
32 CAD, Plant Inspector, Cape Town (henceforth APC) 5, file no.: 36 part 5: Nursery 
Quarantine Stellenbosch Importation of Fruit Trees, June 1938. · 
33 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 126. 
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his party in the Popular Front won the election of 1938 and Aguirre Cerda 
became president.34 
This .. victory enabled the Radical Party to snatch all key .government 
positions from the Right. In an effort to draw support for the Radical Party 
from the middle and upper classes Aguirre Cerda implemented policies 
which favoured them. During his presidency, Cerda pursued a model of 
paternalistic state capitalism in which government and private enterprise 
collaborated in the development of a mixed economy.35 In an attempt to 
become more industrialised, the government mobilised the labour 
movement behind national economic development rather than by 
attempting to quell working-class discontent by mere social welfare. During 
Cerda's term, in 1939 Chile was struck by a devastating earthquake in the 
area of Chillan. Approximately 50 000 people were killed, and the 
agricultural potential of this area was severely damaged.36 
In an effort to alleviate the suffering caused by the earthquake, the Chilean 
government, with financial assistance from the private sector and the 
U.S.A., established a new industry, the Corporaci6n de Fomento 
(CORFU). This corporation evolved into a venture for state capitalism, as 
well as private and foreign interests.37 The economic policy of the Popular 
Front, like those of previous Chilean governments, was essentially driven 
by international factors. Under the Popular Front, the U.S.A. doubled its 
sales and tripled its purchases of goods to and from Chile. The result was 
that Chile's overseas orientation increasingly swung towards the U.S.A. 
rather than Europe and Great Britain, as had previously been the case.38 
34 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, pp. 59-60. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 126. 
38 Drake, 'Chile, 1930-1958,' in L. Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, pp. 108, 111. 
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The establishment of CORFU and subsequent industrialization benefited 
several sectors of the population. Industrialists, although slightly 
apprehensive about these new developments, eventually realised that 
state intervention in the economy actually helped boost private enterprise 
rather than· being an either/or situation. There was also the fact that the 
economic nationalism implemented by the Popular Front defused social 
conflict. This was due to subsequent improvements like better 
organisation, representation, health, housing and education which came 
about as a result of the improvement in the economy. Meanwhile, the 
middle class benefited from the increase in employment opportunities and 
the improvements in community services like health, housing, education 
and social security. The Radical Party was thus able to retain the support 
of these beneficiaries for the next decade.39 In response to the Chilean 
government's attraction to the United States during this period and the 
increase in United States investment and trade with Chile, Britain became 
concerned that it was losing its hold on the Chilean economy and fought 
back to keep Chile within Britain's circle of influence. 
After Aguirre Gerda's death in November 1941 , the Radical Party 
managed to secure the political arena for another decade. Although its 
political base altered somewhat from obtaining support from essentially 
reformist ideals, Juan Antonio Rios was elected as Gerda's successor. 
Rios was described as a businessman who identified with the anti-
communist right wing of the Radical Party. He served as president from 
1942 until 1946. His presidential goals were to devote efforts to increase 
national unity, social stability and economic growth.40 He assumed office 
while World War II was raging in Europe and the Atlantic so his 
administration was forced to deal with the wartime scarcity of imported 
capital goods. Nevertheless, the Chilean populace were encouraged to 
maintain high levels of productivity. Between 1940 and 1945, Chile's 
39 Ibid., pp.111·112. 
40 Ibid., p. 115. 
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industrial output increased by more than nine percent annually.41 During 
November 1944, the South African Secretary for Commerce and Industry, 
Francois du Toil, made preparations for the establishment of a direct 
shipping service line between South Africa and Chile as well as the 
development of reciprocal trade between the two. Du Toit, however, had 
certain reservations about the direct shipping line and trade agreements. 
The reason was that he felt South Africa was unable to export anything 
substantial to Chile in exchange for Chilean phosphates required for 
agriculture. The South African Government under Jan Smuts decided to 
suspend the venture temporarily. However, in November 1948 South 
Africa did establish a direct shipping service with Chile and the vessels 
deployed belonged to the South African Railways and Harbours 
(SAR&H).42 
Despite a measure of prosperity that the World War brought to Chile, it 
also placed its government in an awkward position on maintaining a 
neutral stance. Rios' administration was forced to make a decision that 
would, firstly, ensure that Chile could remain in a favourable light with its 
prominent trading partners, Britain and the U.S. and, secondly, attempt to 
accommodate the wishes of the German entrepreneurs concentrated in 
the south who had invested and contributed much to the well-being of the 
Chilean economy.43 As in World War I so in World War II, Chile's initial 
intentions were to remain neutral. Yet in 1942, under heavy pressure from 
the U.S., concerned, above all, about the Pacific theatre of War, Chile 
declared war on Japan. Even so the Chileans finally declared war on 
Germany and Italy in the European theatre as late as the first quarter of 
1945. There were two reasons for the eventual war declaration. The first 
41 ibid., p. 116. 
42 NAR, SAD, HEN 4317, file no.: 747, vol. 1: Trade with Chile. Trade relations and 
Treaties, Memorandum from F. du Tait, secretary for Commerce and industry, and Jan 
Smuts, Minister of External Affairs, November 1944. 
43 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, pp. 126-127. 
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was because in March 1942, a Chilean vessel, To/ten, was sunk by what 
appeared to be a German sub-marine. However, according to the 1942 
annual report compiled by Sir Colin Orde, British Ambassador to Chile, the 
sinking of this ship was perpetrated under the orchestrations of the United 
States to spoil the prospects of stronger commercial relations with the Axis 
powers, particularly Japan. The second reason was that Chile's recently 
appointed Foreign Affairs Minister Barros, was a supporter of the United 
States and he insisted that Chile unmistakeably pledge her loyalty to the 
United States' cause.44 Despite this nailing of colours to the mast, no 
Chilean troops were ever sent to fight in World War 11.45 
In 1946, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, a member of the left wing faction of the 
Radical Party, became president. During his term from 1946 to 1952, he 
promoted industrialisation, technological modernisation in agriculture, and 
improvements in transportation by means of increased state intervention 
and an expanded public sector. He also expanded Chile's oil-refining 
process and encouraged the construction of several hydroelectric 
projects.46 Gonzalez Videla had obtained much support from the 
Communists during the run-up to the elections and in a gesture of 
gratitude he invited them to join his cabinet. Although, the Communists 
displayed strong anti-North American feelings, Chile's economic ties with 
the U.S. tightened during Gonzalez Videla's term as productivity in the 
mining sector scaled new heights. Chile's export revenues from the U.S. 
increased from $406 million in 1945 to $547 million in 1952, while in the 
same period, her import expenditures from the U.S. increased from $187 
million to $430 million.47 Foreign investment from the U.S. totalled nearly 
seventy percent, while foreign loans mainly from the U.S. to CORFU, 
44 NAR, SAD, BTS file no.: 1/42/3, vol. 1: Chilean Annual Foreign Report, May 1943. 
45 Stickler, The Saga of Chile, p. 127. 
46 Sater, Southern Cone Nations, p. 71. 
47 Drake, 'Chile, 1930-1958,' in Bethell (ed.), Chile since Independence, p. 119. 
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continued to encourage industrialisation. As a result of the economic 
advantages of the United States for Chile, Gonzalez Videla was forced to 
distance himself from the Communists and ask their members in his 
cabinet to resign. Chile's subsequent economic prosperity, the result of 
increased involvement by the United States, appealed to the middle 
sectors of the population. The traditional elite, who during the nineteenth 
century had been avid fans of British involvement in the Chilean economy, 
were now turncoats loving the United States.48 These sectors of the 
Chilean population,. with assistance and encouragement from the U.S., 
were determined to do everything in their power to pursue a future that 
worked. 
It was into this scenario under the Gonzalez Videla administration that 
South Africa re-established direct diplomatic ties with Chile and 
established a direct shipping line of South African commodities by SAR&H 
to Chile in exchange for Chilean cargoes of timber for railway sleepers and 
nitrates.49 In reaction to the United States' aggressive campaign to seize 
Latin American markets which had once been Britain's, the British 
Government sought to make British merchants and industrialists aware of 
the potential of the Latin American markets, including Chile. As a result 
favourable reports were compiled which resulted in the establishment of a 
South African Legation in Santiago, Chile in 1948. 
48 Ibid. 
49NAR, SAD, HEN 4317, file no.: 747 vol. 1. Correspondence tietween the South African 
Legation in Chile to D. de Waal Meyer, Secretary of Commerce and Industries, 12 
November 1948. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: INFLUENCE OF SOUTH 
PERSONALITIES ON BILATERAL 
WITH CHILE, 1902-1948. 
AFRICAN 
RELATIONS 
Between 1902 and 1.948, the personalities in South Africa who influenced 
relations between Chile and South Africa were Jan Christian Smuts and 
James Barry Munnik Hertzog. Both of these characters influenced 
domestic events as well as South Africa's diplomatic involvement with 
other countries. Smuts was a Boer general in the South African War 
(1899-1902). He was responsible for trying to encourage the Boers of the 
advantages of cooperation with Britain and of being part of the British 
Empire. Smuts' attraction to Britain determined his attitude towards 
relations with Chile during his terms as Prime Minister. Hertzog, on the 
other hand, was also a former Boer general in the South African War, but 
unlike Smuts he was bitterly opposed to having the Union of South Africa 
incorporated into the British Empire. His dissatisfaction with Britain led him 
to establish the South African Department of External Affairs in 1927 .1 
Prior to 1927 all matters related to South Africa's foreign affairs were 
determined by the British Government. Hertzog was Prime Minister 
between 1924 and 1939 and during these years South Africa's bilateral 
relations with Chile remained limited restricted primarily to small-scale 
trade in agricultural produce in exchange for nitrates and phosphates. As a 
result of the decision to join Britain in the Second World War Hertzog 
departed from the South African political scene. Under Smuts, after the 
war, efforts were made to establish direct bilateral relations between South 
Africa and the Latin American countries of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and 
Chile. 
During 1947 Smuts led the way to the establishment of direct diplomatic 
relations with these South American nations.2 Because of the imminent 
independence of numerous non-European British colonies, like India. 
1 E.S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign" Policy, p. 13. 
2 NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no. 38/36. 
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Smuts felt pressurised into making white South Africa more presentable to 
the international community. Because of her racial policies, South Africa 
was increasingly branded as a "homeland of neo-fascism."3 To counter 
such. sentiments, she established relations with the South American 
countries of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. The populations of 
these countries were regarded by the South African Government as 
"bevolk ... van gemengde oorsprong" (people of mixed origins).4 In April 
1948, Stephanus Francois du Toit was appointed as the new South 
African Minister to the mission established in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In 
May 1948 the South African Legation opened in Santiago, Chile, and Du 
Toit was also appointed as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary.5 
* * * * * 
Throughout the period 1902 until 1960, South Africa's domestic and 
foreign policies were dominated by the "constant tension, not only about 
Britain, but also with Britain."6 In essence, the general focus of South 
African affairs was with the power struggle between the English and 
Afrikaans population.7 For the Afrikaner, the struggle, personified by 
Hertzog, was the attainment of national self-determination and a solution 
to the problems of the restless non-white majority.8 
In South Africa between 1902 and 1910, the political scene was 
dominated more by domestic concerns than trying to establish diplomatic 
3 D.P. Wessels, 'Die lnternasionalisering van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika se Posisie in 
die Wereldpolitiek,' INCH, (December 1981 ), p. 69. 
4 M.H.H. Lauw, 'Die Uitwaartse Beweging na Latynse-Amerika,' Suid-Afrikaanse lnstituut 
van lnternasionafe Aange/eenthede Nuusbrief, 2, (May 1969). p. 3. 
5 S.F. du Toil, Home and Abroad, pp. 60-75. 
6 J. Spence, 'South Africa and the Modern World,' in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (ed.), 
Oxford History of South Africa, p. 478. 
7 Ibid., p. 477. 
8 Ibid., p. 480. 
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relations elsewhere. During this period, Britain's main objectives, 
personified by British High Commissioner Lord Milner, were to consolidate 
Boer and Briton and to have the gold mining industry brought to full 
production. Milner introduced Anglicization policies, encouraged British 
farmers to immigrate to the rural areas, limited the use of the Dutch 
language and stressed the advantages of Boer-Briton cooperation.9 
General Louis Botha became Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa 
in May 1910. He dedicated his mission to the process of reconciliation 
between Briton and Boer. In an effort to heal the wounds of the South 
African War, Botha appointed a ministry that gave equal representation to 
both Boer and Briton. The cabinet of the Union essentially consisted of two 
camps, the South African and Unionist Parties.10 Both parties liked the 
idea of a single nation, dominated by the white man, the enforcement of a 
"native policy," material development and economic prosperity. However, 
none of these parties were too perturbed about granting special protection 
to the Afrikaner and as a result, Hertzog showed strong opposition to 
these parties. He fought bitterly to ensure that Dutch and English received 
equal status in business and for a bilingual public service. He was also 
bitterly opposed to British Imperialism and he had no qualms about 
expressing these views publicly. He furthermore, condemned Botha and 
Smuts' policy of reconciliation and advocated South African nationalism.11 
As a result of Hertzog's continual attacks on Botha's policies, he had 
Hertzog expelled from his cabinet in 1912. Hertzog abandoned the South 
African Party and established a new outfit, the National Party in 1914.12 
9 Davenport, South Africa, pp. 225-228. 
10 R. de Villiers, 'Afrikaner Nationalism,' in Wilson and Thompson (ed.), Oxford History of 
South Africa, pp. 368-369. 
11 Ibid., pp. 368-370. 
12 S.J. Schoeman, 'Die J.B.M. Hertzog-Versameling,' Archives News, 8, 10, (April 1966), 
p. 21. 
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During the early years of Union, the country's scope of external affairs was 
confined to Britain. South Africa, like the British Dominions of Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand were regarded in international law as colonial 
portions of the mother country. This in effect meant that all diplomatic 
activity was conducted via the channels provided by the British Foreign 
Office. Within South Africa, the Prime Minister's Office and the Office of 
the Governor General, who represented the British Government, handled 
the external affairs of the Union.13 
During the period 1910 to 1920, General Smuts was the Union's Minister 
of Defence. His responsibilities were to establish and maintain the Union's 
defence forces and cadets. He was also required to exercise control over 
all imports, exports, as well as the sale and acquisition of arms and 
ammunition. Smuts was Minister of Defence for the duration of World War 
I, and convinced Prime Minister Botha to declare war on the Central 
Powers and offer aid to Britain. In April 1915 in his capacity as Minister of 
Defence, Smuts was able to restrict the release and subsequent 
publication of the events surrounding the sinking of the German cruiser, 
Dresden, by the British squadron Kent, Orama and Glasgow, off the 
Chilean coast. 14 By restricting the publication of this event in the South 
African newspapers, Smuts prevented this information from reaching the 
South African anti-British enclave. 
As Minister of Defence, Smuts was one of the first South Africans to read 
the memorandum of January 1917 that was compiled by the British War 
Office, and distributed to the Dominions' secretaries of defence 
Governments, concerning the activities of the Germans in South America, 
in general, and in Chile, in particular. Smuts convinced Louis Botha to 
refuse the sale of coal to the Chilean coke-company, Compania 
13 Public Records Office information leaflets on roles of the Foreign and Colonial Offices 
in London. 
14 NAR, SAD, GG 663, file no.: 9/87/13: War 1914-1915. Report from the Colonial Office 
re sinking of German cruiser, 16 April 1915. 
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Carbonffera de Funcidi6n Schwager in fear that it would be used in the 
manufacture of weapons.15 In September 1918, a second separate 
incident occurred when Smuts refused to allow Chilean Don Felipe 
Santiago Fonck to obtain his dividends .from his E.R.P.M. (Pty) Ltd. 
shares. Smuts arranged for this money to be confiscated. A portion of it 
was paid to the Public Trustee in London and the rest into the Custodian 
of Enetny Property in Pretoria.16 By carrying out this move, Smuts was 
complying fully with the 1918 agreement which Britain and the United 
States had signed. ln this agreement both the U.S. and Britain agreed not 
to trade nor have liaisons of any sort, with countries or their nationals that 
were considered to be pro-German. Such countries were listed on both the 
U.S. Enemy and the British Statutory Lists and Chile was one of them. 
Smuts' loyalty to Britain and her cause caused strain in South Africa's 
bilateral relations with Chile because she adamantly remained neutral. 
During 1916 and 1917, the South African State Mining Commission was 
appointed and instructed to obtain information on the state-owned mining 
operations of the non-British territory, Chile, which was targetted because 
she had decided to remain neutral in the war. Smuts acknowledged that 
gold mines were the Union's pulse and their efficiency was also vital to the 
British Empire. Although consent was given from the Prime Minister's 
Office to approach Chile for similar information, this was done only after 
Britain had given her consent via the Governor General Viscount Buxton. 
Nevertheless, despite all the precautions taken Chile did not provide the 
commission with any information about her mining potential. 17 
15 NAR, SAD, GG 589, file no.: 9/27/273: War 1914-1918. Correspondence re Refusal to 
sell coal, 16 March 1917. 
16 NAR, SAD, GG 566, file no.: 9/27/273. E.R.P.M. shares, September 1918. 
17 NAR, SAD, Commission on State Mining (henceforth K70), vol. 1: State Mining 
Commission Minutes 26 January 1916 to 8 December 1917. Minutes of the Second 
meeting, 4 October 1916. 
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After the First World War, the United States emerged as a dominant 
power, the inter-war period saw the United States' upsurge displacing 
Britain and Germany in foreign investment and trade. Not only was 
Britain's position as the world's commercial power being threatened by the 
United States, for it also hit her colonies. At the end of the war, the position 
of self-governing Dominions such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia and 
South Africa were altered in the direction of full statehood under 
international law.18 In 1919, representatives of the British Dominions 
signed the Peace of Versailles. Botha and Smuts signed this treaty on 
behalf of South Africa. The signing of the treaty coincided with South 
Africa's entry into the League of Nations. Since Britain guaranteed 
permission for the Dominions to sign all treaties on behalf of their 
governments, these dominions achieved a higher status. 19 From 1919 
onwards, the dominions were allowed to consider and ratify treaties 
separately and were no longer considered as subordinate to Britain. 
Hertzog who had become Prime Minister in 1924, insisted that the 
possession of sovereign independence should be put in writing and in 
1926 the Balfour Declaration was drawn up. 20 
In response to this declaration, Hertzog set in motion the process for the 
establishment of the Department of External Affairs in June 1927. From 
1927 until 1953, each Prime Minister held the portfolio of Minister of 
External Affairs. During Hertzog's combined term as Prime Minister and 
Minister of External Affairs, he exerted efforts to have South Africa 
acknowledged in Europe and United States, by establishing South African 
Legations in The Hague, Rome and Washington.21 In 1931, the Statute of 
18 G.C. Oliver, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in D. Worrall (ed.), South Africa: 
Government and Politics, p. 286. 
19 Ibid., p. 287. 
20 Ibid. 
21 J. Barratt, 'The Department of Foreign Affairs,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and 
Politics, pp. 332-333. 
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Westminster stated Britain's acceptance of the Commonwealth Concept 
as was promulgated in the Balfour Declaration. Hertzog proliferated by 
appointing more South African representatives in Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, 
Brussels and Lisbon.22 
During Hertzog's term as Minister of External Affairs between 1924 and 
1939, bilateral relations between Chile and South Africa were meagre. His 
disinterest in South America, in general, and Chile, in particular, was 
illustrated by four actions. The first was the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with European nations and the United States. Secondly, in 
October 1931, Chile and Britain signed the Provisional Commercial 
Agreement in which both countries agreed to give each other favourable 
treatment with regards to customs and excise costs on their products. 
Chile wanted this agreement to be extended to the British Dominions. 
However, the South African Government refused to be a part as they were 
of the opinion that there were no benefits for the Union. Therefore, in 
response to the South African Government's attitude, Britain advised Chile 
to forge independent agreements with each of the Dominions. The third 
incident was the resignation of the Chilean Honorary Consulate Arthur 
Dennison Hinde in 1932. Hinde had served officially in this position for 
seventeen years. Hertzog made no effort to encourage the appointment of 
another person to this post. He believed that the Union's small-scale 
relations with Chile, perseveringly looked after by Hinde, were structures 
which Britain rather than South Africa put into place to allow the United 
Kingdom to remain one of Chile's chief trading partners. Fourthly, in 1934 
in a Chilean expedition under Francisco Landerstoy, the Chilean Under 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, visited South Africa with the intention of 
extending commercial ties with the Union. His delegation was not received 
too enthusiastically by the South African Government. It proposed the 
establishment of a direct shipping line between the two countries. 
22 Olivier, 'South African Foreign Policy,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, p. 288. 
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However, the South Africans turned down the proposal as they felt there 
was not much to gain from such a venture. Despite these views, in 1948 
during the last months of Prime Minister Smuts' term, the South African 
Government set the wheels in motion and in November of the same year, 
a shipping line was created between the two countries. 
In 1939 when hostilities broke out in Europe, all South Africa's missions, 
except for Stockholm and Lisbon were closed, and the war drove a rift into 
the South African political scene.23 According to the Balfour Declaration, 
the Dominions were not obliged to side with Britain in the war. 
Nevertheless, because of Smuts' view that South Africa had a common 
destiny with Britain and had obtained a mandate from the white South 
African voters to participate in the war, declared war against Germany 
after Hertzog resigned in 1939. General Smuts' reason for involving South 
Africa in the Second World War was to secure South Africa's position in 
the British Commonwealth. As a result of Hertzog's resignation General 
Smuts became Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs for the 
period 1939 to 1948 and South African-Chilean relations were determined 
by Smuts' loyalty to Britain. 
During World War II, because of Chile remaining neutral until early in 
1943, Smuts was reluctant to renew Chile's consular relations with the 
Union. As Smuts was a major role player in the South African National 
Party, he encouraged the South African Department of External Affairs to 
allow Chile to resume her consular relations with the Union. In 1937 a 
South African resident, Dora Marais, was appointed as the Chilean 
Honorary Consul though she stayed there until her resignation in 1938. 
Her appointment maybe fitted to the favourable British Foreign Office 
reports that were distributed to the Dominions in the hope that they would 
23 Barratt, 'Foreign Affairs,' in Worrall (ed.), Government and Politics, p. 333. 
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be attracted to establish and strengthen commercial ties with this South 
American nation. 
During the period 1939 to 1942, no recorded trade was exchanged 
between Chile and South Africa. In February 1943 when Chile had 
declared war on the Axis powers, Smuts welcomed the appointment of 
Edmund Rogelio Piffre as career consul for Chile. However, as a result of 
an incident in July 1943, when Piffre was arrested at the Mozambican 
border with no form of identification, the issue became embarrassing for 
both the South African and Chilean Governments and consular relations 
were abandoned until 1948. Nevertheless, despite the abandonment of 
consular relations from the middle of 1943, South Africa and Chile did 
have small-scale commercial relations during the later war years once 
Smuts was ultimately convinced that Chile was on the side of the Allies. 
At the end of the war, the world order had changed dramatically. Many 
states that had been under colonial rule challenged and revolted against 
their mother countries. Anti-colonial sentiments, and condemnation of 
racial discrimination characterized world opinion.24 These attitudes were 
directed towards the Union of South Africa with its colour bar on the non-
whites. 
Before though, in 1940 Prime Minister Smuts hoped that the Union would 
take its "rightful place as leader in pan-African development, and in the 
shaping of future policies and events in. . . [the] vast continent."25 
However, in 1946 at the first meeting of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, Smuts received violent criticisms from the Indian and 
Soviet delegations on South Africa's racial policies.26 Increasingly after the 
24 Spence, 'South Africa and the Modern World,' in Wilson and Thompson (ed.), Oxford 
History of South Africa, p. 506. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 508. 
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war, Smuts felt it was vital for South Africa to be accepted by the 
international community to effectively function as a member of the British 
Commonwealth.27 In order to eliminate these criticisms levelled against 
South Africa for solely promoting the interests of the Europeans, Smuts 
made arrangements for consular and diplomatic involvements with nations. 
not on the European continent. In order to win the support of the 
international community, Smuts encouraged the establishment of bilateral 
relations between South Africa and the South American countries of Brazil, 
Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. During the period 1947 to May 1948 direct 
bilateral relations were established with three of these countries. Uruguay 
was the only one not to reciprocate by sending a representative to South 
Africa. The incentives for establishing relations with these South American 
countries were several. The first incentive was the favourable reports 
compiled by the British ambassadors serving in these countries distributed 
to the various Dominions. The second reason was to convince the 
international community that the South African Government was not solely 
European-orientated in either her foreign or domestic policies. The third 
reason was to establish diplomatic relations with countries on the globe 
whose people were of mixed race in order to prove to countries like India 
and the Soviet Union that her policies were not racist. The fourth and final 
reason was that Smuts wanted to gain Britain's approval by the 
establishment of bilateral relations with these South American nations. 
Eventually in May 1948, all of these factors led to the opening of the South 
African Legation in Santiago, headed by Stephanus Francois du Toit.28 
27 Ibid. 
28 NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36: Foreign Legations and Consuls. 
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THE ROLE OF WORLD POWERS IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN-CHILEAN BILATERAL RELATIONS, 
1795-1948. 
The period selected for investigation begins with the impact of the 
Napoleonic Wars and Britain's industrialisation. Throughout the period 
1795 to 1948, the bilateral relations between Chile and South Africa were 
small scale. When relations did occur, be they diplomatic or commercial, it 
was due to or in response to both nations' relationship with the 
international community. The period chosen not only traces Chile-South 
African bilateral relations but, also marks Britain's rise as a world power, 
her position under threat from Germany, and finally to the devolution of her 
world power status to the United States beginning after the First World 
War and intensifying and eventually collapsing after World War II. 
The approach adopted by the author of this thesis is vastly different from 
that of D.C.M. Platt who has been one of the few authors to mention Chile 
and South Africa in the same works. In his book, The Cinderella Service. 
British Consuls since 1825 he describes in detail the various experiences 
of British officials working in consulates around the world.1 The first half of 
his book describes and discusses conditions in the British Consular 
Service in the nineteenth century, while the second part deals with similar 
issues experienced by officials in the twentieth century. The topics which 
are addressed include the functions, recruitment of officials, training 
received, service conditions, salaries, promotions, incentives,and the 
subordinate relationship of the consuls with the Foreign Office. Platt 
describes the experiences of the different British officials who occupied 
posts on behalf of the British Government around the world. Thus, the 
British honorary consul established in Chile is mentioned and the 
experiences of British subjects appointed as honorary consuls for other 
governments in the British colonies are addressed. The main aim of his 
1 D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825. 
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work is to give a grim-gram account of the sufferings endured by consuls 
in these outlandish corners of the globe. Concern with the plight of Latin 
Americans is totally absent. 
In a chapter entitled "Trade Competition in the Regions of Recent 
Settlement" in a combined work by authors D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham 
and R. Michie, Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas Trade, 1873-
1914, Platt elaborates on Britain's trade experiences with areas of 
European settlement such as Canada, South Africa, Australia, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Chile and Brazil. Once Britain's trade commitments to India, the 
United States of America and Continental Europe began to decrease, she 
shifted to these areas of European settlement and they became her chief 
trading partners.2 My work, on the other hand, specifically concentrates on 
the bilateral diplomatic and consular relations which Chile and South Africa 
had during the period 1795 to 1948. It provides a more in-depth and 
systematic approach to the subject than has been attempted before. This 
thesis intensely examines the influence of international and domestic 
factors and personalities on bilateral relations between Chile and South 
Africa. 
Both countries during the period of study experienced domestic and 
external upheavals and challenges. Chile broke away from her colonial 
master, Spain, and became an independent country in 1818. During the 
nineteenth century, she traded extensively with Britain and her economy 
was on the export-import model with the majority of the merchants as well 
as the shipping companies being British. In fact, this sovereign country 
became an unofficial or informal British coiony. Her wealthy landowners 
and mining elite were bourgeois and were the major beneficiaries of 
Chilean trade with Britain. During the 1800s, she sold raw agricultural 
produce, coal and nitrates to Britain in exchange for manufactured goods 
2 D.C.M. Platt, A.J.H. Latham and R. Michie, Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas 
Trade, 1873-1914, pp. 91-129. 
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such as British linen, crockery and leather. Between 1818 and 1881, all 
the Chilean presidents did their utmost to satisfy and meet the needs of 
the British marine merchants in order to please the powerful sectors of the 
Chilean bourgeois who were. thoroughly integrated into the British 
enclave.3 This resulted in trade occurring between Chile and the British 
colonies, like Australia and the Cape Colony. 
However, in 1886 Jose Balmaceda became President and he disliked the 
hold which the British had over the Chilean economy. As a consequence 
of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), in which Chile defeated Peru and 
Bolivia, the subsequent treaties drawn up gave Chile the provinces of 
Tarapaca and Antafogasta and the monopoly of the nitrate industry. Britain 
was naturally attracted to the economic potential of the nitrate industry but 
had a new competitor to deal with in the shape of Germany. However, 
Balmaceda was xenophobic and particularly anti-British. Once he became 
president he undertook determined campaigns to "Chileanize" the nitrate 
industry as well as other sectors of the national economy.4 The only 
foreigners who were permitted to invest in the nitrate industry were the 
Germans. In 1891, Chile's wealthy bourgeois classes in league with British 
mine-owners overthrew Balmaceda and put in his place a government that 
would adhere to their needs and preferences.5 
During the 1890s until the 191 Os there prevailed a rather turbulent period 
in Chilean political history as many governments took power and were 
replaced. The presidents who remained in office longest were those who 
satisfied the wishes of the ruling classes. Such leaders did their utmost to 
maintain and strengthen relations with Britain and her colonies. However, 
3C. Veliz, Historia de la marina mercante de Chile, pp. 58-60. 
4C. Pregger-Roman, 'Class and Politics,' LAP, 18, 1, (1991), p. 137. 
5C. Pregger-Roman, 'Origin and Development of the bourgeoisie,' LAP, 1 o, 2 and 3, 
(1983), pp. 52-53. 
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during this period there began to emerge a sector of the Chilean 
population that was German and retained strong affiliations to Germany. 
During the period 1890 to 1914, Germany became Chile's second largest 
trading partner. As a consequence of this German enclave and its 
affiliations, when both world wars broke out, the Chilean population was 
divided as to whom they should support.6 It is thus small wonder that the· 
Chilean Government generally opted to remain neutral in the conflicts. In 
World War I, Chile's neutral stance damaged her economy severely as 
both Britain and, eventually, the United States, placed trade embargoes 
and blacklisted Chilean products. In the Second World War, Chile initially 
chose to remain neutral, but was pressurised to abandon her stance once 
the United States entered the War in December 1941. These international 
conflicts and Britain's reactions towards Chile had a severe effect on the 
bilateral relations with Britain's colonies, particularly the Union of South 
Africa. 
Like Chile, South Africa was also classed as a periphery nation in 
comparison to Britain, the countries of North Western Europe and United 
States who formed the centre.7 In Chilean history Britain played an 
influential part in its course, while in South Africa the major historical 
events during the period 1795 to 1948 also occurred because of Britain's 
participatory role. The first British occupation of the Cape in 1795 occurred 
shortly after Napoleon had invaded the Netherlands. Britain was worried 
that the route to the East would fall into French hands and thus arranged 
for a take-over. The Cape was returned to Batavian Rule in 1803, but in 
1806 when the British realised that the Netherlands Government was 
actually a French ally, they arranged for a re-occupation of the Cape and 
then remained on the continent until the 1960s. Britain and her appointed 
officials at the Cape and later Natal colonies significantly influenced major 
South African historical events, as well as bilateral relations with Chile. 
6G. McCuthchen McBride, Chile: Land and Society, pp. 283-284. 
7V. Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p. 156. 
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These officials and Britain herself were largely responsible for the 
migration of thousands of Boers further into the interior of South Africa as 
they attempted to escape from the pressures and restraints which they felt 
the British imposed on them. During the 1850s as a result of these ·. 
migrations four separate territories were established, those being the 
Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal (South African Republic). 
Each of these territories had their own involvements with Chile which were 
all rather small, and involved trade of products like barley, wheat and 
nitrates. 
Britain and her officials also became major contenders and contributors to 
the South African diamond and gold mining industry during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Britain's interest and pressure in the gold mining 
industry was one of the factors that provoked the South African War 
(1899-1902). The second factor was that Germany began to threaten 
Britain's position on the southern African continent, particularly with the 
annexation of German South West Africa. The South African War had an 
impact on the Chilean population and created a division between those 
who supported the Boers' cause and those who supported Britain. The 
pro-Boer enclave supplied arms, ammunition, horses and other livestock 
to the Boers. Meanwhile, the pro-British enclave supplied food, livestock 
and other war materials to the British forces fighting in South Africa. 
The South African War was won by the British and eventually in 1910, the 
four separate territories became one under the Union of South Africa. The 
Union's foreign policy from 1910 until 1926 was determined by the British 
Foreign Office in London. As South Africa was a British Colony, she had to 
adhere to the policies and instructions of London. 
Two South African personalities, Jan Smuts and James Barry Munnik 
Hertzog, and their individual attitudes concerning relations with Britain, had 
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ramifications when it came to South Africa's bilateral relations with Chile. 
Smuts, for example, believed that it was essential for South Africa to be an 
integral part of the British Empire and accordingly respected and adhered 
to Britain's wishes. Smuts only pursued commercial and diplomatic 
relations with nations who were in good standing with Britain. This was 
particularly evident in both world wars when Chile wanted to remain 
neutral. In World War II shortly after Chile declared war on the Axis 
Powers in 1942, in his capacity as both Prime Minister and Minister of 
External Affairs, Smuts immediately granted permission for the resumption 
of a Chilean Consulate in South Africa which had been vacant since 1938. 
Hertzog, on the other hand was a different kettle of fish. He was bitterly 
opposed to Britain's hold over South Africa and tried everything in his 
power to allow South Africa to become an independent entity, without 
having to answer to Britain. In 1924 when Hertzog became Prime Minister 
he immediately set the wheels in motion to have a document written by the 
British Government which allowed the British Dominions to be more 
autonomous. A certain degree of autonomy was evident when at the end 
of the First World War, South Africa, like Britain's other Dominions, was 
allowed to sign the Treaty of Versailles alongside Britain. This in effect 
meant that the international community no longer regarded these countries 
as subordinate to Britain. In 1926 after much pressure from Hertzog, the 
British Government drew up the Balfour Declaration. In 1931, this 
declaration was published and approved. It became known as the famous 
Statute of Westminster. Following up the 1926 Balfour Declaration, 
Hertzog established the South African Department of External Affairs that 
opened in June 1927. Hertzog regarded the portfolio of Minister for 
External Affairs to be of such major importance and so assigned it to 
himself. From 1927 until 1953, the portfolio of Minister of External Affairs 
was always assigned to the Prime Minister of the day. The Balfour 
Declaration allowed the dominions to determine their own foreign policies 
but within reason. Hertzog's attitude towards Britain and his admiration for 
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Western European countries, like Germany, and the United States played 
an important role in the South African-Chilean relations during his terms as 
Prime Minister. Hertzog's focus was more towards Europe and the United 
States, than to peripheral areas like Latin America. 
At the end of World War II, Britain lost her world power status to the United 
States and her colonial empire began crumbling with more and more 
colonies wanting their independence. Not only was Britain no longer a 
major contender on the world centre stage but, the international 
community had also changed. South African Prime Minister Smuts, a · 
major contributor to the establishment of the United Nations, hoped that 
after the war South Africa would be able to play a central role in pan-
African development. Instead he was faced with an international 
community which severely criticised racial policies for which he was not 
responsible. South Africa was faced with harsh attacks from countries, 
such as India and the Soviet Union. In order to alleviate these attacks, to 
convince the international community that South Africa was not only 
interested in having relations with European countries and the United 
States, and not to discredit Britain, Jan Smuts encouraged G. Heaton 
Nichols, South African High Commissioner in London, to encourage the 
establishment of direct diplomatic bilateral relations with the officials 
stationed in London in the Latin American countries such as Brazil, 
Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. The inhabitants of these countries were 
described by officials of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs as 
"gemengde volk" (mixed race) and were regarded as a good means of 
camouflaging their racial policies. 8 Between 1946 and May 1948, South 
African missions and legations were established in these four countries. 
8M.H.H. Louw, 'Uitwaarste Beweging na Latyns-Amerika,' Su)d-Afrikaanse lnstituut vir 
lnternasionale Aangeleenthede Nuusbrief, 2, (May 1969), p. 3. 
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Similar structures were placed in South Africa by the Brazilian, Argentine 
and Chilean Governments but, not Uruguay.9 
South African-Chilean bilateral relations remained small scale throughout 
our period. One of the reasons which was highlighted by Lesley Boyd of 
Anglo American during his visit to Chile in August 1993. "The one 
disadvantage of Chile was it is on the wrong side of South America and 
this adds to shipping costs."10 Although, from 1801 accounts of 
merchandise traded between the Cape and Latin America can be located, 
it is only in 1867 when direct diplomatic relations were established 
between Chile and South Africa. During the 1860s when Britain was 
undoubtedly Chile's chief trading partner and the Conservative 
Government, under President Jose Perez, who wished to maintain and 
strengthen these relations, gave Britain permission to establish an 
honorary Chilean consulate in Cape Town in 1867 and another one in Port 
Elizabeth in 1869. These consulates were filled by officials living in the 
Cape Colony who were appointed by Britain._ The officials selected for this 
job were prominent businessmen from the Cape Colony. Despite being 
selected by Britain, these officials received their salaries for their consular 
duties from Chile. In 1886 when President Balmaceda came to power, he 
refused to renew consular relations whenever these posts became vacant. 
The resumption of Chilean consular relations in South Africa were only 
really reactivated from 1912. Between 1892 and 1912 the reasons for the 
break in relations were factors both in Chile and in South Africa. In Chile 
once Balmaceda had been removed from power in 1891, the British 
Government remained sceptical about Chilean loyalties towards Britain. 
Secondly, Britain feared that the anti-British lobby in Chile would attempt 
to aid the Boer republics in their ordeal against Britain. 
'Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and Swaziland, No. 24 of 1948, pp. 1241-1243. 
1
°Citizen, 30 August 1993. 
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In 1915 the Chilean honorary consulate was finally established with the 
appointment of Arthur Dennison Hinde who served in this portfolio until his 
resignation in 1932. Despite bureaucratic bungling with his initial 
appointment, he served the Chilean Government during many changes 
and wars, and was often faced with the task of negotiating for Chile when 
its policies conflicted with those of Britain, such as in World War I when 
Chile remained neutral. Hinde was assigned the task of trying to obtain 
money and shares of Chileans who had investments in South Africa. 
However, because. of Britain's wartime propaganda campaign to have 
Chile branded as pro-German, he was unable to aid these Chileans 
properly. Nevertheless, during Hinde's term he managed to facilitate small 
scale trade agreements between Chile and South Africa. During his period 
South Africa exported fruit trees and agricultural products to Chile in 
exchange for nitrates and phosphates. The two countries also exchanged 
their knowledge and expertise on mining and agriculture. 
During the 1930s and until 1942, South African-Chilean diplomatic 
relations and commercial relations were minimal and somewhat 
restrained. The are several reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, during 
the 1930s South African Prime Minister Hertzog was in power and, as 
already mentioned, also the Minister of External Affairs, and he regarded 
South Africa's relations with Chile to be a British move. Secondly, Hertzog 
was also more interested in having South Africa recognized in Europe and 
United States and thus, sent foreign representatives to The Hague, Paris, 
Berlin and Washington rather than to Latin America. Thirdly, the general 
attitude of the South African Government during the 1930s was that Chile 
was of no importance as a consumer of South African products and that 
the Union had nothing to gain by establishing trade agreements with 
Chile. 11 The fourth factor relates to World War II when Minister Smuts was 
11NAR, SAD, HEN 4430, file no.: 791/42: Trade Relations and· treaties: United Kingdom 
and Chile. Correspondence between Secretary for External Affairs and Secretary of 
Mines and Industries, 20-25 september 1931. 
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in power 1n South Africa. Smuts was very pro-Britain and strongly 
encouraged the Union to assist in the war. At the beginning of the Second 
World War, Chile decided to remain neutral and because of Smuts' loyalty, 
he did not encourage Chile to renew its consular post once it was vacated 
by Dora Marais. She served in this portfolio between 1937 and 1938. 
This situation however, changed in 1942 when Chile also decided to 
declare war on Germany and Japan. Wheels were set in motion and 
Edmund Rogelio Piffre was appointed as honorary consul but did not last 
long. His aftermath was so bad that in October 1943 when Carlos Casto 
Ruiz applied for the post of Chilean Consul, this request was turned down 
by the South African Department of External Affairs. Between 1943 and 
1947 there was once again a lapse of consular relations. However, small 
scale trade did occur between the two nations.12 
Immediately after the Second World War, Britain realised that she was 
losing ground to the United States worldwide. In a desperate attempt to 
rescue her waning commercial empire, particularly in Latin America, 
Britain encouraged her ambassadors and officials to propagate the 
advantages of British trade and to stimulate interest amongst her own 
colonies to become more commercially and diplomatically involved with 
Latin America. Favourable reports were written by British officials stationed 
in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil and Venezuela, which were distributed 
to the various British colonial governments for their attention and 
interest.13 As a result, Prime Minister Smuts responded to these 
favourable reports and plans were initiated with the South African 
Railways and Harbours to investigate the possibility of establishing a direct 
12SANDFA, DC Group 3, file no. 705/2, Chapter 1: Consuls of Foreign Countries 
stationed in the Union, 1942-1948. 
13NAR, SAD, BTS, file no.: 1142/4: Chilean Economic and Financial Matters. Printed 
reports, 1945 to 1946. 
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shipping line between Chile and South Africa to exchange products. 
Eventually in November 1948, as a result of these efforts, Francios du Tait 
established a direct shipping line and a reciprocal trade agreement was 
signed by both countries. This was in spite of the fact that in 1934 there 
were elements in the South African Government who were sceptical about 
such ventures with Chile.14 
Secondly, the whole world order had changed at the end of the Second 
World War, and South Africa became a scape-goat with her racial policies. 
In 1946 when G. Heaton Nichols, the South African High Commissioner 
stationed in London, was approached by four South American delegations 
from Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile about the possibilities of 
establishing direct bilateral diplomatic relations with South Africa, he made 
a comment to Smuts that he feared if South Africa turned these 
delegations away it would be seen in a racial light. Therefore, to avoid 
criticisms, the South African Department of External Affairs under the 
leadership of Smuts began intensive negotiations to establish diplomatic 
relations with these four nations.15 In South Africa in May 1948, Jose 
Serrano Palma was appointed as the Chilean Charge d' Affaires and 
Consulate General. While L. Fernandes-Pinheiro and M.A. Barcena were 
appointed as the Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary for 
Brazil and Argentina respectively. During the same period extending from 
February to May 1948, South Africa, as mentioned, appointed Stephanus 
Francois du Tait as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary 
for both Argentina and Chile, with R.H. Coaton as the South African 
Consulate General in Chile. In Brazil, E.K. Scallan was appointed as the 
South African Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Rio de 
14NAR, SAD, HEN 4317, file no.: 747, vol. 1: Trade with Chile. Trade Relations and 
Treaties. Correspondence between F. du Toil and Prime Minister Jan Smuts, November 
1944. 
15 NAR, SAD, BLO 701, file no.: 38/36. Correspondence betWeen South African High 
Commissioner and Secretary for External Affairs, 16 May 1946. 
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Janeiro, and J.A. Chapman as honorary consul in Sao Paulo; while in 
Uruguay J.G. Malan was appointed as an honorary consul in Montevideo. 
Uruguay did not reciprocate by sending one of her officials to South 
Africa.16 
By the time the National Party under D.F. Malan came to power in May 
1948, Smuts had already established nineteen diplomatic posts abroad, 
with four in South America. Malan did not replace any of the foreign affairs 
staff appointed by his predecessor and he did not interfere with consular 
relations already established. However, he like Hertzog, strove even more 
determinedly to follow an independent foreign policy outside of the British 
Commonwealth, based on anti-Communist and pro-Western ideas. The 
year 1948 marked a watersi1ed in South African-Chilean bilateral relations 
and this was three-fold. Firstly, it marks the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations in both countries. Secondly, it marks the establishment 
of the first direct shipping line between Chile and South Africa; and thirdly, 
both countries entered into a reciprocal trade agreement of their own. 
From the late eighteenth century until the 1970s, both Chile and South 
Africa remained periphery nations who both looked to the Northern 
Hemisphere for markets, investment and economic opportunities. Britain, 
North Western Europe and United States were the chief trading partners of 
both nations. South African-Chilean bilateral relations never featured as a 
major priority to either country's government. It was only from the 1970s 
that this changed when both Chile and South Africa pursued domestic 
policies, which displeased the international community. As a result of 
sanctions and boycotts they were forced to establish and forge firm 
relations under the governments of Pinochet in Chile and P.W. Botha in 
South Africa but, this is a topic on its own. However, suffice to say the 
period 1795 to 1948 demonstrates how both Sol,lth Africa and Chile 
16 Official Yearbook of the Union, No. 24 of 1948, pp. 1241-1243. 
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responded to the tribulations of the international community, the whims of 
the super powers and the effect on their bilateral relations. 
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